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This doctoral dissertation is a collection of papers on foreign entry modes. This introductory 
chapter discusses several background issues. Specifically, section 1.2 defines foreign entry 
modes and briefly reviews those modes that are central to this dissertation. Section 1.3 goes 
into my motives for becoming a Ph.D. student and conducting the research that resulted in 
this dissertation, while section 1.4 gives an overview of the dissertation’s main objectives. In 
section 1.5 I describe the structure of the dissertation. Section 1.6, finally, discusses the most 
important links between the different papers. 
 
1.2. Foreign entry modes 
 
In today’s global business environment, it is often attractive, and sometimes even necessary, 
for firms to sell their goods and/or services in multiple geographical markets. As a result, 
foreign expansions by all kinds of firms are the order of the day. Such expansions can be 
accomplished through various entry modes. A foreign entry mode can be defined as “an 
institutional arrangement that makes possible the entry of a company’s products, technology, 
human skills, management or other resources into a foreign country” (Root, 1998: 5). There 
are many different entry modes, such as licensing, franchising, countertrade, exporting, 
strategic alliances, joint ventures, wholly-owned subsidiaries, greenfield investments, and 
acquisitions1. Some of these entry modes require firms to extend employment contracts to 
individuals located in foreign countries, i.e. to undertake foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Firms that have engaged in such investment are called ‘multinational enterprises’ (MNEs). 
They own and control value-adding activities in more than one country (Dunning, 1993), and 
have employees abroad (Hennart, 2000). 
The entry modes that are central to this dissertation are greenfield investments, 
acquisitions, and – to a lesser extent – exporting. A greenfield investment is an investment by 
an MNE in a new foreign affiliate that has to be built from scratch, either by the MNE alone 
or with the help of one or more (local) equity partners. Greenfield investments, or briefly 
greenfields, are also referred to as internal developments (e.g., Yip, 1982), direct entries 
(Chatterjee, 1990), new ventures (e.g., Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995), de novo entries (e.g., 
Sharma, 1998), and start-ups (e.g., Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). An acquisition or 
takeover, on the other hand, refers to the purchase by an MNE of part or all of the equity of 
an existing foreign firm. Acquisitions can thus be partially and wholly owned as well. Both 
greenfield investments and acquisitions are forms of FDI. 
                                                 
1 Although some scholars (e.g., Killing, 1983; Harrigan, 1988; Hill and Jones, 1998) consider licensing 
agreements and joint ventures to be specific types of strategic alliances, others (e.g., Burgers et al., 1993; Bell, 
1996) consider them to be clearly distinctive modes of entry that should not be grouped together. 
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Exporting, finally, can take place in various ways, i.e. directly from an exporting firm 
to its foreign customers, indirectly through sales agents or distributors located either 
domestically or abroad, or through a local sales subsidiary owned by the exporting firm 
(Albaum et al., 2002; Bell, 1996). In the latter case, the firm undertakes FDI to establish or 




I became interested in international management and foreign entry modes through CentER’s 
research master in Organization and Marketing, which I attended in the final year of my 
studies at Tilburg University. I ended up writing my master’s thesis on the factors that 
determine whether MNEs expand abroad through greenfield investments or acquisitions. It 
turned out that the existing literature had identified a large number of potential determinants, 
and that its empirical results had been rather mixed. These findings later formed the basis for 
the first paper included in this dissertation. 
While writing my master’s thesis, I gradually became aware of the fact that I wanted to 
know more about foreign entry modes and their implications, and that I wanted to test some 
of my – at that time preliminary – ideas myself. This made me decide to apply for a position 




An inherent characteristic of academic research is that it is subject to various constraints, the 
main ones being financial, time, and cognitive ones. This also holds for research into foreign 
entry modes. Although there have been numerous entry mode studies (for a extensive 
overview, see e.g. Datta et al., 2002), each of them has its limitations and is, hence, open to 
improvement2. The general objective of this dissertation is therefore to push forward research 
in the area of foreign entry modes. More specifically, its main goal is to increase our 
scientific understanding of the determinants of foreign entry mode choices and the 
subsequent performance of these entry modes, with a special emphasis on the role of national 
cultural distance and the planned degree of subsidiary autonomy. The reason for focusing on 
the effects of cultural distance and the degree of subsidiary autonomy is that these factors 
have so far been insufficiently – or not at all – related to foreign entry modes and their 
performance. One of the aims of this dissertation is to provide more insight into the exact role 
of these two concepts. 
 
1.5. Structure and content 
 
The papers comprising this dissertation are included in chronological order, with their 
starting date serving as the ordering criterion (cf. Vermeulen, 1999). The first paper (chapter 
2) critically reviews the existing empirical literature on the determinants of an MNE’s choice 
                                                 
2 Obviously, the seriousness of these limitations varies significantly, with some studies meeting high-quality 
standards, and others being open to more serious improvements. 
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of foreign establishment mode, i.e. greenfield investment or acquisition. The reason for doing 
so is that after almost 25 years of research, we still do not have a clear idea of the exact 
factors that drive this choice, as the results of the literature have generally been mixed. In this 
paper we identify the main reasons for this diversity and provide suggestions to guide future 
research3. 
The second paper (chapter 3) examines the effects of national cultural distance, the 
planned degree of subsidiary autonomy, and their interaction on an MNE’s establishment 
mode choice. Previous studies have argued that MNEs prefer greenfields over acquisitions in 
culturally distant countries, because large cultural differences make it difficult to integrate 
acquired subsidiaries. However, these studies have not always found supporting evidence. 
We argue that this is because post-acquisition integration difficulties in culturally distant 
countries are considerably reduced if acquired subsidiaries are allowed to operate 
autonomously, which should make acquisitions in such countries more likely. 
We test this contention on a sample of 246 expansions by Dutch MNEs into 52 
countries, and – after carefully controlling for a variety of other factors that have been found 
to influence establishment mode choices – find that a large cultural distance leads to 
greenfields, but that this relationship is significantly weaker when subsidiaries are granted a 
considerable degree of autonomy. We also find that – keeping cultural distance constant – 
MNEs planning to grant little autonomy to their subsidiaries prefer greenfields, and that this 
is especially true for MNEs that want tight integration in production. 
The third paper (chapter 4) examines the comparative performance of greenfield 
investments and acquisitions, as the limited number of previous studies on this topic have 
used different theoretical arguments to ground their opposing predictions, and have obtained 
mixed results, presumably due to methodological limitations. Analyzing a sample of 210 
foreign expansions by Dutch MNEs, and correcting for these limitations, we find that 
greenfields generally perform worse than acquisitions, but that greenfields outperform 
acquisitions if their parents desire a high degree of subsidiary integration. 
The fourth and final paper (chapter 5) examines the effect of national cultural distance 
on the amount of bilateral merchandise trade between countries. We argue (i) that firms can 
sell their products abroad in two ways, viz. through trade and through local production, (ii) 
that national cultural distance has a stronger negative effect on foreign sales through local 
production than on those through trade, and (iii) that this results in an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between cultural distance and bilateral trade flows. Analyzing a sample of 
bilateral merchandise trade flows between 100 countries in the period 1990-1999, and 
controlling for the traditional variables that have been found to affect these flows, such as the 
combined size and level of economic development of the trading countries, and their 
geographic distance, we indeed find that the amount of bilateral trade between countries first 
increases and then decreases with cultural distance. 
Chapter 6, finally, presents the overall conclusions of this dissertation. Specifically, it 
summarizes its most important contributions and findings, and offers some suggestions for 
future research. 
 
                                                 
3 Throughout the dissertation, I use the word ‘we’ to indicate that all papers are the result of joint work. 
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1.6. Links between the papers 
 
Although the papers briefly summarized above are separate projects that can be assessed 
independently, they are nevertheless related in several ways4. First of all, the first three 
papers all deal with greenfield investments and acquisitions. In addition, the first and second 
paper both focus on the determinants of an MNE’s choice between these two establishment 
modes. However, while the first one is a review of previous empirical studies, the second 
represents a theoretical and empirical extension of these previous efforts. 
The link between the second, third, and fourth paper is that they are all empirical. 
Moreover, the empirical analyses of both the second and third paper are based on survey data 
on foreign expansions by Dutch MNEs, and both papers emphasize the importance of taking 
into consideration the extent to which an MNE parent intends to integrate the focal expansion 
into its corporate network. The second paper argues that it is important to consider the 
planned degree of subsidiary integration because it influences the strength of the relationship 
between national cultural distance and an MNE’s preference for greenfield investments, 
while the third paper argues that this is important because it determines whether greenfields 
outperform acquisitions or vice versa. 
The fourth paper is also empirical, but its analyses are based on existing, secondary 
data rather than on primary data collected through survey. While it has a different unit of 
analysis, i.e. country pairs rather than individual foreign expansions, and while it focuses on 
trade rather than greenfields and acquisitions, it has in common with the other papers that its 
theoretical arguments are at the firm level and deal with the choice between different foreign 
entry modes, in this particular case that between export and local production. In addition, the 
paper focuses on the effect of national cultural distance, as does the second one. 
                                                 
4 As a result of this relatedness, some paragraphs may closely resemble each other. I have tried to avoid this as 
much as possible. 




GREENFIELD VS. ACQUISITION: A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL 





One important strategic decision faced by multinational enterprises (MNEs) is whether to 
expand abroad through greenfield investments or acquisitions – what we will call the foreign 
establishment mode decision (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995). Yet, after almost 25 years of 
research, we still do not have clear evidence on its exact determinants, as the empirical 
findings have not been as robust as one would wish. In this paper we review the empirical 
literature that has attempted to uncover why MNEs choose to expand abroad through 
greenfields rather than acquisitions with the aim of (1) providing a detailed overview of its 
results (2) identifying the main reasons for their divergence, and (3) presenting guidelines to 
move this research forward. Our paper compliments a recent survey by Shimizu et al. (2004), 
which discussed the various theoretical perspectives on cross-border acquisitions that have 
been used in the literature. 
In the next section we survey the empirical studies on the determinants of an MNE’s 
choice between a greenfield investment and an acquisition, and report their findings. We then 
present the main reasons for the observed divergence in findings. We close with our 
conclusions and recommendations for future research. 
 




MNEs can expand abroad through either greenfield investments or acquisitions. A greenfield 
investment involves building an entirely new facility from scratch. Local inputs are 
purchased in disembodied form and combined into a productive unit with those held by the 
foreign investor (Hennart, 2000). MNEs often establish greenfield investments by sending 
over expatriates who carefully select and hire employees from the local population and 
gradually build up the business (Hofstede, 2001). This can either be done alone or with a 
local partner who is familiar with the local environment. A greenfield investment can thus be 
a wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) or a joint venture (JV). Making an acquisition means 
purchasing part or all of the equity of an existing firm. This implies that acquisitions can be 
partially and wholly owned as well6. 
                                                 
5 This paper is the result of joint work with Jean-François Hennart. 
6 Some studies (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1999) narrow the definition somewhat by 
stating that the amount of equity purchased should be sufficient to confer effective control, meaning that the 
degree of ownership in the affiliate should be sufficient to guarantee that operational and strategic decision-
making power remains with the acquiring firm. We know of no strong theoretical reasons for doing so. 
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Most authors agree that an MNE’s choice between expanding abroad through 
greenfield investment or acquisition is influenced by firm, industry, and country-level factors. 
Below, we will identify some of the theoretically most important ones. 
Firm-level factors. Greenfield entry is generally considered to be more risky than 
entry through acquisition. This is because making an acquisition means buying a going 
concern with a team of managers who are familiar with industry and local market conditions, 
thus reducing the uncertainty about the subsidiary’s future cash flows. A new affiliate, on the 
other hand, has to be built from scratch by bringing together several inputs whose 
combination has not yet proved itself in that particular market. Entry through acquisition thus 
generally means choosing a lower, but more certain expected rate of return (Caves, 1996). It 
also means paying the going-concern value of a business. This only makes sense if the assets 
held by the MNE can be combined with those held by the target without extensive 
modification of the latter (Hennart, 2000). The greater the extent to which the target must be 
re-organized to be valuable to the MNE, the less desirable an acquisition becomes. Extensive 
modification of a subsidiary is needed when an MNE’s advantages consist in firm-specific 
technologies and routines, i.e. technologies and routines which have been developed by a 
particular firm and are specific to it (Hennart and Park, 1993). Because such technologies and 
routines have been elaborated in a specific corporate context, they can only be transferred to 
other firms if the latter first unlearn their existing practices (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; 
Harzing, 2002). If this is the case, MNEs will find it generally more efficient to opt for 
greenfield entry, because this allows them to mold the affiliate to their image from the outset 
(Hennart and Park, 1993). 
The preceding analysis offers a number of testable implications. First, MNEs that want 
to exploit abroad firm-specific technologies and routines should have a clear preference for 
greenfield investments, as such assets are generally difficult to combine with a going concern 
(Hennart and Park, 1993). Second, widely diversified MNEs should prefer acquisitions over 
greenfield investments, because their main advantage consists of general management know-
how embedded in senior management, an advantage which can be relatively easily married 
with acquired subsidiaries quasi-independently managed by local personnel (Hennart, 2000; 
Hennart and Park, 1993). Third, MNEs with little target-country experience and those 
entering new lines of business should also prefer acquisitions because they can acquire tacit 
host-country or product knowledge in this way (Caves, 1996). 
Fourth, since the efficiency of acquisitions hinges on the extent to which modifications 
in their structures, policies, and procedures are required, an MNE’s international strategy 
should influence its choice of establishment mode (Harzing, 2002). Specifically, MNEs 
following a global strategy should generally opt for greenfield investments because they 
strive for a high degree of subsidiary integration, which is easier to realize through 
greenfields, as MNEs can then transfer their latest production technologies and organize their 
affiliates to their preferences without having to deal with existing structures, policies, and 
procedures. MNEs pursuing a multidomestic strategy, on the other hand, should prefer to 
make acquisitions and to leave them largely unchanged, so as to obtain the tacit local market 
knowledge needed to be locally responsive. 
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Finally, since acquisitions come with their own cadre of managers, and since there is a 
limit to the number of new managers an MNE can recruit and train in a given period of time 
(Penrose, 1959), subsidiaries with a large minimum efficient scale (MES) are more likely to 
be acquired than built up from scratch, because this saves on valuable managerial resources 
(Caves and Mehra, 1986). 
Industry-level factors. A major difference between greenfield and acquisition entry is 
that the former increases local supply, which reduces prices and profits and may therefore 
provoke a competitive response from incumbents (Caves and Mehra, 1986). Such a response 
is more likely if an industry is growing slowly, and if it is concentrated, as greenfield entry 
will lead to a large increase in supply and therefore to a large reduction in prices and profits. 
If an industry is growing rapidly and/or is highly competitive, on the other hand, the supply-
increasing features of greenfields are less of a problem, as each incumbent’s profit is hardly 
affected in this case. This should make greenfield investments more tolerable for incumbents 
and, hence, more likely. 
However, building a subsidiary from scratch takes time, and this delay may result in 
high foregone profits if an industry is growing very rapidly (Caves and Mehra, 1986). This 
suggests that MNEs will opt for acquisitions rather than greenfields if an industry is either 
growing very slowly (so as to avoid competitive responses) or very rapidly (so as to avoid 
foregone profits) (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Hennart and Park, 1993). 
Country-level factors. A number of country-level factors should also affect an MNE’s 
establishment mode choice. One of these is the cultural distance between the home country of 
the MNE and the country entered (Kogut and Singh, 1988). The cultural risks and costs 
associated with greenfields are generally considered to be limited, because the MNE’s 
management can introduce its practices from the outset by carefully selecting employees who 
fit its national culture (Hofstede, 2001; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). The cultural risks 
and costs associated with foreign acquisitions, on the other hand, can be considerable due to 
incompatibilities between the practices of the MNE and those of the acquired unit. In general, 
the larger the cultural distance between two countries, the larger the difference in 
organizational practices (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Larimo, 2003). This suggests that MNEs 
are more likely to choose greenfields than acquisitions when they enter culturally distant 
countries. However, this should only be the case when the MNE plans to integrate the 
subsidiary into its corporate network. Otherwise, there will be little interaction between the 
two entities, and post-acquisition integration problems resulting from incompatible practices 
should not occur (Hofstede, 2001; Neal, 1998). Hence, a large cultural distance should lead to 
greenfields, but only in the case of integrated subsidiaries.  
          All the theoretically important firm, industry, and country-level factors discussed so far 
have been strategic ones. However, there are also important institutional factors that influence 
an MNE’s establishment mode choice, especially at the country level7. The most important of 
these are the absence of local takeover targets and the presence of barriers to acquisition. In 
particular, when there are no suitable takeover targets, as is often the case in small or 
developing countries (Caves, 1996), or when host-governments restrict or prohibit foreign 
acquisitions (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995), greenfield investments are often the only 
                                                 
7 By institutional factors we mean factors that restrict MNEs in choosing their preferred establishment mode. 
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possible form of foreign direct investment (FDI). As we will show below, the effects of these 
factors should not be underestimated, and their presence should carefully be accounted for, 
which – unfortunately – has not always been the case. 
 
2.2.2. Empirical studies 
 
Compared to research on the choice of ownership structure for foreign subsidiaries (JV vs. 
WOS), there has been relatively little empirical work on the factors influencing an MNE’s 
foreign establishment mode choice (Hennart et al., 1996; Tatoglu and Glaister, 1998). In this 
review we focus on the empirical literature on the determinants of an MNE’s choice between 
a greenfield investment and an acquisition. We thus exclude purely theoretical contributions 
and modeling efforts (e.g., Buckley and Casson, 1998; Görg, 2000), as well as studies dealing 
with issues like the sequential foreign entry process (e.g., Chang, 1995) and the effect of 
entry mode choices on subsequent foreign subsidiary performance (e.g., Li, 1995). Through 
an extensive keyword search in ABI/Inform Global and our knowledge of other relevant 
studies in the field, we identified a total of 23 empirical studies on this topic. 
However, several of these studies consider the choice of establishment mode and that 
of ownership structure simultaneously, while it can in fact be argued that these two choices 
should be studied independently because they are conceptually different and cover different 
aspects of FDI. Specifically, while the choice of establishment mode mainly depends on the 
extent to which an effective combination of MNE and local assets would require changes in 
the foreign subsidiary, the choice of ownership structure largely depends on the need for 
control over the subsidiary’s assets (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988). If an MNE decides to opt 
for shared ownership, for example because it needs only a selection of another firm’s non-
marketable assets (Hennart, 1988), it can either choose a greenfield JV or a partial 
acquisition. Even if the MNE opts for a greenfield because the subsidiary needs to closely 
resemble its parent, it can still share the greenfield’s ownership in order to obtain the 
committed supply of complementary assets8. Hence, the two decisions are independent of 
each other. Not surprisingly, the bulk of the empirical evidence supports this view, since it 
finds that greenfields and acquisitions are equally likely to be JVs (Hennart and Park, 1993; 
Hennart et al., 1996; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). Moreover, combining the two choices 
results in different entry mode categories and, hence, in results that are not directly 
comparable to those of other studies. For these reasons we excluded the following studies 
from our review: (1) Kogut and Singh (1988), Anand and Delios (1997), and Chang and 
Rosenzweig (2001), who examine the determinants of an MNE’s choice between (full and 
partial) acquisition, greenfield JV, and wholly-owned greenfield; (2) Shaver (1998), who 
distinguishes between the same three entry modes, but excludes greenfield JVs; (3) Hennart 
and Reddy (1997), who analyze the choice between greenfield JV and full acquisition; and 
(4) Meyer (1998), who distinguishes between four entry modes (wholly-owned greenfield, 
greenfield JV, partial acquisition, and full acquisition), and examines what factors make 
MNEs prefer each of these entry modes over the other three. We also excluded Vermeulen 
and Barkema (2001) because their sample consists of a mix of domestic and foreign 
                                                 
8 This was for example the case for Diamond-Star, the Mitsubishi-Chrysler JV in Illinois. 
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expansions, and Anand and Delios (2002) because their unit of analysis is the industry 
entered rather than an individual expansion. We are thus left with 15 comparable studies on 
the determinants of an MNE’s establishment mode choice. Table 2.1 provides an overview of 
their main characteristics. The studies are comparable on other aspects as well. First, with the 
exception of Harzing (2002), they all fully rely on objective rather than perceptual measures. 
Second, their samples only contain expansions by manufacturing MNEs9. Third, they 
primarily focus on firm- and industry-level determinants10. Finally, their research method 
consists in building a sample of foreign entries by different MNEs, and in using logit or 
probit to regress a categorical variable (whether an entry was a greenfield investment or an 




Table 2.2 reports the results of the 15 studies, with explanatory variables grouped into firm, 
industry, and country-level variables12. The table shows that a great variety of variables has 
been hypothesized to influence an MNE's foreign establishment mode decision and that 
results have been mixed (cf. Shimizu et al., 2004), with some studies finding a positive 
relationship between a particular variable and an MNE’s propensity to acquire, others finding 
the opposite, and still others obtaining insignificant findings. Reasonably consistent results 
across a large number of studies emerge for only a few variables, viz. the parent’s R&D 
intensity and its degree of product diversity, the (relative) size of the subsidiary, the growth 
rate of the industry it entered, the level of income of the host country, and time. 
In line with the theory outlined in section 2.2.1, R&D intensive MNEs (i.e., MNEs 
with a high R&D expenditures to sales ratio, a rather rough proxy for firm-specific assets) 
have been found to prefer greenfields in all nine studies that included this variable, 
presumably because their technological assets are to a certain extent firm-specific and hence 
difficult to exploit through acquisitions. Seven studies found that firms with a diversified 
product portfolio prefer acquisitions over greenfields, which is probably due to the fact that 
their main competence, general management, can be easily superimposed on acquired units. 
                                                 
9 A notable exception is Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), who include both service and manufacturing MNEs. 
10 Zejan (1990), Cho and Padmanabhan (1995), Brouthers and Brouthers (2000), and Larimo (2003) are also 
interested in country-level determinants. Some of the other studies also include country-level variables in their 
models, but merely as controls. 
11 Exceptions are Wilson (1980) and Forsgren (1989), who use OLS regression with the proportion of cross-
border acquisitions in an MNE’s portfolio of foreign subsidiaries and the amount of money an MNE invested in 
foreign acquisitions relative to its total amount of FDI as the dependent variables, respectively. 




Table 2.1: Main characteristics of the studies reviewed 
 
Setting Study Theoretical perspective(s) Home country Host country Time period 
Sample 
size Method 
Wilson (1980) - (exploratory) Various Various 
1900 – 
1967/1971 ? OLS 
Caves and Mehra 
(1986) 
Transaction cost theory, agency theory, 
industrial organization Various U.S. 1974 – 1980 138 Binomial probit 
Forsgren (1989) Internalization theory, network theory Sweden Various 1970 – 1982 33 OLS 
Zejan (1990) Transaction cost theory Sweden Various 1969 – 1978 250 Binomial probit 
Hennart and Park 
(1993) 
Transaction cost theory, mergers and 
acquisitions theory, theory of the growth of the 
firm, theory of capital market imperfections 
Japan U.S. 1978 – 1980 and 1984 – 1987 270 Binomial logit 
Andersson and 
Svensson (1994) Organizational learning Sweden Various ± 1961 – 1990 ± 1000 Binomial logit 
Cho and 
Padmanabhan (1995) 
Transaction cost theory, bargaining power 
model Japan Various 1969 – 1991 756 Binomial logit 
Hennart, Larimo, and 
Chen (1996) 
Transaction cost theory, mergers and 
acquisitions theory Japan and Finland U.S. 1978 – 1993 401 Binomial logit 
Meyer and Estrin 
(1997) 
Various 
(based on several earlier studies) 
Germany and 
U.K. Various early 1990s 211 Binomial logit 
Barkema and 
Vermeulen (1998) Organizational learning The Netherlands Various 1966 – 1994 829 Binomial logit 
Padmanabhan and 
Cho (1999) Organizational learning Japan Various 1969 – 1991 752 Binomial logit 
Brouthers and 






1981 – ? 136 Binomial logit 
Harzing (2002) Ownership-Location-Internalization (OLI) paradigm, institutional theory Various Various ? – mid 1990s 277 Binomial logit 




Various 1960 – 1999 3524 Binomial logit 
Chen and Zeng (2004) Theory of barriers to entry, transaction cost theory, mergers and acquisitions theory Japan U.S. 
1978 – 1980 and 




Table 2.2: Findings of the studies reviewed (+ = increases the probability of an acquisition) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Firm-level variables:                
parent’s national origin:                
- U.K. -*1               
- Germany n.s.1        n.s.3       
- Japan -*1       -2        
- U.S. +*1               
- non European         -3       
parent’s percentage of subsidiaries in LDCs -               
parent’s international experience - +* + n.s.  + n.s.  n.s. - - - + n.s.  
parent’s regional experience         n.s.       
parent’s host-country experience      n.s. + n.s. ∩  + n.s.   n.s.  
parent’s decision-specific experience with greenfields           -     
parent’s decision-specific experience with acquisitions           +     
parent’s degree of product diversity + + + + n.s.  n.s.  + ∪ n.s. + n.s. +  
parent’s R&D intensity   -  - - - -   - - -  - 
parent’s R&D expenditures         -       
parent is first to enter industry  n.s.              
parent is follower  n.s.   -*           
parent size   n.s.   + n.s. n.s. ∩ n.s. n.s.   +  
parent’s endowment in human resources     +*           
parent’s leverage     n.s.           
parent’s advertising intensity     n.s.           
parent’s advertising expenditures in host country               - 
parent’s advertising expenditures in home country               n.s. 
parent’s market position       n.s.    n.s.     
factor costs motivation for entry         +*       
parent’s labor intensity         -       
parent’s profitability          +      
parent follows multidomestic (rather than global) strategy             +   
product relatedness  n.s.  n.s. -  n.s. -  n.s. n.s. +*  - - 
(relative) subsidiary size  +   +  n.s.    n.s. + +   




Table 2.2 (continued): Findings of the studies reviewed 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Industry-level variables:                
growth rate of industry entered  ∪  - ∪   ∪ -*   -   ∪ 
concentration of industry entered  +4   n.s.   -       - 
number of firms in subsidiary’s size-class  n.s.              
entry is into durable goods industry  -              
entry is into resource-intensive industry        +        
entry is into non-food consumer goods industry         -*       
entry is into food and beverage industry         +       
R&D intensity of industry entered  n.s.             n.s. 
R&D intensity of industry in which parent is active              -  
advertising intensity of industry entered  n.s.             + 
brand equity of industry entered (reputation barriers)               ∪ 
percentage of industry shipments to retailers               + 
Country-level variables:                
size of host economy    n.s.      n.s.      
growth rate of host economy      n.s.    n.s.    -  
host-country per capita income    +  + +   n.s. +   +  
availability of bargains in host country     n.s.           
host-government restrictions       +*   - +*     
cultural distance to parent’s home country       n.s.   - n.s. n.s. - -  
uncertainty avoidance of host country            -    
host-country risk          -5      
Miscellaneous:                
time +   +  + n.s.   + +  + +  
 
1 compared to what Wilson (1980) labels MNEs from ‘other’ countries, 2 compared to Finnish MNEs, 3 compared to British MNEs, 4 provided that desired scale of entry is 
large, 5 partial support was found 
 
+ = increases the probability of an acquisition, – = increases the probability of a greenfield, ∪ and ∩ = curvilinear effect on the probability of an acquisition, n.s. = not 
significant, * = unexpected result (i.e., contrary to the study’s theoretical predictions) 
 
1. Wilson (1980)     6. Andersson and Svensson (1994)  11. Padmanabhan and Cho (1999) 
2. Caves and Mehra (1986)    7. Cho and Padmanabhan (1995)   12. Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) 
3. Forsgren (1989)     8. Hennart, Larimo, and Chen (1996)  13. Harzing (2002) 
4. Zejan (1990)     9. Meyer and Estrin (1997)   14. Larimo (2003) 
5. Hennart and Park (1993)  10. Barkema and Vermeulen (1998)  15. Chen and Zeng (2004) 
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Furthermore, four out of six studies found that large subsidiaries are more likely to be 
acquisitions than greenfield investments. The likely reason is that acquired subsidiaries come 
with their own cadre of managers, which is beneficial when the MES of a subsidiary is 
relatively large, as a greenfield investment of that size would absorb many valuable 
managerial resources (Caves and Mehra, 1986). Another consistent finding is that the 
likelihood of greenfield entry initially increases with industry growth. What happens in case 
of very high industry growth is less clear, however. Three studies find that greenfield entry 
remains dominant, while the other four find that acquisitions become more attractive again, 
presumably because they make speedy entry possible (Andersson and Svensson, 1994; Caves 
and Mehra, 1986). Acquisitions have also been found to be preferred in high-income 
countries in five of the six studies that included this variable, supposedly because such 
countries have more suitable acquisition candidates (Zejan, 1990). Seven out of eight studies 
also found that the propensity to acquire has increased over time13. 
Despite the relatively homogeneous nature of the studies included in our review, table 
2.2 shows that the results for many other variables are rather inconclusive. To give a striking 
example, while Caves and Mehra (1986), Forsgren (1989), Andersson and Svensson (1994) 
and Harzing (2002) found that an MNE’s experience with international operations had a 
positive impact on its propensity to acquire, the effect of this variable was negative in Wilson 
(1980), Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), Padmanabhan and Cho (1999) and Brouthers and 
Brouthers (2000), and insignificant in Zejan (1990), Cho and Padmanabhan (1995), Meyer 
and Estrin (1997) and Larimo (2003). Even the findings for some of the theoretically 
important variables are surprising. For example, table 2.2 shows that the parent’s host-
country experience, product relatedness (i.e., whether the subsidiary produces a product not 
produced by the parent), and the concentration ratio of the industry entered only had their 
predicted effects in a very limited number of studies, and that some studies even found the 
exact opposite. 
How can these mixed findings be reconciled? In the remainder of this paper, we will 
argue that the presence of opposing and moderating effects, variations in research designs, 
and operationalization difficulties are important reasons explaining the divergence in 
findings. 
 
2.3. Reasons for the divergence in findings 
 
Although the foreign establishment mode literature has undoubtedly contributed to both our 
theoretical and practical understanding of the determinants of an MNE’s choice between a 
greenfield investment and an acquisition, table 2.2 reveals a variety of contradictory, 
unexpected, and insignificant results. Below we will argue that this is due to (1) the presence 
of opposing and moderating effects, (2) variations in research designs, and (3) 
operationalization difficulties. 
                                                 
13 Another finding in line with established theory is that firms following a global strategy prefer greenfields, 
while those following a multidomestic strategy prefer acquisitions (Harzing, 2002). However, this finding has so 
far not been replicated and, as we will argue below, should be interpreted with care due to the omission of 




2.3.1. Opposing and moderating effects 
 
Although the theory developed in section 2.2.1 has clear implications for the impact of some 
variables on an MNE’s establishment mode choice, the theoretical rationale for others is more 
ambiguous. For example, although transaction cost theory suggests that MNEs with little 
host-country experience should choose acquisitions over greenfields in order to obtain the 
necessary tacit local market knowledge, the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) literature 
suggests that such MNEs should prefer greenfields because they are likely to lack the skills to 
handle local acquisitions (Hennart and Park, 1993). Similarly, while some authors (e.g. 
Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998) have argued that internationally experienced MNEs possess 
the necessary capabilities to make greenfield investments abroad, others (e.g., Andersson and 
Svensson, 1994) have stressed that they are better able to absorb and apply knowledge 
residing in local firms, thus increasing their preference for acquisitions.  These opposing lines 
of reasoning may explain the mixed empirical findings with respect to these two variables 
(see table 2.2). 
Another important theoretical variable for which mixed results have been obtained is 
the concentration ratio of the industry entered. Industrial Organization theory suggests that 
MNEs should prefer acquisitions when entering highly concentrated and large MES 
industries, because greenfield entry would lead to a large increase in industry capacity and 
hence a large reduction in prices and profits. However, of the four studies that tested this 
argument, only one (Caves and Mehra, 1986) found empirical support. This may be due to 
the presence of an opposing institutional effect, namely that governments often oppose 
foreign acquisitions in concentrated industries in order to keep foreign firms from dominating 
the industry and capitalizing on the low level of competition (Chen and Zeng, 2004), forcing 
them to make greenfield investments instead. 
Besides opposing effects, moderating effects may also account for some of the mixed 
findings that have been obtained. For example, the literature has generally argued that a large 
cultural distance should lead MNEs to opt for greenfield investments, so as to avoid post-
acquisition problems stemming from differences in organizational practices. However, 
empirical findings have been mixed, with three studies finding support and three others 
finding an insignificant effect. This may be because post-acquisition difficulties stemming 
from differences in practices do not occur if a subsidiary is granted considerable autonomy, 
as there will be little interaction with the MNE parent in this case (Hofstede, 2001; Neal, 
1998). This should make acquisitions in culturally distant countries more attractive. That is, 
the degree of subsidiary autonomy is likely to negatively moderate the relationship between 
cultural distance and the likelihood of greenfields. 
This may explain the mixed results of the studies that tested for the effect of cultural 
distance, as their samples may have contained systematic variations in the degree of 
autonomy granted to foreign subsidiaries. These variations may have been caused by 
differences in the characteristics of the MNEs studied, such as their national origin, and/or of 
the industries they entered (for example, predominantly global or multidomestic ones), thus 
producing a significantly positive effect of cultural distance on the likelihood of greenfields 
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in some studies, but an insignificant one in others. Interestingly, all three studies that found 
an insignificant effect of cultural distance studied Japanese MNEs, suggesting that these 
firms – although well known for their preference for tightly-controlled greenfields – also 
make quasi-autonomous acquisitions in culturally distant (i.e., Western) countries where 
suitable takeover targets are available (cf. Child et al., 2001). 
In still other cases, a variable may have clear theoretical predictions, but empirical 
effects may be too small to be identified as significant. For example, only four out of ten 
studies found support for the widely accepted theoretical argument that MNEs entering 
unrelated industries are more likely to make acquisitions because they lack the tacit product-
specific knowledge required to successfully operate in the new industry, while those entering 
similar or related industries are more likely to opt for greenfields, because they already 
possess much of the required knowledge. However, in terms of value, only 30% of all cross-
border acquisitions in 1999 were made in unrelated industries (UNCTAD, 2000), suggesting 
that access to industry-specific (as opposed to country-specific) knowledge is not an 
important motive for cross-border acquisitions. Although the proportion of cross-border 
acquisitions in unrelated industries may still be larger than the proportion of foreign 
greenfield investments in such industries (as theory would predict), in several studies (Caves 
and Mehra, 1986; Zejan, 1990; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999) 
the difference is likely to have been too small for a statistically significant effect to emerge. 
 
2.3.2. Research designs 
 
The fact that an MNE’s choice of establishment mode is determined by firm, industry, and 
country-level factors that are sometimes difficult to measure makes it a complex choice that 
is hard to model. A solid investigation requires collecting data on variables at various levels. 
Such data is not generally available in published sources and must therefore be collected from 
a variety of secondary sources, or obtained by survey. However, the availability, reliability, 
and coverage of parent, subsidiary, and industry-level data vary considerably across 
countries. R&D expenditures, for example, are only available for MNEs based in a few 
developed countries. As a result, choosing the right sample is crucial, as this makes it 
possible to control for some factors by keeping them constant. Unfortunately, scholars have 
often relied on less-than-optimal samples, which may account for some of their unexpected 
findings. 
Four types of samples have been used. Scholars have looked at entries by MNE parents 
(i) from a single home country into multiple host countries, (ii) from multiple home countries 
into a single host country, (iii) from multiple home countries into multiple host countries, and 
(iv) from a single home country into a single host country. Each of these four types of 
samples has its own benefits and costs. 
One home country, multiple host countries. This is the approach taken by Forsgren 
(1989), Zejan (1990), Andersson and Svensson (1994), Cho and Padmanabhan (1995), 
Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), Padmanabhan and Cho (1999), and Brouthers and Brouthers 
(2000). Its main advantage is that one does not need to obtain comparable parent-level data 
across countries, a task made perilous by international differences in accounting rules and 
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reporting requirements. Addresses for surveys can be collected quite easily and 
questionnaires do not have to be translated into multiple languages. A disadvantage is that it 
is relatively difficult to obtain comparable secondary industry- and country-level data across 
a large number of host countries. Furthermore, most of these host countries will have, to a 
varying extent, barriers to acquisition that limit a parent’s choice of establishment mode by 
restricting its ability or raising its cost of making acquisitions14. Unfortunately, many studies 
have not dealt adequately with such barriers. 
In virtually all countries, governments restrict foreign acquisitions. The few countries 
without any significant regulatory restrictions, except in those few industries deemed to have 
national security implications, are the U.S., the U.K., the Netherlands and Germany (Healy 
and Palepu, 1993; Hennart and Reddy, 1997). Some countries prohibit all foreign 
acquisitions, others require prior governmental approval (e.g., Japan), and some restrict 
acquisitions in ‘strategic’ industries (e.g., Canada) (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995). 
Although many restrictions on foreign acquisitions have been removed or relaxed 
during the last decade (UNCTAD, 2000), they were present during the time periods covered 
by most studies (notably during the 1970s and 1980s). Controlling for these restrictions is 
important, because they may severely limit an MNE’s ability to acquire. Unfortunately, only 
a few of the studies analyzing entries into multiple host countries have attempted to do so, 
and this may account for some of their conflicting findings. Specifically, Cho and 
Padmanabhan (1995), Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), and Padmanabhan and Cho (1999) 
included a dummy variable measuring whether or not a host country imposed restrictions on 
foreign acquisitions, and found insignificant effects for cultural distance (Cho and 
Padmanabhan, 1995; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999) and host-country per capita income 
(Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998), while most other studies that did not control for such 
restrictions found significant effects for these two variables. This suggests that cultural 
distance and host country per capita income proxied for host-country restrictions in those 
studies. 
However, measuring host-government restrictions through a dummy variable is not an 
optimal solution for several reasons. First, such restrictions vary in their intensity across 
countries and over time, and this requires a measure that allows for more variation than a 
simple binary one (Gomes-Casseres, 1990). 
Second, including a restrictive host-country dummy does not make it possible to 
ascertain whether the impact of independent variables on establishment mode choice results 
from firm preferences or is an outcome of the bargaining process between firms and 
restrictive host-country governments. Separating these effects in samples containing FDI in 
both restrictive and non-restrictive countries requires a more sophisticated statistical approach 
such as the one used by Gomes-Casseres (1990)15. 
Third, other barriers to acquisition besides host-government restrictions may have an 
important impact on the choice of establishment mode. These other barriers arise from (i) 
incorporation statutes, (ii) legal maneuvers, and (iii) corporate ownership structures. 
                                                 
14 This explains the large differences in foreign acquisition activity that are observed across countries (see e.g., 
Healy and Palepu, 1993). 
15 For more details regarding this approach, we refer to Gomes-Casseres (1990). 
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Acquisitions are often restricted by statutes of incorporation. For example, provisions in the 
articles of incorporation of Singapore companies often restrict any person or company from 
holding more than 5 percent of the issued share capital, either directly or indirectly. 
Sometimes, this limit is even as low as 3 percent. Similar restrictions are present in other 
countries. For instance, the Swiss company Nestlé prevents foreign investors from buying 
more than 3 percent of its registered shares (Lam, 1997). 
In addition to these statutory restrictions, many countries allow the use of a panoply of 
legal maneuvers to deter hostile takeovers by foreigners (Conklin and Lecraw, 1997). One of 
these methods is the separation of voting rights from rights to receive dividends and capital 
gains. This system of so-called dual-class shares is frequently used in Denmark, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland (Rydqvist, 1992). 
Barriers to acquisition also arise from the ownership structures of local firms. While 
dispersed ownership facilitates hostile takeovers, personal/family, government, and dominant 
minority ownership by stable shareholders such as banks and other financial institutions, 
discourage them. This is because these owners are generally reluctant to sell their shares to 
foreign investors (Healy and Palepu, 1993)16. 
There is considerable evidence suggesting that corporate ownership structures 
systematically differ by country (Healy and Palepu, 1993; Thomsen and Pedersen, 1996; 
Pedersen and Thomsen, 1997) and that these differences have an important impact on 
international acquisition activity (Healy and Palepu, 1993; Lawrence, 1993; Pedersen and 
Thomsen, 1997). In addition, Pedersen and Thomsen (1999) found that ownership structures 
also systematically differ by industry. This suggests that barriers to acquisition resulting from 
these ownership structures are likely to vary across both countries and industries. 
Establishment mode studies analyzing FDI into multiple countries have thus been 
performed on entries made in settings where barriers to acquisition varied. The lack of 
detailed controls for such barriers in most of these studies should be a real concern, especially 
in those that included relatively many entries into countries where these barriers were high, 
because this is likely to have caused the strategic firm, industry, and country-level variables 
identified in our theory section to have become statistically insignificant in these studies, 
which may explain the inconclusive findings for some of these variables. Future studies could 
yield more consistent findings by including a dummy variable reflecting a country’s or 
industry’s prevailing corporate ownership structure (dispersed or not), as in Healy and Palepu 
(1993). However, such a variable does not distinguish between the several non-dispersed 
ownership structures, nor does it take into account the fact that the incidence of particular 
ownership structures varies across countries and industries. It may therefore be better to 
construct a continuous variable measuring the overall height of a country’s or industry’s 
barriers to acquisition, as in Makino and Beamish (1998). This, however, is an arduous and 
time-consuming task. 
Besides barriers to acquisition, other host-country factors may also affect the choice 
between greenfield and acquisition, and it is equally important to control for them, for 
example by including country dummies (cf. Meyer and Estrin, 1997) or relevant country-
                                                 
16 Concentrated ownership does, however, facilitate friendly takeovers, i.e. takeovers which have been initiated 
or approved by shareholders (Becht et al., 2002). 
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level variables. Unfortunately, this is not always done (see Wilson, 1980; Forsgren, 1989; 
Zejan, 1990; Andersson and Svensson, 1994; Harzing, 2002). Still another solution is to use a 
different research design. 
Multiple home countries, one host country. This is the approach employed by Caves 
and Mehra (1986) and Hennart et al. (1996). Its main advantage is that it makes it easier to 
obtain industry-level data, since there is only one host country involved. One of the 
disadvantages is that it may become more difficult and time consuming to collect firm 
addresses to send surveys, and questionnaires will have to be carefully translated. Another 
disadvantage is that it is more difficult to obtain objective and comparable MNE parent-level 
data due to the large differences between home countries in accounting rules and reporting 
requirements. One solution used by some authors has been to proxy for these difficult-to-
measure parent characteristics by data on the home industry of the foreign investor or on that 
of the host-country industry entered, a shortcut which has its own problems, as seen below. 
A third disadvantage of studying entries by MNEs from different countries is that the 
national origin of the MNE parent may affect its propensity to acquire. Although most 
establishment mode studies have implicitly ignored this possibility, and have therefore not 
controlled for it, there is evidence that MNEs from uncertainty-avoiding countries prefer 
greenfield JVs and wholly-owned greenfields over acquisitions (Kogut and Singh, 1988). 
While some studies control for potential national origin effects by including dummy 
variables for the country of the parent (Wilson, 1980; Hennart et al., 1996; Meyer and Estrin, 
1997), others (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Harzing, 2002; Larimo, 2003) do not, which may 
have biased their parent-level variables, as these are likely to be to some extent country 
specific17. For example, MNEs from developed countries generally have more international 
and host-country experience than those from developing countries, because the former started 
to internationalize earlier. Another way to control for national origin effects is to choose a 
sample of entries by MNEs from a single home country into a single host country, as in 
Hennart and Park (1993) and Chen and Zeng (2004). 
Multiple home countries, multiple host countries. Analyzing foreign entries by 
MNEs based in different countries into a variety of host countries, as in Wilson (1980), 
Meyer and Estrin (1997), Harzing (2002), and Larimo (2003), also has its advantages and 
disadvantages. The main advantage is high generalizability. However, the potentially large 
number of home and host countries involved makes it difficult or even impossible to obtain 
comparable data on theoretically important firm, industry, and country-level factors and to 
control for their potential effects. This is clearly illustrated by Wilson (1980), Harzing (2002), 
and Larimo (2003), who were all forced to omit some theoretically important industry-level 
and home- or host-country variables (see table 2.2). As a result, their findings may contain 
biases due to correlations between the included and omitted variables (Buckley and Casson, 
1991) and are open to alternative explanations. For example, Harzing (2002) classified an 
MNE’s strategy as either global or multidomestic, and found that MNEs with a global 
strategy were more likely to choose greenfield investments, and those with a multidomestic 
strategy acquisitions. Her theoretical argument is that MNEs following global strategies strive 
                                                 
17 It should be noted that the MNEs included in Larimo’s (2003) sample were all from Nordic countries. These 
countries share large cultural and historic similarities (Hofstede, 2001). 
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for cost efficiency, which is easier to achieve through greenfields, because MNE parents can 
then transfer their latest technologies and mould their affiliates to their specific preferences. 
MNEs following multidomestic strategies, on the other hand, aim for a high degree of local 
responsiveness, which requires a high amount of local market knowledge – knowledge that 
can be obtained through the acquisition of local firms. Unfortunately, because she was 
looking at entries into a large number of countries, Harzing was unable to include industry-
level variables. This leaves open the possibility that the structural conditions of the industries 
entered by the MNEs in her sample, rather than their strategies, drive her results. As we have 
seen, one major difference between greenfield and acquisition entry is that the former adds 
capacity to the industry (Hennart and Park, 1993). Incumbents’ reactions to a greenfield 
investment depend on two industry-level factors, viz. the growth rate and the MES of the 
industry entered. If an industry is growing slowly, and if its MES (and, hence, usually its 
concentration ratio) is large, greenfield entry will lead to a large increase in capacity and 
therefore to a large reduction in prices and profits. Incumbents are therefore likely to resist 
greenfield entry into such industries and will ‘force’ the entrant to opt for an acquisition 
instead. When an industry has a low MES and/or is growing rapidly, on the other hand, the 
capacity-increasing features of greenfield entry are less of a problem, as the impact of 
capacity expansion on each incumbent’s profits is much smaller. This makes greenfield 
investments more tolerable for incumbents and, hence, more likely. Since many industries in 
which MNEs follow global strategies are high growth ones18, and since Harzing did not 
control for industry growth, it may be that the MNEs in her sample preferred greenfields over 
acquisitions because they were operating in fast growing industries, and not necessarily 
because they followed global strategies. 
A large number of the insignificant findings in table 2.2 may also be due to the 
omission of relevant variables, in particular when the effects of the omitted variables 
dominate those of the included ones. Cho and Padmanabhan (1995) and Padmanabhan and 
Cho (1999), for example, omitted industry-level variables from their models, and obtained a 
large number of insignificant findings for firm-level variables such as the parent’s degree of 
product diversity. Although the effect of this variable may have been truly insignificant, it is 
also possible that the undiversified MNEs in their sample did in fact prefer greenfields and 
the diversified ones acquisitions (as predicted by theory), but that a generally slow growth of 
the industries they entered persuaded many of the undiversified MNEs to opt for acquisitions 
instead, thus attenuating the effect of product diversity on the choice of establishment mode. 
One home country, one host country. The fourth and final way to study foreign entry 
mode choices is to compile and analyze a sample of foreign entries by MNEs from a single 
home country into a single host country (Hennart and Park, 1993; Chen and Zeng, 2004). In 
this way all potential pitfalls, such as data collection difficulties and country-level effects, are 
avoided. For example, if the host country has few or no restrictions on acquisitions, this setup 
sidesteps the difficult problem of modeling the impact of barriers to acquisition on an MNE’s 
choice of foreign establishment mode. However, this comes at the cost of reduced 
generalizability. That is, the results of Hennart and Park (1993) and Chen and Zeng (2004) 
may only apply to Japanese MNEs entering a highly-developed country like the U.S., and 
                                                 
18 High-technology industries provide a good example of such industries. 
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may have limited applicability to MNEs from other countries entering different host markets. 
 
2.3.3. Operationalization difficulties 
 
According to Popper (1959), scientific knowledge should be based on “ruling out alternative 
explanations of phenomena so as to remain with only one conceivable explanation” 
(Andersen, 1993: 215). Popper uses falsifiability as a criterion for distinguishing between 
science and nonscience (Popper and Bartley, 1983). In order to rightfully falsify a theory, 
there has to be a high degree of correspondence between the empirical operationalizations 
and the abstract constructs they intend to represent (Andersen, 1993). Poor 
operationalizations may produce statistical noise and, even worse, biased parameter 
estimates, which may lead to wrongful rejections of theories and hypotheses, and thus to 
divergent findings. 
Unfortunately, some constructs are difficult to operationalize due to limited data 
availability. This constitutes a serious problem in the establishment mode literature, since 
almost all studies rely exclusively on secondary data. As stated earlier, data on R&D 
expenditures is only available for firms based in a few countries. This forced Caves and 
Mehra (1986) to proxy an MNE’s firm-specific technological skills by the R&D expenditures 
to sales ratio of the foreign industry entered by the focal affiliate19. However, one would 
expect the R&D intensity of MNEs expanding abroad to systematically diverge from those of 
the foreign industries they enter. This is because MNEs are at a disadvantage compared to 
their domestic rivals due to their lack of knowledge of the foreign market, and they will 
therefore only enter if they can compensate for this disadvantage by having superior product 
or process technologies. Hence, proxying an MNE’s unique technological skills by the 
average R&D intensity of the foreign industry entered systematically underestimates those 
skills, and is likely to produce insignificant findings. A more accurate proxy for an MNE’s 
firm-specific technological skills is the parent’s ratio of R&D expenditures to sales. As stated 
earlier, all nine studies that used this proxy found that it had the expected positive effect on 
the likelihood of greenfields20. Ideally, R&D intensity should be measured at the product 
level (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995), but obtaining data at this level is very difficult. 
Other constructs whose operationalization could be improved are listed in table 2.3, 
along with suggestions that should lead to more reliable and – presumably – more uniform 
findings. 
                                                 
19 Chen and Zeng (2004) also included the R&D intensity of the industry entered, but they did so to capture the 
presence of technological barriers to entry rather than an MNE’s unique technological skills.  
20 Two other studies (Meyer and Estrin, 1997; Larimo, 2003) included the parent’s R&D expenditures and the 
R&D intensity of the industry of the parent, respectively, and found that these measures also increased the 
likelihood of greenfields. 
 
 
Table 2.3: Constructs whose operationalization might be improved 
 
Construct Study Operationalization Remark(s) Suggestion(s) 
Parent’s firm-specific 
technological skills (should 
lead to greenfields) 
- Caves and Mehra 
(1986) 
- Larimo (2003) 
- R&D intensity of 
industry entered 
- R&D intensity of 
industry in which 
parent is active (low, 
medium, high) 
Industry-level variables 
poor proxies for firm-
level constructs. 
R&D intensity of parent (e.g., Cho and Padmanabhan, 
1995) 
Parent’s marketing skills 
(should lead to acquisitions)  
Caves and Mehra 
(1986) 
Advertising intensity of 
industry entered 
Industry-level variables 
poor proxies for firm-
level constructs. 
Advertising intensity of parent (e.g., Hennart and Park, 
1993) 
- Difficulty to establish a 
greenfield 
- Disturbances that a 
greenfield causes in the 
market shares and 
revenues of incumbent 
firms 
(should lead to acquisitions) 
- Zejan (1990) 
- Barkema and 
Vermeulen (1998) 
- Host country GDP 
- Host country GNP 
- Should be measured 
at the industry level. 
- Why would it be 
more difficult to 
establish a 
greenfield in a large 
host country? 
- Industry sales 
- Growth rate of industry entered (e.g., Brouthers 
and Brouthers, 2000) 
- Absolute value of industry growth’s deviation 
from its sample mean divided by its standard 
deviation (e.g., Caves and Mehra, 1986) 
Parent’s organizational skills 
(should lead to acquisitions) 
Andersson and 
Svensson (1994) 
- Parent size 
- Number of previous 
foreign subsidiaries 
Greater firm size may 
constrain information 
exchange and learning 
(cf. Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1998). 
Total count-years of mode-specific experience 
(Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999) 
- Benefit to quick entry 
(should lead to acquisitions) 
- Scope for new firms 






Growth rate of host 
economy 
Should be measured at 
the industry level. 
- Growth rate of industry entered (e.g., Brouthers 
and Brouthers, 2000) 
- Absolute value of industry growth’s deviation 
from its sample mean divided by its standard 
deviation (e.g., Caves and Mehra, 1986) 
Parent’s international 
experience 
(should lead to either 
greenfields or acquisitions) 
- Forsgren (1989) 
- Brouthers and 
Brouthers (2000) 
- Foreign to total sales 
- Parent’s export ratio 
Firms with a high share 
of foreign sales or a high 
export ratio may still 
have limited 
international experience 
(cf. Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977). 
- Number of foreign subsidiaries (Andersson and 
Svensson, 1994) 
- Number of years firm has been operating abroad 
(e.g., Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995) 
- Number of countries in which firm has 
subsidiaries (e.g., Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998) 
- Total count-years of international experience 
(Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999) 
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2.4. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
This paper reviews the empirical literature on the determinants of an MNE’s choice between 
two alternative modes of foreign establishment, greenfield investment and acquisition. We 
find contradictory results and a considerable number of insignificant and unexpected 
findings. We seek to reconcile these findings by identifying the main reasons for their 
divergence. The first is that some variables do not always have clear effects on the choice 
between greenfield and acquisition, as there may be opposing or moderating effects. Second, 
studies have used different research designs with different limitations. Several studies have 
used samples consisting of entries into countries where the choice between greenfield and 
acquisition is – to a varying extent – constrained by institutional barriers to acquisition, but 
have not adequately controlled for them. In addition, many studies analyzing entries into 
various host-countries have been forced to omit important industry-level variables, which 
may have biased their results and leaves them open to alternative explanations. And some 
studies have used samples consisting of entries made by MNEs based in different countries, 
without controlling for potential national origin effects, such as the cultural characteristics of 
an MNE’s home base. Third, several studies have had difficulties in operationalizing 
particular constructs due to data limitations, among others, which has forced them to rely on 
less-than-optimal proxies that may have produced biases. 
Although it is difficult to determine the extent to which these reasons explain the lack 
of robustness of the findings of the studies we reviewed, and even more difficult to unravel 
their separate effects, we believe that future entry mode research would benefit from greater 
attention to the issues addressed in this paper. We have a number of specific 
recommendations. First, future research should pay more attention to the choice of research 
design. This choice should primarily be determined by the research question posed. Scholars 
interested in parent- and industry-level determinants of an MNE’s establishment mode choice 
should analyze samples of entries by MNE parents from a single home country into a single 
host country, thus keeping constant as many country-level variables as possible, as these (for 
example, barriers to acquisition) are often hard to model. On the other hand, scholars 
interested in country-level determinants should maximize variance on this dimension by 
including a variety of home and/or host countries. Specifically, studies focusing on home-
country determinants, such as the culture of an MNE’s home base, should preferably use 
samples of entries by MNE parents from various home countries into a single host country, 
while those focusing on host-country effects should take the opposite approach21. Whenever 
multiple home and/or host countries are involved, scholars should make sure, however, that 
they properly control for potential parent- and industry-level effects. Another possibility is to 
focus on a specific type of MNEs, such as those of similar size and with a similar level of 
international experience, active in a given industry. Table 2.4 summarizes these different 
possibilities. 
                                                 
21 Note that the effect of some variables can be examined through several research designs. For example, 
scholars interested in the impact of cultural distance may either analyze foreign entries by MNEs (i) from one 
home country into multiple host countries, (ii) from multiple home countries into one host country, or (iii) from 
multiple home countries into multiple host countries, as all these research designs may produce sufficient 
variation in cultural distance. 
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To be used by scholars 






(e.g., host-country risk) 
- Control for firm- and industry-level variables or 
focus on MNEs that are similar (in terms of size, 
experience, etc.) and/or active in a single industry 







- Control for firm- and industry-level variables or 
focus on MNEs that are similar (in terms of size, 
experience, etc.) and/or active in a single industry 




Home- and host-country 
factors simultaneously 
- Control for firm- and industry-level variables or 
focus on MNEs that are similar (in terms of size, 
experience, etc.) and/or active in a single industry 
- Control for other home- and host-country factors 
One home and 
host country 
Firm- and industry-level 
factors 
Results should be reliable, although they are not by 
definition generalizable 
 
While focusing on MNEs from a single home country investing in a single host 
country is one strategy for scholars interested in parent- and industry-level determinants of an 
MNE’s establishment mode choice, another – perhaps second-best – option is to control for 
potential country-level effects. In the case of multiple host countries this amounts to carefully 
controlling for the presence of barriers to acquisition, not only those stemming from host-
government restrictions, but also those resulting from corporate ownership structures. The 
latter issue can be handled by including a dummy variable reflecting a country’s or industry’s 
prevailing corporate ownership structure (as in Healy and Palepu, 1993), or – even better – by 
constructing a continuous variable measuring the overall height of a country’s or industry’s 
barriers to acquisition (as in Makino and Beamish, 1998). Other host-country effects could be 
controlled by including host-country dummies (as in Estrin and Meyer, 1997), or a number of 
potentially relevant country-level variables. Similarly, studies on parent and industry-level 
determinants that involve multiple home countries should control for potential home-country 
effects, such as culture-related establishment mode preferences, for example by including 
home-country dummies (as in Wilson, 1980). 
A second recommendation is that there should be greater consistency across studies in 
the independent variables entered and in their operationalization. Theoretically important 
variables at each relevant level (firm, industry, and country) should always be included, and 
they should correspond as closely as possible to the underlying constructs they intend to 
represent. Table 2.5 provides a list of these variables. If comparable industry- and/or country-




Table 2.5: Variables that should always be included 
 
Level Variables to be included Reason Preferred operationalization in case of secondary data 
parent’s firm-specific technological skills argued and shown to be an important factor ratio of parent’s R&D expenditures and its sales (either in its home country or worldwide) 
parent’s degree of product diversity argued and shown to be an important factor number of n-digit SIC codes in which firm operates, if possible weighted by sales share 
parent’s host-country experience argued to be an important factor 
- number of subsidiaries in host country 
- number of years firm has been operating in host country 
- total count-years of host-country experience 
product relatedness argued to be an important factor dummy indicating whether or not the subsidiary produces a product also produced by the parent 
parent’s desired degree of subsidiary 
integration argued to be an important factor measure through survey data (cf. Harzing, 2002) 
(relative) subsidiary size argued and shown to be an important factor - ratio of subsidiary’s and parent’s number of employees - ratio of subsidiary’s and parent’s assets  
parent size basic control variable 
- parent’s sales 
- parent’s number of employees 
- parent’s assets  
Firm 
parent’s nationality basic control variable home-country dummies 
growth rate of industry entered argued and shown to be an important factor 
- growth rate of industry entered 
- absolute value of industry growth’s deviation from its 
sample mean divided by its standard deviation Industry 
concentration of industry entered argued to be an important factor 
- share of industry sales by the n (typically 4) largest firms 
- sum of the squared market shares of the n largest firms in 
the industry 
cultural distance to parent’s home country argued to be an important factor Kogut and Singh (1988) index 
presence of acquisition targets  argued and shown to be an important factor host country’s GDP or GNP per capita 
Country 
host-country barriers to acquisition argued to be an important factor 
- variable indicating the extent to which a host country 
imposed restrictions on (foreign) acquisitions in the year 
of entry 
- variable indicating the incidence of particular corporate 
ownership structures 
- variable measuring overall barriers to acquisition (cf. 
Makino and Beamish, 1998) 
Miscellaneous time (in case of long time periods) shown to be an important control variable year in which an entry took place 
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Third, there is an urgent need for more establishment mode research based on 
perceptual survey measures. So far, Harzing (2002) is the only study using this approach, 
primarily to assess an MNE’s international strategy (global or multidomestic). Its main 
advantage is that it makes it possible, by carefully designing and formulating survey 
questions, to achieve a high degree of correspondence with the actual constructs, thus 
reducing the likelihood of biases. This is especially relevant for complex constructs like an 
MNE’s firm-specific technological skills and the height of barriers to acquisition, which may 
be very difficult to measure through secondary data. In addition, strategic decisions such as 
entry mode choices ultimately reflect managerial perceptions (Boyd et al., 1993), and should 
therefore preferably be explained by survey-based perceptual measures. 
Fourth, we encourage researchers to study more closely the effect of an MNE’s 
international strategy on its choice of establishment mode. So far, only Harzing (2002) has 
examined the effect of this theoretically important factor, but her choice of research design 
(multiple home and host countries) forced her to omit several relevant variables, which leaves 
her findings open to alternative explanations. In addition, subsidiaries within an MNE may 
have different roles, and may therefore be granted different levels of autonomy (Birkinshaw 
and Morrison, 1995; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994). Hence, the degree of autonomy granted to a 
specific subsidiary should be a better predictor of an MNE’s establishment mode choice than 
its overall international strategy. 
Finally, it is also worthwhile to empirically test the theoretical argument derived from 
the M&A literature that the degree of autonomy granted to individual foreign subsidiaries 
negatively affects the strength of the relationship between cultural distance and an MNE’s 
preference for greenfields. Doing so will increase our understanding of the role of national 
cultural differences on an MNE’s choice of foreign establishment mode. 
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Global investment rose dramatically in the last decades of the 20th century, with the total 
annual foreign direct investment (FDI) outflow going from $ 37 billion in 1982 to $ 800 
billion in 1999, raising the total FDI outward stock to a dazzling 1999 figure of $ 4,759 
billion (UNCTAD, 2000). The associated growth in sales abroad has led to more cultural 
interactions between firms from different countries (Hofstede, 2001). Nevertheless, there has 
been surprisingly little research on the effect of national cultural distance on the choice by 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) between setting up a new affiliate from scratch (i.e., 
making a greenfield investment) and acquiring an existing one, what has been called the 
‘establishment mode choice’ (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995). Although several studies have 
identified cultural distance as one of the factors influencing this choice, Kogut and Singh’s 
(1988) pioneering study has so far been the only one focusing exclusively on this factor, while 
various others have merely controlled for its potential effect. Moreover, their findings have 
not been consistent, with some studies finding that a large cultural distance leads MNEs to 
prefer greenfields over acquisitions, and others finding an insignificant effect. 
In this paper we argue that these ambiguous findings are due to the fact that these 
studies have implicitly assumed that acquired subsidiaries are always integrated into an 
MNE’s network of operations. Their argument is that a large cultural distance makes it 
difficult to integrate acquisitions, which leads MNEs to opt for greenfields when they expand 
into culturally distant countries (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Larimo, 2003). However, we would 
expect post-acquisition integration difficulties in culturally distant countries to be 
considerably reduced if acquired subsidiaries are allowed to operate quasi independently, as 
there is little interaction between parent and subsidiary in this case. This should significantly 
lower an MNE’s preference for greenfields in culturally distant countries. 
We test this contention on a sample of 246 foreign expansions by Dutch MNEs into 52 
countries, and – after carefully controlling for a variety of other factors that have been found 
to influence the choice of foreign establishment mode – find that a large cultural distance 
leads to greenfield investments, but that this relationship is significantly weaker when 
subsidiaries are granted considerable autonomy. We also find that – keeping cultural distance 
constant – MNEs planning to grant little autonomy to their foreign subsidiaries prefer to 
make greenfield investments. A more detailed analysis reveals that MNEs especially insist on 
greenfields if they want tight integration in production, and that integration in other areas 
plays a secondary role. 
The next section explains how cultural distance, the planned degree of subsidiary 
autonomy, and their interaction influence an MNE’s establishment mode choice. In the 
                                                 
22 This paper is the result of joint work with Jean-François Hennart. 
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methodological section that follows we describe our data, the operationalization of our 
variables, and the statistical method used to test our hypotheses. We then present our results 
and offer our conclusions. 
 
3.2. Theory and hypotheses 
 
3.2.1. National cultural distance and establishment mode choice 
 
National cultural distance (henceforth, CD) can be defined as the degree to which the shared 
norms and values in one country differ from those in another country (cf. Hofstede, 2001; 
Kogut and Singh, 1988; Morosini et al., 1998). The international management (IM) literature 
has generally argued that CD influences the performance of greenfields and acquisitions in 
different ways (e.g., Hofstede, 2001; Neal, 1998). The cultural risks and costs associated with 
greenfields are generally considered to be limited, because the managers appointed to build 
the business – often expatriates – can carefully select and hire employees who fit the national 
culture of the MNE (Hofstede, 2001; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001), and can introduce the 
MNE’s organizational and management practices from the outset (Kogut and Singh, 1988; 
Larimo, 2003). The literature has seen foreign acquisitions as more risky because of the 
potentially large differences in national culture between an MNE and an acquired unit, which 
may result in considerable differences in their organizational and management practices 
(Kogut and Singh, 1988; Larimo, 2003), such as strategic decision making (Schneider and De 
Meyer, 1991), leadership (Dorfman and Howell, 1988; Puffer, 1993), management (Ralston 
et al., 1993), and negotiation styles (Adler and Graham, 1987; Campbell et al., 1988), 
conflict resolution strategies (Cushman and King, 1985), human-resource management 
practices (Ngo et al., 1998; Schuler, 1998), entrepreneurial characteristics (Thomas and 
Mueller, 2000), and corporate codes of ethics (Langlois and Schlegelmilch, 1990). 
In general, the larger the CD between two countries, the larger the differences in their 
firms’ organizational and management practices (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Larimo, 2003). 
Post-acquisition integration will thus become more difficult when cultural differences 
become larger, because the practices used by MNEs and acquired units will become 
increasingly incompatible (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995), and their transfer more 
problematic (Geringer et al., 1989). 
On the human side, large differences in organizational and management practices are 
likely to lead to misunderstandings, and misattributions of motives and intentions, all of 
which impede smooth interaction between people from different national cultures (Olie, 
1996). The problematic interactions that result cause negative feelings among the parties 
involved, such as uncertainty, confusion, helplessness, stress, discomfort, and hostility (Olie, 
1996; Hofstede, 2001; Elsass and Veiga, 1994). These feelings can be subsumed under the 
term ‘acculturative stress’, which is the disruptive tension that is felt by the members of a 
culture when they are required to interact with another culture (Very et al., 1996). In general, 
the larger the cultural differences between the interacting parties, the greater the amount of 
acculturative stress (Very et al., 1996; Berry, 1980). 
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The effect of acculturative stress is that it leads to the deterioration of intergroup 
relations by discouraging communication and promoting conflict between the respective 
groups (Neal, 1998). Such ‘acculturative conflict’ may result in a ‘cultural clash’ between the 
parties involved (Elsass and Veiga, 1994). Acculturative stress has been argued to decrease 
the commitment, loyalty, cooperation, satisfaction, and productivity of employees (Buono 
and Bowditch, 1989; Very et al., 1996), to increase conflict potential and to hinder agreement 
over management issues (Olie, 1996), and to lead to communication breakdowns, resistance 
to parent-company directives, management underperformance (Neal, 1998), and high 
management turnover (Buono and Bowditch, 1989). All these difficulties negatively affect 
post-acquisition performance (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Elsass and Veiga, 1994; Very et 
al., 1996). 
Previous research has therefore argued that managers anticipating the above difficulties 
tend to avoid acquisitions in culturally distant countries and prefer greenfield investments 
instead. The reason is that greenfields allow MNEs to choose their own workforce, and to 
install their own practices from the outset, thus minimizing these difficulties. In line with 
previous research, we therefore hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The larger the CD between an MNE’s home country and the target country of 
the expansion, the more likely that expansion will be a greenfield investment rather than an 
acquisition. 
 
In spite of this clear prediction, the results of the empirical studies examining the 
relationship between CD and an MNE’s foreign establishment mode choice have been mixed, 
with some studies (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2001; Harzing, 2002; Larimo, 2003) finding that a larger CD leads MNEs to prefer 
greenfields over acquisitions, and others (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; Padmanabhan and 
Cho, 1999; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000) finding an insignificant effect (see table 3.1). 
Below, we argue that these ambiguous findings are due to the fact that these studies have not 
taken into account that the degree of autonomy granted to foreign subsidiaries varies, and that 
this affects the strength of the relationship between CD and the likelihood of greenfields. 
First, however, we argue that the degree of subsidiary autonomy also directly affects an 




Table 3.1: Empirical studies on the impact of CD on establishment mode choice (greenfield or acquisition) 
 
Setting Study Home country Host country Operationalization of CD 
Observed 
impact of CD1 
Kogut and Singh (1988) Various U.S. Kogut and Singh index + 
Cho and Padmanabhan (1995) Japan Various Kogut and Singh index n.s. 
Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) The Netherlands Various Kogut and Singh index + 
Padmanabhan and Cho (1999) Japan Various Kogut and Singh index n.s. 
Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) Japan 




Kogut and Singh index n.s. 
Vermeulen and Barkema (2001) The Netherlands Various Kogut and Singh index + 
Harzing (2002) Various Various Kogut and Singh index + 
Larimo (2003) Various Various Kogut and Singh index + 
 
1 + = increased probability of a greenfield, n.s. = not significant 
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3.2.2. Subsidiary autonomy and establishment mode choice 
 
The relationship between the degree of autonomy granted to foreign subsidiaries and their 
establishment mode has received little attention in the literature. So far, the only study that 
has addressed this relationship is Harzing (2002). She introduced an MNE’s international 
strategy as a determinant of establishment mode choice by arguing that MNEs which follow 
global strategies should prefer to establish new subsidiaries from scratch, while MNEs with 
multidomestic strategies should have a preference for acquisitions. According to her, MNEs 
following global strategies strive for a high degree of subsidiary integration in order to 
capture economies of scale and scope (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989), which is easier to achieve 
through greenfields, because MNE parents can then transfer their latest production 
technologies and organize their affiliates to their specific preferences without having to deal 
with existing operations, structures, and procedures. MNEs following multidomestic 
strategies, on the other hand, grant their subsidiaries a relatively high degree of autonomy 
because they aim to be locally responsive (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989), meaning that they try 
to respond to differences in customer preferences across countries (Harzing, 2000). This 
requires high amounts of local market knowledge. As such knowledge is generally tacit and 
therefore difficult to purchase in disembodied form (Hennart, 1982), it can best be obtained 
through the acquisition of local firms (Harzing, 2002). 
Analyzing 277 foreign entries by MNEs from 9 different countries, Harzing (2002) 
indeed finds support for the hypothesis that MNEs following a global strategy prefer 
greenfield investments, while those with a multidomestic strategy prefer acquisitions. This 
result seems to be driven primarily by the different levels of subsidiary autonomy associated 
with global and multidomestic strategies. While global strategies usually imply low levels of 
subsidiary autonomy, multidomestic ones are generally based on a decentralized network of 
autonomous subsidiaries (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). It could therefore be argued that 
MNEs granting their subsidiaries little autonomy (i.e., those following a global strategy) 
should prefer greenfields, while MNEs with autonomous subsidiaries (i.e., those following a 
multidomestic strategy) should prefer acquisitions. However, subsidiaries within an MNE 
may have different roles, and may therefore be granted different levels of autonomy 
(Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994). We therefore contend that the 
planned degree of autonomy for a specific subsidiary is a more precise predictor of an MNE’s 
establishment mode choice than its overall international strategy. Specifically, we expect an 
MNE that plans to grant little autonomy to a particular foreign subsidiary to opt for a 
greenfield investment, because this makes it possible to organize and operate the subsidiary 
according to headquarters’ preferences from the outset (Hennart and Park, 1993). On the 
other hand, an MNE that plans to give a subsidiary a quasi-autonomous status should care 
less about its internal structure and procedures and, moreover, can be expected to seek (tacit) 
local knowledge in order to be locally responsive. It should therefore be more likely to opt for 
an acquisition. Formally: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the planned degree of subsidiary autonomy, the more likely an 
MNE will prefer an acquisition over a greenfield investment. 
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3.2.3. The combined effect of cultural distance and subsidiary autonomy 
 
As stated earlier and shown in table 3.1, the results of previous empirical studies into the 
effect of CD on an MNE’s establishment mode choice have been mixed. Their theoretical 
argument has been that a large CD results in considerable differences in organizational and 
management practices, which makes it difficult to integrate acquired subsidiaries and, hence, 
leads MNEs to opt for greenfields when they expand into culturally distant countries (Kogut 
and Singh, 1988; Larimo, 2003). However, “how different one culture is from another has 
little meaning until those cultures are brought into contact with one another” (Shenkar, 2001: 
527-528). In other words, national cultural differences are not a problem – in the sense that 
they do not lead to conflicts and poor performance – as long as the amount of interaction 
between the cultures involved is low. By arguing that foreign acquisitions become less 
attractive when CD increases, previous studies have implicitly assumed that all acquisitions 
involve the same amount of cultural interaction. However, this amount varies significantly 
from one acquisition to another (Olie, 1996; Shenkar, 2001). The prime determinant of the 
amount of cultural interaction is the degree of autonomy granted to the acquired firm (Buono 
and Bowditch, 1989; Elsass and Veiga, 1994). If an acquired unit is tightly integrated into an 
MNE’s network of operations, there will be a large amount of interaction between the two 
parties, and integration difficulties are likely to occur (Neal, 1998). If an acquired subsidiary 
is treated as a quasi-autonomous unit, on the other hand, there will be no or only limited 
interaction between the MNE and the acquired unit (Olie, 1996). In this case the potential for 
ex post integration problems will be small and negative performance effects negligible 
(Hofstede, 2001; Neal, 1998). 
Thus, the integration difficulties associated with acquisitions in culturally distant 
countries are considerably reduced if acquired subsidiaries are allowed to operate quasi 
independently. An MNE’s preference for greenfield investments in culturally distant 
countries should therefore be significantly lower when it plans to grant the subsidiary a high 
degree of autonomy. Formally: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The planned degree of subsidiary autonomy weakens the relationship between 
CD and an MNE’s preference for greenfield investments. 
 
The above may explain the mixed results of the previous empirical studies into the 
effect of CD on an MNE’s establishment mode choice: Their analyzed samples may have 
contained systematic variations in the degree of autonomy granted to foreign subsidiaries. 
These variations may have been caused by differences in the characteristics of the MNEs 
studied, such as their national origin, and/or of the industries they entered (for example, 
predominantly global or multidomestic ones), among others, thus producing a significantly 
positive effect of CD on the likelihood of greenfields in some studies, but an insignificant 
effect in others. Interestingly, all three studies that found an insignificant effect of CD studied 
Japanese MNEs, suggesting that these MNEs – although well known for their preference for 
tightly-controlled greenfields – also make quasi-autonomous acquisitions in culturally distant 
(i.e., Western) countries where suitable takeover targets are available (cf. Child et al., 2001). 




3.3.1. Data collection 
 
Data were collected through a mail survey conducted in the summer of 2003. The 12-page 
questionnaire used was first pretested on various scholars specialized in international 
management, and subsequently on five senior managers whose firms had recently established 
or acquired one or more foreign subsidiaries. These pretests led to several small 
modifications in the wording of questions. 
A first round of questionnaires and hand-signed accompanying letters was sent in June, 
followed by a second round in early July. The questionnaires were personally directed to 
members of the Executive Board of 821 Dutch MNEs with more than 100 employees23 
(Dutch subsidiaries of foreign firms were excluded). The names of these board members and 
their firms had been identified through the ‘REview and Analysis of Companies in Holland’ 
(REACH) database24, which contains Chamber of Commerce data on all firms registered in 
the Netherlands25. 
The questionnaire was sent to 1,782 managers (1520 Dutch and 262 foreign). Eighty-
nine of these turned out to be no longer employed at the firms contacted, while another 19 
worked for firms without foreign subsidiaries. Three hundred and twenty-two questionnaires 
were filled out and returned – a response rate of 19.2%, comparable to that of other foreign 
entry mode studies using survey data (e.g., Kim and Hwang, 1992: 22%; Brouthers et al., 
1996: 20%; Harzing, 2002: 20%). Respondents were mostly CEOs and CFOs, although in 
some cases they held other positions, such as Member of the Executive Board, and Director 
of Corporate Development26. 
The questionnaire was structured in such a way that respondents would only provide 
data on their firm’s foreign expansions if (1) their firm was responsible for foreign entry 
mode decisions, (2) the expansions had taken place in recent years, and (3) they had been 
personally involved in them. As a result, only 200 of the 322 respondents provided data on 
one of their firm’s foreign greenfield investments and/or acquisitions. In total we received 
data on 248 foreign expansions by 159 firms. For 15 firms, there were multiple respondents, 
either two (11 firms), three (1 firm), or four (3 firms). In the few cases where these 
respondents provided data on the same expansion, their responses were averaged. 
Two expansions were excluded from the analyses; one because of missing data on one 
of the crucial variables (i.e., the planned degree of subsidiary autonomy), the other because 
its parent firm turned out to have far less than 100 employees. The final sample thus consists 
of 246 expansions – 127 greenfields and 119 acquisitions – by 157 firms into 52 countries. 
The geographic distribution of the expansions is shown in table 3.2, while the industry 
                                                 
23 When lower-level entities, i.e. divisions and business units, turned out to be responsible for foreign 
expansions as well, we also attempted to send a questionnaire to the heads of these entities. This was mainly the 
case for the largest Dutch MNEs with quasi-autonomous divisions. 
24 We crosschecked each board member name against the names reported in the firms’ latest annual reports and 
those reported on their websites in order to make sure that we sent the questionnaires to the right persons. 
25 All firms in the Netherlands are legally required to file data with the Chamber of Commerce. 
26 In a few cases respondents had still another position, such as Export Director or Corporate Controller. 
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distribution of their parent firms is shown in table 3.3. Eighty-four firms are into 
manufacturing, while the other 73 are into either services or wholesale trade. Their annual 
sales vary between 4.8 million and 66.6 billion euros, with an average of over 3 billion, and 
they have between 105 and 270,739 employees, with an average of approximately 12,400. 
The number of 4-digit industries in which the firms are active varies between 1 and 13, with 
an average of 2.8. 
 
Table 3.2: Geographic distribution of the expansions in the sample 
 
Region Number of expansions Percentage 
Belgium and Luxembourg 24 9.8 
Northern Europe 13 5.3 
United Kingdom and Ireland 32 13.0 
Southern Europe 28 11.4 
Germanic countries 28 11.4 
Eastern Europe 44 17.9 
North America 27 11.0 
Latin America 15 6.1 
Asia 26 10.6 
Africa 6 2.4 
Australia 3 1.2 
 
Table 3.3: Industry distribution of the parent firms 
 
Main industry Number of firms Percentage 
Agriculture and horticulture 4 2.5 
Food and beverages 14 8.9 
Machinery and electronics 15 9.6 
Wood and paper products 11 7.0 
Chemicals and synthetics 15 9.6 
Metal products 13 8.3 
Construction 7 4.5 
Other manufacturing 5 3.2 
Retail and wholesale trade 20 12.7 






Financial services 15 9.6 
Professional services 23 14.6 
Other services 3 1.9 
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3.3.2. Non-response bias 
 
In order to assess whether the 159 MNEs from which we received expansion data are 
representative of the full population of Dutch MNEs, we examined whether they differed 
from the 662 MNEs that did not provide data. Specifically, we examined whether the two 
groups of MNEs were significantly different in annual worldwide sales and number of 
employees27. T-tests that corrected for unequal variances across the two groups indicate that 
the MNEs that provided expansion data are significantly larger than those that did not, both in 
annual worldwide sales and in number of employees (p<0.01 for both variables, two tailed), 
with the former having on average sales of 3.34 billion euros and over 12,000 employees, and 
the latter sales of 1.16 billion and approximately 2800 employees. Hence, it should be kept in 
mind that our findings only apply to the largest Dutch MNEs, and that they are not 
necessarily generalizable to the smaller ones. 
The fact that our expansion data mainly come from large MNEs should not be 
surprising for two reasons. First, large MNEs are more likely to have established and/or 
acquired foreign subsidiaries in recent years, and are therefore more likely to qualify for 
participation in the study, as we explicitly asked for data on recent foreign expansions. 
Second, because these large MNEs on average expand abroad more often, their management 
should be more interested in participating in the study, as we gave respondents the option to 




Establishment mode. The dependent variable is the foreign establishment mode chosen by 
an MNE, either greenfield investment or acquisition. We created a dummy variable EM, 
which was coded 1 in case of a greenfield, and 0 otherwise. 
Cultural distance. In line with all previous studies on the effect of CD on the choice 
of establishment mode, we measured CD by the Kogut and Singh (1988) index, which is 
based on Hofstede’s (1980) country scores of national culture. Analyzing questionnaire data 
on work-related values obtained from IBM employees working in 40 different countries28, 
Hofstede identified four dimensions along which national cultures differ, viz. power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity29, with each dimension representing a 
varied response to a universal societal problem (Hofstede, 2001). He assigned each country a 
score on each dimension that varied between about 0 and 10030. Many studies have 
confirmed the validity of Hofstede’s dimensions (e.g., Van Oudenhoven, 2001; for an 
overview of earlier replications, see Sφndergaard, 1994), suggesting that his findings can 
                                                 
27 Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain sales and employee data for all MNEs that did not provide data. 
28 Later, supplementary data became available for another 10 countries and 3 multi-country regions, thereby 
raising the total number of countries to 50 (Hofstede, 1983). 
29 Later research by Hofstede and Bond (1988) uncovered a fifth dimension along which national cultures differ 
as well, i.e. long-term orientation. Unfortunately, scores on this dimension are available for a limited number of 
countries only, which reduces its empirical applicability.  
30 For an overview of these country scores, see Hofstede (2001: 500). 
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reliably be used to classify countries according to their national cultures, and to determine the 
CD between them31. 
The Kogut and Singh index is based on the differences in Hofstede’s scores between 
the foreign country entered and an MNE’s home country. These differences are corrected for 
differences in the variance of each dimension and then arithmetically averaged. 
Algebraically: 
 
where CDj is the cultural distance between country j and the MNE’s home country, Iij is 
country j’s score on the ith cultural dimension, Iih is the score of the MNE’s home country on 
this dimension, and Vi is the variance of the score of the dimension. 
The main reason for using the Kogut and Singh index, in spite of its limitations (e.g., 
Shenkar, 2001), is to maximize comparability with previous studies by ruling out the 
possibility that our findings are due to the use of a different measure of CD. 
Subsidiary autonomy. The planned degree of subsidiary autonomy was assessed 
through 12 items. We asked managers to indicate how much autonomy their management 
team intended to give the subsidiary at the time it was established or acquired. We asked 
them to do so for 12 different business activities32 on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘very little 
autonomy intended’ to ‘very much autonomy intended’, and also provided a category ‘no 
intentions in advance’, in case managers had not considered the desired degree of autonomy 
for one or more activities ex ante. We deliberately asked for the planned degree of autonomy 
for each activity, because this should be a better predictor of establishment mode choice than 
the actual ex post degree, as the latter may be a de facto consequence of unsuccessful 
integration attempts. 
We created a summated autonomy scale by combining the individual autonomy items 
into a single composite measure. Hair et al. (1998) state that for a summated scale to be 
reliable, the inter-item correlations should exceed .30 and the item-to-scale correlations .50. 
We therefore excluded the item ‘raising capital’, as it has a low correlation with most of the 
other items and an item-to-scale correlation of only .33 33. The 11 remaining items generally 
satisfied Hair et al.’s (1998) correlation criteria and formed a highly reliable scale with a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .89. Their scores were therefore averaged to form a composite measure 
of the planned degree of subsidiary autonomy (AUTONOMY)34. 
                                                 
31 Although other scholars (e.g., Schwartz, 1994) have more recently developed similar national-culture 
frameworks to classify countries, these frameworks have so far not been subject to extensive validation, which 
makes the one developed by Hofstede more reliable, as it has been proven to be robust. 
32 These activities were procurement, product/service design, R&D, manufacturing/service process, the use of 
brand names, packaging, pricing, advertising and sales promotion, the design of reward systems, job design, 
selection and training of employees, and raising capital. 
33 These low correlations are caused by the fact that subsidiaries generally had very little autonomy with respect 
to raising capital. In 205 of the 246 cases respondents assigned a score of 1 to this item. 
34 It should be noted that we did not always have autonomy scores on all 11 items, either because respondents 
indicated that their management team had not considered the desired degree of autonomy for a particular 
activity ex ante, or because a subsidiary did not perform all 11 business activities. As a result, we could not use 
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Cultural distance x Subsidiary autonomy. In order to avoid multicollinearity 
problems while testing hypothesis 3, the variables CD and AUTONOMY were centered 
before they were multiplied to create the interaction term CD x AUTONOMY. Although this 
procedure does not affect the interpretation of the regression coefficient of the interaction 
effect, it does change the interpretation of the two main effects when all three terms are 
included in the same model. Specifically, the main effects no longer represent constant 
effects, but rather the effects of the variables on establishment mode choice at the mean of the 
other variable (Aiken and West, 1991). 
 
3.3.4. Control variables 
 
In order to bring out more clearly the true effects of CD, the planned degree of subsidiary 
autonomy, and their interaction on establishment mode choice, we controlled for a variety of 
other firm-, industry-, and country-level variables that have been theorized and found to 
affect an MNE’s choice between greenfield and acquisition. 
MNE size. Compared to greenfield investments, acquisitions generally require more 
financial and managerial resources, which large MNEs are more likely to possess (Kogut and 
Singh, 1988). This could make them more active acquirers than small MNEs. We controlled 
for this potential effect by including the variable SIZE, which is measured by an MNE’s 
worldwide annual sales (in thousands of euros). Data for this variable were obtained from the 
REACH database. 
Degree of diversification. Widely diversified MNEs should prefer acquisitions over 
greenfields because their main advantage consists of management control skills embedded in 
senior management, an advantage that can be relatively easily exploited through acquisitions 
(Hennart and Park, 1993). An MNE’s degree of diversification (DIVERSIFIED) was 
measured by its number of 4-digit BIK codes as indicated in the REACH database35. 
International experience. An MNE’s level of international experience may encourage 
either greenfields or acquisitions. On the one hand, experienced firms may possess the 
necessary capabilities to establish new subsidiaries abroad (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998), 
but on the other they may be better able to absorb and utilize the knowledge held by local 
firms, which should make acquisitions more likely (Andersson and Svensson, 1994). 
INTEXP was measured by an MNE’s total number of foreign subsidiaries (wholly and 
partially owned)36. This number was obtained from the MNEs’ annual reports or from their 
corporate websites. As some firms do not report a list of their subsidiaries in their annual 
report or on their website, we also asked for the number of foreign subsidiaries in the 
questionnaire. 
Host-country experience. Previous experience with the host country entered has also 
been argued to influence an MNE’s establishment mode choice. On the one hand, MNEs with 
considerable experience of a country may already possess all the knowledge required to 
                                                 
35 The BIK-code is the Dutch equivalent of the American SIC-code. It has been developed by the Dutch 
Chamber of Commerce. 
36 This measure is not optimal, as the number of foreign subsidiaries depends on the way in which an MNE 
organizes its international operations. A better measure, such as the number of foreign countries in which the 
MNE operates, was not available for all firms. However, the two measures are highly correlated (0.75). 
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successfully operate in that country and, hence, may not need to make acquisitions to obtain 
this (tacit) knowledge. On the other hand, MNEs with much host-country experience may be 
better at managing local acquisitions, and may therefore be more likely to make them 
(Hennart and Park, 1993). An MNE’s level of host-country experience was assessed through 
the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to indicate whether their firm had previously been 
active in the country entered through (1) licensing agreements, (2) export (direct or through 
sales agents), (3) sales subsidiaries, (4) manufacturing or service subsidiaries, or (5) other 
means (see below). As the amount of interaction with locals and the degree of integration in 
the local economy – and thus the contribution to the MNE’s local knowledge base – varies 
across these experience types (Johansson and Vahlne, 1977), we assigned different values to 
them. Specifically, the first four experience types were given the values of 1 to 4, 
respectively. In 10 cases, firms had other experiences with the country entered37. The value 
we assigned to these experiences depended on the description provided by the respondents. 
The resulting variable HCEXP is the sum of the values assigned to the different experience 
types.  
Mode experience. MNEs with much experience with a particular establishment mode 
(greenfield or acquisition) are likely to use this establishment mode for future expansions as 
well. This is either because they have gradually developed the skills and routines to 
effectively manage the establishment mode, thus reducing its implementation costs, or 
because they have become isomorphic, copying their past behavior or that of rivals 
(Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999). GFEXP and ACQEXP were assessed through the 
questionnaire and measured on a 7-point scale. 
MNE type. As our sample consists of expansions by both manufacturing and service 
MNEs, we controlled for potential differences in their entry mode behavior by including the 
dummy variable FIRMTYPE, which was coded 1 for non-manufacturing MNEs – i.e., service 
and wholesale firms – and 0 otherwise. 
Transfer of technological knowledge. MNEs that plan to transfer large amounts of 
firm-specific technological knowledge to their foreign subsidiaries should have a clear 
preference for greenfields, as such knowledge is easier to transfer to a purposely-chosen labor 
force than to one inherited from an acquisition (Hennart and Park, 1993). We therefore asked 
respondents to indicate on a 7-point scale the amount of proprietary technological knowledge 
that was intended to be transferred to the subsidiary at the time it was established or acquired 
(TECHTRANS). 
Product relatedness. MNEs expanding into new industries should prefer to make 
acquisitions, as this allows them to obtain the tacit product-specific knowledge they need to 
successfully operate in the new industry (Caves, 1996; Hennart and Park, 1993). We asked 
respondents for a description of the subsidiary’s main products/services and compared it to 
REACH’s description of the parent’s main and secondary activities. The resulting variable 
UNRELATED was assigned a value of 0 if the subsidiary’s main products/services were the 
same as the parent’s main products/services, a value of 1 if the subsidiary’s main 
products/services were the same as the parent’s secondary products/services, and a value of 2 
                                                 
37 These experiences include temporary projects, procurement from local firms, and attending trade shows, 
among others. 
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if the subsidiary’s main products/services were different from both the parent’s main and 
secondary products/services.   
Subsidiary size. MNEs have also been found to acquire when the (planned) size of a 
subsidiary is relatively large. The likely reason is that acquired subsidiaries come with their 
own cadre of managers, which is beneficial if a subsidiary is large and the MNE does not 
have the managerial resources needed for a greenfield investment (Caves and Mehra, 1986). 
A subsidiary’s (planned) relative size (in terms of its number of employees) was assessed 
through the questionnaire and measured on a 7-point scale (SUBSIZE). 
Joint venture. Although the choice of establishment mode – greenfield or acquisition 
– and that of ownership structure – joint venture (JV) or wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) – 
are generally considered to be two separate decisions, Caves and Mehra (1986) and Larimo 
(2003) nevertheless found that greenfields were more likely to be JVs rather than WOSs. We 
therefore controlled for a subsidiary’s ownership structure by entering the variable JV, which 
was coded 1 if respondents indicated that a subsidiary had one or more local co-owners, and 
0 otherwise.  
Demand growth and competition. A major difference between greenfield and 
acquisition entry is that the former increases local supply, which often reduces prices and 
profits and may therefore provoke a competitive response from incumbents (Hennart and 
Park, 1993). Such a response is more likely if an industry is growing slowly, and if 
competition is weak, as greenfield entry will lead to a large increase in supply and therefore 
to a large reduction in prices and profits in this case. If an industry is highly competitive 
and/or growing rapidly, on the other hand, the supply-increasing features of greenfields are 
less of a problem, as each incumbent’s profit is hardly affected in this case. This makes 
greenfields more tolerable for incumbents and, hence, more likely. Respondents were 
therefore asked for the expected growth rate of demand for the subsidiary’s products/services 
(DEMGRTH) and the level of competition it was expected to encounter (COMP) at the time 
of the decision to expand abroad. Both variables were measured on a 7-point scale. 
Host-country risk. Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) found that MNEs prefer to enter 
risky countries through greenfields. The likely reason is that greenfields can gradually and 
carefully be built from scratch, which should be an advantage in countries whose economic 
and political environment is uncertain and unpredictable, as losses can be reduced to a 
minimum in this way (Bell, 1996; Sharma, 1998). HCRISK was assessed through the 
questionnaire and measured on a 7-point scale. Respondents were asked how large they 
expected the economic, political, and other external risks for the subsidiary to be at the time it 
was established or acquired. 
Restrictions and incentives. Host-country policies in the form of both legal 
restrictions and governmental incentives constrain an MNE’s establishment mode choice 
(e.g., Padmanabhan and Cho, 1995). We therefore asked respondents to indicate on a 7-point 
scale (ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘to a very large extent’) the extent to which their firm was 
confronted with legal restrictions on acquiring local firms, and with governmental incentives 
to enter through greenfield rather than through acquisition. Both items formed a reliable scale 
with a Cronbach’s alpha of .71. We therefore created the composite measure RESTR_INCEN 
by averaging the scores on the two items.  
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Lack of acquisition targets. A final factor that has been argued and found to affect an 
MNE’s establishment mode choice is the availability of suitable acquisition targets (e.g., 
Zejan, 1990). If such targets are lacking, MNEs have to resort to greenfield investments. The 
variable LACKTARG was obtained by asking respondents to rate on a 7-point scale the 
extent to which their firm was confronted with a lack of suitable local acquisition candidates 
at the time the subsidiary was established or acquired. 
 
3.3.5. Statistical method 
 
Since the dependent variable in our study is dichotomous, we employed binomial logistic 
regression analysis. The regression coefficients estimate the impact of the independent 
variables on the probability that an expansion will be a greenfield investment. A positive sign 
for a coefficient indicates that the independent variable increases the probability of a 
greenfield. In general terms the model can be expressed as P(yi = 1) = 1 / (1 + exp(–a – Xiβ)), 
where yi is the dependent variable, Xi is the vector of independent variables for the ith 
observation, a is the intercept parameter and β is the vector of regression coefficients 





Table 3.4 gives the descriptive statistics of all variables and their correlations. The 
correlations between the independent variables are typically moderate to low, implying little 
multicollinearity problems. The only worrisome correlation is that between SIZE and 
INTEXP (r=0.61), but excluding either one of these variables from the models reported 
below did not change our results. 
Model 1 in table 3.5 presents the logistic regression results for hypotheses 1 and 2. The 
model has a high overall explanatory power, with a Chi-squared value of 108.5 (p=0.0000). 
Another way to assess how well a maximum likelihood model fits the data is to examine its 
classification table (Amemiya, 1981). The classification rate thus obtained can be compared 
to that which would have been obtained by chance, the latter being equal to a2 + b2, where a 
is the proportion of greenfields and b the proportion of acquisitions in the sample. In our 
sample, the classification rate that would have been obtained by chance is 50.05%. Table 3.6 
shows that model 1 correctly classifies 78.05% of the expansions in our sample, which is 
considerably higher. The table furthermore shows that both the model’s sensitivity – its 
ability to correctly predict ‘ones’ (greenfields) – and specificity – its ability to correctly 




Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. EM 0.52 0.50                   
2. CD 2.19 1.07 0.27                  
3. AUTONOMY 3.16 0.89 -0.23 -0.12                 
4. SIZE 3,274,963 8,464,350 -0.06 0.04 0.10                
5. DIVERSIFIED 2.80 1.85 -0.08 -0.11 0.08 0.29               
6. INTEXP 28.1 45.1 -0.07 0.02 -0.02 0.61 0.29              
7. HCEXP 2.95 2.37 -0.21 -0.03 0.04 0.15 0.11 0.23             
8. GFEXP 5.09 1.63 0.18 0.14 -0.11 0.13 -0.04 0.29 -0.01            
9. ACQEXP 4.83 1.86 -0.22 -0.05 0.09 0.33 0.18 0.44 0.19 0.22           
10. FIRMTYPE 0.50 0.50 0.02 -0.11 0.09 0.10 -0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.07          
11. TECHTRANS 4.18 2.02 0.17 0.11 0.04 -0.02 -0.09 0.00 -0.05 0.07 -0.03 -0.04         
12. UNRELATED 0.20 0.48 -0.12 -0.11 0.16 0.21 0.12 0.13 0.05 -0.06 -0.01 0.10 -0.06        
13. SUBSIZE 2.57 1.66 -0.17 -0.10 0.11 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.02 -0.11 0.24 -0.04       
14. JV 0.28 0.45 -0.13 0.11 0.14 -0.03 -0.05 -0.12 0.07 0.04 -0.11 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.06      
15. DEMGRTH 5.42 0.93 0.25 0.16 -0.06 0.09 -0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.07 0.01 -0.07 0.12 -0.04 -0.01 0.02     
16. COMP 4.49 1.33 -0.03 -0.15 0.11 -0.01 -0.07 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.00 -0.13 0.11 -0.02 0.02    
17. HCRISK 2.98 1.53 0.24 0.39 -0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.17 0.07 0.00 -0.04 0.12 -0.06 0.08 0.16 0.15 -0.04   
18. RESTR_INCEN 1.68 1.23 -0.05 0.23 0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.08 -0.01 0.13 0.17 0.04 0.10 0.28  




Table 3.5: Logistic regression results: Greenfield vs. Acquisition (greenfield = 1) 
 











































































































































   
Number of observations 246 246 
Model Chi-squared 108.50*** 114.21*** 
Log likelihood -116.13 -113.28 
Pseudo R-squared 0.318 0.335 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; one-tailed tests for variables of interest and control variables with 
clear predictions, two-tailed tests for control variables with opposing predictions. 
 
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 3.6: Classification table for model 1 
 
  True  
  Greenfields Acquisitions Total 
 Greenfields 98 25 123 
Predicted Acquisitions 29 94 123 
 Total 127 119 246 
Sensitivity:  77.17%   
Specificity:   78.99%  
Correctly classified:    78.05% 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that MNE’s expanding into culturally distant countries would 
be more likely to do so through greenfield investments. The results of model 1 in table 3.5 
support this prediction: the regression coefficient of CD is positive and significant at the 0.01 
level. Hypothesis 2 predicted that MNEs that plan to grant little autonomy to a foreign 
subsidiary would prefer greenfields over acquisitions. Consistent with the hypothesis, the 
coefficient of AUTONOMY is negative and significant (p<0.05), indicating that MNEs 
planning to grant much autonomy to a subsidiary choose acquisitions, while those planning to 
grant little autonomy opt for greenfields. 
The control variables generally have their predicted effects. MNEs with host-country 
and acquisition experience are more likely to acquire (p<0.05 and p<0.001, respectively), 
while those with greenfield experience and those intending to transfer large amounts of 
technological knowledge are more likely to choose greenfields (p<0.001 and p<0.01, 
respectively). Furthermore, large subsidiaries are more likely to be acquired (p<0.05), while 
high-growth industries and risky countries are more likely to be entered through greenfields 
(p<0.01 for both variables)38. A lack of suitable local acquisition targets also leads firms to 
choose greenfields (p<0.01). 
A few unexpected findings warrant some attention. First of all, MNEs confronted with 
governmental restrictions on acquisitions and with incentives to enter through greenfields 
rather than through acquisitions, are nevertheless more likely to acquire. Although this seems 
remarkable, previous establishment mode studies also came to this finding (Cho and 
Padmanabhan, 1995; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999). Cho and Padmanabhan (1995) provide 
three possible explanations. Firstly, it may be that governmental restrictions on acquisitions 
are not binding (as are governmental incentives), but negotiable. However, if this were the 
case, our variable would be insignificant. Secondly, the existence of such restrictions and 
incentives may signal that suitable acquisition candidates are present, which may attract 
foreign acquirers. However, our data do not support this explanation, as the correlation 
between RESTR_INCEN and LACKTARG is positive, implying that in restrictive countries 
suitable acquisition candidates are lacking. Thirdly, there may be a bias towards acquisitions 
in countries with governmental restrictions if MNEs that fail to obtain governmental approval 
choose to abstain from investment altogether, instead of making a greenfield investment. 
However, this explanation assumes that most MNEs would ex ante prefer to enter restrictive 
                                                 




countries through acquisition (and hence that few would prefer greenfield entry), and that 
relatively many of them would actually get governmental approval, which seems unrealistic. 
If one or both of these assumptions do not hold, there should be a bias towards greenfield 
investments. 
We therefore suspect that this surprising finding is due to still another reason, which is 
that the variable RESTR_INCEN was measured through survey data. Specifically, whereas 
respondents providing data on acquisitions made in countries with governmental restrictions 
and incentives probably indicated that their firms were (heavily) confronted with them, those 
providing data on greenfields that were undertaken in such countries are less likely to do so, 
presumably because their firms planned to undertake a greenfield investment from the outset, 
and were thus never confronted with restrictions nor incentives. The significantly negative 
coefficient for RESTR_INCEN thus suggests that firms do generally not resort to greenfield 
investments as a second-best option when they are faced with severe restrictions on 
acquisitions and/or strong incentives to enter through greenfields. Otherwise, some of the 
respondents providing data on a greenfield should have indicated that their firms were 
confronted with such restrictions and incentives as well (leading them to opt for a greenfield), 
and this would have rendered the coefficient for RESTR_INCEN insignificant. 
A second somewhat surprising finding is that the ownership structure of the subsidiary 
matters (cf. Caves and Mehra, 1986; Larimo, 2003). Specifically, our results show that, 
compared to greenfields, acquisitions are more likely to be JVs (p<0.01). This may be 
because MNEs facing governmental restrictions on acquisitions manage to satisfy host 
governments by making partial acquisitions of local firms. A final unexpected finding is that 
diversified MNEs are slightly more likely to opt for greenfields rather than acquisitions 
(p<0.1). 
Model 2 in table 3.5 tests hypothesis 3, which proposes that the relationship between 
CD and the likelihood of greenfields is weaker when an MNE plans to grant a subsidiary a 
high degree of autonomy. Consistent with this hypothesis, the coefficient of the interaction 
term CD x AUTONOMY is negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that MNEs 
are less likely to choose greenfields in culturally distant countries when they plan to grant 
their subsidiaries considerable autonomy. As stated earlier, the coefficients of CD and 
AUTONOMY now reflect the effects of these variables at the mean of the other. The two 
coefficients indicate that there is a positive and significant (p<0.01) effect of CD on the 
likelihood of a greenfield at the mean of AUTONOMY, and a negative and significant 
(p<0.05) effect of AUTONOMY on the likelihood of a greenfield at the mean of CD. The 
effects of the control variables are the same as in model 1, except for the variable 
DIVERSIFIED, whose coefficient is no longer significant. 
We performed a likelihood ratio test to compare model 1 and 2. This test showed that 
adding the interaction term CD x AUTONOMY leads to a significant reduction in log 
likelihood (-2∆LL=5,70; p<0.05), implying that the explanatory power of model 2 is 
significantly higher than that of model 1. This is also indicated by the fairly large increase in 
the pseudo R-squared from 0.318 to 0.335. 
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3.5. Additional analyses 
 
Our results so far show that our composite measure of the planned degree of subsidiary 
autonomy is a significant determinant of an MNE’s establishment mode choice. MNEs that 
want their subsidiary to be tightly integrated in their network show a preference for 
greenfields, while those that are content with autonomous subsidiaries prefer acquisitions. As 
stated earlier, our composite measure consists of 11 business activities, and it is interesting to 
examine whether their impact on an MNE’s choice between greenfield and acquisition 
differs. We therefore performed a (principal component) factor analysis on the 11 items of 
our overall autonomy measure, using an oblique (OBLIMIN) rotation method39. Three factors 
with an eigenvalue larger than 1 together explained 67.6% of the total variance40. As table 3.7 
shows, all items had factor loadings higher than 0.4 – the cutoff suggested by Hair et al. 
(1998) – and primarily loaded on only one factor, except for the item ‘packaging’. We 
therefore removed this item and performed another factor analysis on the 10 remaining items. 
This produced the same three clearly interpretable factors (with loadings highly similar to 
those of the first factor analysis), which together explain 68.8% of the total variance. 
 
Table 3.7: Pattern matrix of the principal component factor analysis with OBLIMIN 
rotation 
 
Autonomy item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
1. Procurement 0.47 0.22 0.14 
2. Product/service design 0.90 -0.04 0.06 
3. R&D 0.94 -0.06 -0.06 
4. Manufacturing/service process 0.45 0.36 0.15 
5. Use of brand names 0.16 -0.04 0.62 
6. Packaging 0.31 0.30 0.39 
7. Pricing 0.04 -0.07 0.86 
8. Advertising and sales promotion -0.16 0.06 0.91 
9. Design of reward systems -0.02 0.77 0.04 
10. Job design 0.17 0.87 -0.11 
11. Selection and training of employees -0.13 0.90 0.03 
 
The first factor is made up of four items, i.e. procurement, product/service design, 
R&D, and manufacturing/service process. This factor is clearly production related. The four 
items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha was 0.81) and were therefore averaged to 
create a composite measure of the planned degree of subsidiary autonomy in production 
(AUTONOMY_PROD). The second factor consists of three items: the design of reward 
                                                 
39 Although orthogonal (VARIMAX) rotation is the most commonly employed rotation procedure, it assumes 
that the different dimensions underlying a concept are uncorrelated. This assumption is likely to be violated in 
this case, as the different dimensions of subsidiary autonomy are likely to be correlated to at least some extent, 
since they theoretically reflect different aspects of a single concept. Oblique rotation methods, on the other hand, 
do not assume that the dimensions underlying a concept are uncorrelated and are therefore more realistic. If the 
ultimate goal is to obtain a number of theoretically meaningful factors, an oblique rotation method is appropriate 
(Hair et al., 1998: 109-110). 
40 VARIMAX rotation produced highly similar results. 
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systems, job design, and selection and training of employees. All these items represent HRM 
activities. Their Cronbach’s alpha was 0.82, so the item scores were averaged into a 
composite measure of planned subsidiary autonomy in HRM (AUTONOMY_HRM). The 
third factor consists of the use of brand names, pricing, and advertising and sales promotion, 
which are all marketing activities. With a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.74, they comprised a reliable 
scale, so we again averaged their scores so as to arrive at a composite measure of the planned 
degree of subsidiary autonomy in marketing (AUTONOMY_MK). 
We tested the effects of each of these three aspects of planned subsidiary autonomy on 
an MNE’s establishment mode choice. In order to avoid multicollinearity problems, each 
measure was entered in a different model. The results of these models are shown in table 3.8. 
All three models have a good explanatory power, as their Chi-squared values are all 
significant (p=0.0000)41. They show that the effects of all three autonomy aspects are 
negative, as expected, but that only the coefficient of AUTONOMY_PROD is significant 
(p<0.001), with that of AUTONOMY_MK approaching significance (p=0.11)42. Apparently, 
MNEs that plan to grant a subsidiary little autonomy in production have a clear preference for 
greenfield investments, but those planning to grant a subsidiary little autonomy in marketing 
or HRM are indifferent between greenfields and acquisitions. These findings may be 
explained as follows. An MNE that plans to grant a subsidiary little autonomy in production 
probably intends to structure the manufacturing/service process of the subsidiary in the same 
way as at home. This can be done more easily through a greenfield investment, because in 
this case the MNE does not have to perform the difficult task of changing the production 
processes and procedures of an acquired subsidiary (Hennart and Park, 1993; Harzing, 2002). 
On the other hand, changing the HRM and marketing practices of an acquired subsidiary does 
not require physical changes in its layout and is hence much easier to accomplish. Integration 
of HRM and marketing activities does therefore not require greenfield entry, but is also 
compatible with acquisitions. 
The effects of the control variables are generally the same as in our previous models. 
However, the positive coefficient of FIRMTYPE becomes significant in model 3, indicating 
that non-manufacturing MNEs are more likely to choose greenfields than manufacturing 
ones. This is probably due to the fact that the pure sales subsidiaries of manufacturing MNEs 
are excluded from this model, as they do not have a score on AUTONOMY_PROD. Since 
almost 70% (35 out of 51) of these excluded subsidiaries are greenfields, a relatively large 
part of the remaining greenfields in the sample of model 3 has been undertaken by service 
MNEs, which may explain the significantly positive effect of FIRMTYPE. 
                                                 
41 The difference in the number of observations between the models is caused by ‘missing’ data on some of the 
items. Two factors are responsible for these ‘missing’ data. First, the question we used to assess the planned 
degree of subsidiary autonomy had an answer category ‘no intentions in advance’, in case managers had not 
considered the desired degree of autonomy for one or more activities ex ante. Second, our full sample of 
expansions contains different types of subsidiaries, i.e. pure manufacturing subsidiaries, pure sales subsidiaries, 
manufacturing and sales subsidiaries, service subsidiaries, and wholesale trade subsidiaries. These subsidiaries 
do not always perform all the business activities included in our list. For example, pure manufacturing 
subsidiaries do not generally perform marketing activities, while pure sales subsidiaries do not produce goods 
themselves. As a result of these two factors, we could not always create composite measures of all three 
dimensions of subsidiary autonomy. 
42 If SIZE is excluded from model 5, the coefficient of AUTONOMY_MK is narrowly significant at the 10% 
level. 
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Table 3.8: Additional logistic regression results: Greenfield vs. Acquisition (greenfield = 1) 
 


















































































































































































    
Number of observations 195 244 218 
Model Chi-squared 99.59*** 106.25*** 102.69*** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.369 0.314 0.340 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; one-tailed tests for variables of interest and control variables with 
clear predictions, two-tailed tests for control variables with unclear predictions. 
 
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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The fact that almost 70% of the expansions excluded from model 3 are greenfield sales 
subsidiaries may also explain why the effect of SUBSIZE becomes insignificant in this 
model, as such subsidiaries are typically small compared to the overall size of their 
manufacturing parents. Specifically, they have a low score on SUBSIZE (1 or 2) in almost 
90% of the cases (31 out of 35) and, hence, heavily contribute to the (expected) negative 
relationship between SUBSIZE and the likelihood of a greenfield. The exclusion of these 
expansions thus significantly reduces the correlation between these two variables. 
 
3.6. Conclusions, limitations, and suggestions 
 
Previous IM research has argued that MNEs should prefer greenfields over acquisitions in 
culturally distant countries because of the difficulty of integrating acquired firms with 
radically different cultures (e.g., Kogut and Singh, 1988; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995). In 
spite of this clear prediction, the empirical evidence has been mixed. We argue that the lack 
of robust confirmation of this hypothesis is due to the neglect of an important variable, the 
degree of integration that is planned for the subsidiary. Our starting point is that it is more 
difficult to integrate acquired than greenfield subsidiaries. Greenfield subsidiaries are 
established from scratch, thus making it possible for their parents to mold them from the 
outset, without having to worry about the pre-existing culture, structure, and procedures of 
acquired units (Hennart and Park, 1993; Harzing, 2002). Acquisitions, on the other hand, 
come with their physical layout and existing management and labor force, and are much more 
difficult to change. Hence, everything else constant, MNEs should show a preference for 
greenfields when tight integration is desired, and one for acquisitions when they plan to give 
the subsidiary considerable autonomy. This preference for greenfield investments should be 
particularly strong in culturally distant countries, and especially when there are plans to 
tightly integrate the subsidiary, since acquisitions are then likely to pose serious integration 
difficulties. But cultural conflicts only flare when cultures are in frequent contact and 
problems of post-acquisition integration will be considerably lower if no integration is 
attempted. Hence we hypothesize that the relationship between CD and an MNE’s preference 
for greenfields is significantly weaker if the subsidiary is granted considerable autonomy.  
We test these hypotheses on a sample of 246 expansions by 157 Dutch MNEs into 52 
countries. Controlling for other factors, we find that these MNEs generally prefer greenfields 
over acquisitions when they enter culturally distant countries, because greenfield entry 
facilitates cultural integration. We also find that they prefer greenfields when they intend to 
grant their subsidiaries little autonomy, especially in production. Lastly, and as expected, 
their preference for greenfields is significantly weaker when they intend to grant their 
subsidiaries a high level of autonomy.  
One limitation of our study is that we only analyze foreign expansions by Dutch 
MNEs. We therefore strongly encourage future researchers to increase the generalizability of 
our findings by testing their validity in other settings, analyzing foreign expansions by MNEs 
from other countries. Another limitation is that although we use the Kogut and Singh (1988) 
index to be able to compare our findings to those of previous studies, this measure has its 
shortcomings (e.g., Shenkar, 2001). We therefore recommend future studies to test our 
Greenfield vs. Acquisition: The Effects of Cultural Distance and Subsidiary Autonomy 
 49 
hypotheses by using other measures of CD as well, both perceptual and objective ones. 
Furthermore, since our findings indicate that the degree of subsidiary autonomy desired by an 
MNE affects its choice between greenfield and acquisition, both directly (by influencing the 
likelihood of greenfields) and indirectly (by influencing the strength of the relationship 
between CD and the likelihood of greenfields), and since this planned degree of autonomy 
may vary substantially from one expansion to the other, even within a single MNE’s network 
of affiliates, any future empirical study of the determinants between greenfield and 
acquisition entry needs to take this variable into account. 
Finally, we recommend future research to examine the performance implications of 
MNEs’ establishment mode choices, while taking into account the planned degree of 
subsidiary autonomy. So far, empirical research on this topic has been limited and is subject 
to various limitations, such as the use of bivariate tests and the failure to correct for self-
selection (see Shaver, 1998). As a result, there is an urgent need for more research in this 
area. 




ENTRY MODE CHOICE AND INTEGRATION: HOW DO THEY 





Firms that expand, either domestically or abroad, have to decide whether to do it through 
greenfield investment or acquisition, and whether to grant the new subsidiary a high degree 
of autonomy or to integrate it tightly into their corporate network. This paper is the first to 
explore the effects of these two decisions on the subsequent performance of foreign 
subsidiaries. 
Although many scholars have studied the determinants of a firm’s choice between 
greenfield and acquisition entry (for an overview, see chapter 2), few have compared their 
subsequent performance. When they have done so, they have used different theoretical 
arguments to ground their opposing predictions, and have obtained contradictory results. 
While these ambiguous findings may be due to a variety of methodological limitations, such 
as the use of simple bivariate tests (e.g., Woodcock et al., 1994), inconsistent definitions of 
greenfields and acquisitions (e.g., Li and Guisinger, 1991), failure to correct for entry mode 
self-selection (e.g., Li, 1995), and the use of less-than-optimal performance measures (e.g., 
Pennings et al., 1994), the main weakness of the literature has been its failure to take into 
account the effect of the planned degree of subsidiary integration. Drawing from the mergers 
and acquisitions literature, we hypothesize that efforts by firms to integrate their foreign 
subsidiaries reduce the performance of these subsidiaries, especially in early years, and that 
this effect is stronger for acquisitions than for greenfields. 
This paper aims to overcome the limitations of previous research noted above and to 
provide an answer to the following three questions: (1) Does the performance of greenfields 
and acquisitions differ systematically? (2) Does integration reduce subsidiary performance? 
and (3) Does the effect of integration on subsidiary performance differ between greenfields 
and acquisitions? Analyzing a sample of 210 foreign expansions made by Dutch firms, and 
controlling for a variety of other variables that have been found to affect subsidiary 
performance (including self-selection), we find that (1) the performance of greenfields is 
significantly lower than that of acquisitions, (2) increases in the planned degree of integration 
negatively affect subsidiary performance, and (3) this negative effect is much stronger for 
acquisitions than for greenfields. A more detailed analysis also reveals that although 
greenfields generally have a lower performance than acquisitions, the former nevertheless 
outperform the latter when the planned degree of subsidiary integration is high. 
The next section outlines our theory and hypotheses on the impact of entry mode 
choice and the planned degree of integration on the performance of foreign subsidiaries. The 
methodological section that follows describes the data collection process, the 
operationalization of our variables, and the statistical approach used to test our hypotheses. 
                                                 
43 This paper is the result of joint work with Jean-François Hennart. 
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We then present the results of the empirical tests of these hypotheses, and discuss them in a 
subsequent section. The final section presents the conclusions and limitations of this study, 
and offers some suggestions for future research. 
 
4.2. Literature review 
 
It is so far unclear which entry mode, greenfield investment or acquisition, generally 
performs better. Below we present the theoretical arguments made in the literature why either 
one of these entry modes should outperform the other. We also discuss the empirical findings 




Several studies have argued that the performance of greenfields should be systematically 
better than that of acquisitions (Woodcock et al., 1994; Li, 1995; Nitsch et al., 1996; Hennart 
et al., 1998). Using Dunning’s (1980, 1988) eclectic theory – also called the Ownership 
Location Internalization (OLI) paradigm – Woodcock et al. (1994) and Nitsch et al. (1996) 
argue that acquisitions involve higher resource procurement and higher ownership and 
managerial control costs than greenfield investments44. The costs of procuring additional 
resources should be higher for acquisitions because firms opting for greenfields already 
possess all the necessary resources, while those making acquisitions presumably lack many 
of these and, hence, incur additional costs when procuring them on the market for firms. Such 
costs stem from (i) the search for a suitable acquisition target, and (ii) the risk of overpaying 
for the target and its resources due to incomplete information about their exact value and the 
one-off nature of acquisition transactions. Ownership and managerial control costs should be 
higher for acquisitions than for greenfields because (i) acquiring firms are limited in their 
ability to understand and control acquired units due to differences in corporate cultures, and 
(ii) expected synergies between the acquirer and the acquired unit often do not materialize, 
while costly duplications do. For these reasons, Woodcock et al. (1994) and Nitsch et al. 
(1996) expect acquisitions to do worse than greenfield investments. 
However, firms making greenfield investments also have to procure complementary 
local resources, such as land, equipment, and a workforce (Hennart and Park, 1993), and the 
costs of obtaining these resources in disembodied form are not necessarily lower than those 
of acquiring them bundled in firms. Moreover, not all acquisitions incur substantial 
ownership and managerial control costs, because not all of them are made for synergistic 
reasons (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Seth et al., 2000) and hence always require 
integration into the acquirer’s operations (Datta, 1991; Olie, 1996; Shrivastava, 1986). If 
acquisitions do not need to be integrated, cultural conflicts and additional costs due to 
unrealized synergies and resource duplications are unlikely to arise, thus lowering their 
control costs. In sum, it is unclear whether resource procurement and control costs are 
                                                 
44 It should be noted that Nitsch et al. (1996) is basically a replica of Woodcock et al. (1994) in a different 
empirical setting. 
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systematically higher for acquisitions than for greenfields, and hence whether we should 
expect the former to generally perform worse than the latter. 
The other two studies arguing that the performance of acquisitions should be 
systematically lower than that of greenfields (Li, 1995; Hennart et al., 1998) also emphasize 
the difficulties associated with integrating into the parent an acquired unit with a different 
corporate and/or national culture. However, as stated above, and as we will argue in more 
detail below, cultural differences only cause problems – in the sense that they lead to cultural 
conflict and poor performance – if there is a high amount of cross-cultural interaction 
between the workforces involved (Neal, 1998), and this will only be the case when the 
acquirer attempts to tightly integrate the newly acquired unit. If an acquired unit is given 
considerable autonomy, which is quite common, cultural differences are unlikely to cause 
problems. It is therefore questionable whether integration causes the performance of 
acquisitions to be systematically lower than that of greenfields. 
While the preceding studies have argued that greenfields should generally outperform 
acquisitions, other authors suggest the reverse. One of the reasons put forward is that 
acquisitions are less risky than greenfield investments (Caves, 1996; Pennings et al., 1994), 
because making an acquisition means buying a going concern with a proven track record 
(Hill and Jones, 1998), established suppliers and customers, and managers familiar with 
industry and local market conditions (Caves, 1996). All this reduces the uncertainty about the 
subsidiary’s future cash flows (Hill and Jones, 1998; Caves, 1996). Making a greenfield 
investment, on the other hand, means building a new subsidiary from scratch by bringing 
together several inputs whose combination has not yet proved itself in the new market. 
Greenfields are thus highly risky, and have uncertain performance outcomes (Burgleman, 
1983; 1985; Hill and Jones, 1998). Caves (1996) concludes that entry through acquisition 
generally means choosing a lower, but more certain rate of return than greenfield entry. 
However, acquiring firms have to pay a price for this lower risk, as acquisitions virtually 
always require substantial takeover premia (Pennings et al., 1994). 
Research in both organizational ecology (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1965; Freeman et al., 
1983; Singh et al., 1986) and – more recently – international management (e.g., Lupo et al., 
1978; Li and Guisinger, 1991; Pennings et al., 1994) has argued and shown that new ventures 
suffer from a ‘liability of newness’ (Stinchcombe, 1965), i.e. a higher likelihood of failure 
than older firms, with significantly higher losses and organizational death rates during the 
first few years of their existence than in later years. New ventures are vulnerable, as they start 
at the beginning of a learning curve, and have to overcome high barriers to obtain a solid 
market position (Pennings et al., 1994). For example, new entrants need time to adapt to an 
unknown market, especially when this market is foreign, and to create local awareness and 
build market share. Acquisitions, on the other hand, involve existing firms, which are by 
definition older than greenfield investments and are thus likely to have moved beyond the 
liability-of-newness stage (Pennings et al., 1994). This implies that – all else equal – 
acquisitions should – at least initially – outperform greenfields. 
Caves and Mehra (1986) and Hennart and Park (1993) have argued that greenfield 
investments increase industry supply and that incumbents may therefore retaliate against 
them, especially when market concentration is high and market growth low. Such competitive 
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responses should negatively affect the performance of greenfield investments. Acquisition 
entry, on the other hand, does not increase industry supply, and therefore generally avoids 
retaliation from incumbents. This also suggests that the performance of greenfields should 
generally be lower than that of acquisitions. 
 
4.2.2. Empirical studies and their limitations 
 
Just as the literature has proposed opposing theoretical arguments, empirical findings have 
been mixed as well. As we argue below, this is because (1) some studies have only performed 
simple bivariate tests, (2) they have used different definitions of greenfields and acquisitions; 
(3) they all have failed to correct for self-selection effects, (4) they all have neglected the 
impact of integration on performance, and (5) some of them have used ambiguous 
performance measures. 
Li and Guisinger (1991) compared the total number of foreign affiliate exits caused by 
bankruptcy and liquidation in the U.S. between 1978 and 1987 to the total number of foreign 
entries during that period and found that full and partial acquisitions of U.S. firms failed 
significantly more often than wholly-owned greenfield investments. The failure rate of joint 
ventures (JVs), which they defined as greenfields with multiple parents, did not differ 
significantly from that of acquisitions, nor from that of wholly-owned greenfields. 
Analyzing 1992 Toyo Keizai data on the financial performance of Japanese 
subsidiaries in North America, Woodcock et al. (1994) found that wholly-owned greenfield 
entries of over two years of age performed significantly better than their full acquisition 
counterparts45. The performance of JVs, which they also defined as greenfields with multiple 
parents46, fell in between that of wholly-owned greenfields and full acquisitions. In a later 
study, Nitsch et al. (1996) used 1992 and 1994 Toyo Keizai data and obtained similar 
findings for Japanese entries into Western Europe, although their results were stronger for 
1992 than for 199447. 
However, all these findings are based on bivariate tests rather than on a multivariate 
model, and should therefore be interpreted with care, as such tests do not control for other 
factors influencing exit rates and performance. Furthermore, comparison between these 
studies is difficult as they have used different definitions of greenfields and acquisitions. 
While Li and Guisinger (1991) contrast the performance of full and partial acquisitions to 
that of wholly-owned greenfields, Woodcock et al. (1994) and Nitsch et al. (1996) compare 
the performance of full acquisitions to that of wholly-owned greenfields. Finally, both 
Woodcock et al. (1994) and Nitsch et al. (1996) exclude from their analyses all foreign 
entries that were less than two years old, thus artificially eliminating the potential effect of a 
liability of newness on the performance of greenfields. 
                                                 
45 A subsidiary’s financial performance was measured through a survey question with three answer categories: 
profitable, break-even, and loss. 
46 As Woodcock et al.’s (1994) acquisition category contains full acquisitions only, this definition of JVs 
suggests that partial acquisitions were excluded from the analysis. 
47 In related work, Simmonds (1990) and Busija et al. (1997) found that firms pursuing a strategy of internal 
development (i.e., firms relying on greenfields) performed as well as those pursuing an acquisition strategy. 
Note that these two studies focused on overall firm performance rather than on individual subsidiary 
performance. 
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Three other studies regressed subsidiary longevity on a dummy variable indicating 
whether an expansion was a greenfield or an acquisition48. Although each of them controlled 
for a variety of other factors affecting longevity, they nevertheless obtained different results. 
Pennings et al. (1994) analyzed a sample of 462 expansions by 14 Dutch non-financial firms 
between 1966 and 1988, and found that the longevity of greenfields was lower than that of 
acquisitions, with the median duration of greenfields being 12.6 years, and that of 
acquisitions 17.6 years. Moreover, the proportion of greenfields surviving decreased faster 
over the sampling period than that of acquisitions. 
Li (1995), on the other hand, analyzed a sample of 267 foreign entries made between 
1974 and 1988 into the U.S. computer and pharmaceutical industries, and found that full and 
partial acquisitions had a significantly higher exit rate than wholly-owned greenfields in both 
the full sample and the industry subsamples. He also found that JVs, i.e. greenfields with 
multiple parents, had a significantly higher exit rate than wholly-owned greenfields in the full 
sample and in the pharmaceutical industry subsample49. 
Hennart et al. (1998), finally, examined a sample of 355 Japanese investments in the 
U.S. between 1980 and 1991, and found that acquired subsidiaries were more likely to be 
sold than greenfields, but that they were equally likely to be liquidated. 
In spite of their multivariate nature, the three studies above suffer from a number of 
limitations. First, using longevity as a proxy for subsidiary performance and regressing it on 
an entry mode dummy will adequately capture the effect of entry mode only if (1) firms 
regularly make mistakes so that the choice of entry mode is random, or (2) all other factors 
influencing performance are controlled so that there are no unobserved effects (Shaver, 1998: 
572). Otherwise, the regression coefficient for the entry mode dummy will be biased. This 
problem is likely to arise in the three studies above because (1) a fundamental assumption in 
(international) strategic management is that managers deliberately choose one strategic 
alternative over another based on their expected performance outcomes (Hamilton and 
Nickerson, 2003), and (2) it is almost impossible to control for all other factors influencing 
performance. Biases in the regression coefficients of their entry mode dummies may 
therefore explain why these studies came to different findings, as these biases may have 
varied across studies, making acquisitions look artificially more attractive in one study, and 
greenfields in another. 
We can control for the fact that entry mode choices are endogenous and self selected 
(rather than exogenous and chosen randomly) by adding a correction term for self selection50 
(Shaver, 1998). The consequences of not doing so can be serious, as Shaver (1998) 
illustrated. He found that the survival rate of full and partial foreign acquisitions in the U.S. 
in 1987 was significantly lower than that of their wholly-owned greenfield counterparts, but 
that this effect disappeared when he corrected for self selection. 
                                                 
48 In related work, Vermeulen and Barkema (2001) found that the number of previous greenfields had a negative 
effect on the survival rate of a firm’s subsidiaries, while the number of previous acquisitions had a positive 
effect. They did not examine the effect of entry mode choice on subsidiary survival, however. 
49 Li (1995) was unable to compare the performance of JVs and wholly-owned greenfields in the computer 
industry because of its small number of JV entries. 




A second limitation of the multivariate studies described above, including Shaver 
(1998), is that they differ in what they call ‘greenfields’ and ‘acquisitions’, with Li (1995) 
comparing the performance of (1) full and partial acquisitions, (2) wholly-owned greenfields, 
and (3) greenfields with multiple parents, Shaver (1998) comparing the performance of (1) to 
that of (2), thus excluding (3), and Pennings et al. (1994) and Hennart et al. (1998) 
comparing the performance of (1) to that of (2) and (3). That is, the latter two studies group 
all greenfields in one category and treat them alike, which seems more appropriate, because 
the choice of establishment mode (greenfield or acquisition) and that of ownership structure 
(partial or full ownership) are two conceptually different and separate decisions that should 
not be mixed (Hennart and Park, 1993; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996). 
Third, all multivariate studies use a subsidiary’s longevity as a proxy for its 
performance, while Hennart et al. (2002) have shown that subsidiaries are not necessarily 
divested because they are performing poorly. 
Lastly, although all of them control for a variety of other factors influencing subsidiary 
performance, none of the multivariate studies take into account the extent to which the 
expanding firm plans to integrate the foreign subsidiary into its corporate network. However, 
as we will show below, that extent has a strong effect on its initial performance and, 
moreover, this effect differs between greenfields and acquisitions. Not controlling for the 




To summarize, various theoretical arguments have been put forward to explain why 
greenfields and acquisitions should perform differently, with Woodcock et al. (1994) and 
Nitsch et al. (1996) arguing that acquisitions should generally have a lower performance 
because of their higher resource procurement and control costs, and others positing that 
greenfields should perform worse because they are more risky (e.g., Caves, 1996), suffer 
from a liability of newness (e.g., Pennings et al., 1994) and are more prone to be retaliated 
against (e.g., Caves and Mehra, 1986). Empirical tests have not resolved these theoretical 
divergences, as they have produced mixed findings due to methodological flaws, such as the 
use of simple bivariate tests, divergent categorizations of entry modes, the failure to control 
for entry mode self-selection and the (planned) degree of subsidiary integration, and the use 
of longevity as a proxy for performance. As a result, it is so far unclear whether there are true 
systematic differences in the performance of greenfields and acquisitions and, if so, which 
entry mode generally performs better. In this paper we aim to shed more light on this issue by 
overcoming the methodological limitations of previous research. Because of the opposing 
theoretical predictions that have been made, we simply hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The performance of greenfields is higher than that of acquisitions. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The performance of greenfields is lower than that of acquisitions. 
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4.3. Integration and subsidiary performance 
 
As stated earlier, an important factor that may also affect a subsidiary’s performance is the 
extent to which it is integrated into its parent. Hambrick and Cannella define integration as 
“the process of adopting similar systems, policies and procedures” (1993: 742), while Pablo 
defines it as “the making of changes in the functional activity arrangements, organizational 
structures and systems, and cultures of combining organizations to facilitate their 
consolidation into a functioning whole” (1994: 805). Larimo states that the “degree of 
integration means how closely the operation of the (…) unit is tied to the operation of the 
parent firm and how much autonomy the (…) unit has in its decision making” (1993: 133).  
The mergers and acquisitions (M&A) literature has shown that integration attempts by 
acquiring firms negatively affect the performance of acquired units and that such attempts 
often fail and end up in divestment (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991; Pablo, 1994; Shrivastava, 1986). Even friendly and well-managed acquisitions tend to 
experience problems and drops in performance (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Pritchett, 1985). 
Post-acquisition integration generally implies changes in the way the acquired unit conducts 
its business (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Pablo, 1994). These changes will initially 
interfere with the proper functioning of the acquisition, and will reduce its performance. 
Tight integration also increases the level of interaction between the parent and the acquired 
unit and hence the probability of conflicts (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Datta, 1991; Elsass 
and Veiga, 1994). These conflicts may stem from differences in management styles (Datta, 
1991), and in organizational (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Elsass and Veiga, 1994) or national 
cultures (Very et al., 1996), from a lack of interorganizational trust (Buono and Bowditch, 
1989), or from resistance by the acquired unit’s managers, who fiercely try to defend their 
autonomy (Datta and Grant, 1990). The problematic interactions that result cause uncertainty, 
confusion, helplessness, stress, discomfort, and hostility (Olie, 1996; Hofstede, 2001; Elsass 
and Veiga, 1994). These feelings can be subsumed under the term ‘acculturative stress’, 
which is the disruptive tension that is felt by the members of a culture when they are required 
to interact with another culture (Very et al., 1996). In general, the larger the differences 
between the interacting parties, the greater the amount of acculturative stress (Very et al., 
1996; Berry, 1980). Within organizations, acculturative stress has been shown to decrease the 
commitment, loyalty, cooperation, satisfaction, and productivity of employees (Buono and 
Bowditch, 1989; Very et al., 1996), to increase conflict potential and to hinder agreement 
over management issues (Olie, 1996), and to lead to communication breakdowns, resistance 
to parent-company directives, management underperformance (Neal, 1998), and high 
management turnover (Buono and Bowditch, 1989). All these problems negatively affect the 
performance of acquired units (Elsass and Veiga, 1994; Very et al., 1996), sometimes even 
leading to their complete failure (Hofstede, 2001; Barkema et al., 1996)51. 
                                                 
51 According to Buono and Bowditch (1989), it takes about five to seven years before employees feel truly 
assimilated into a new firm and before inter-group tensions and mutual distrust between members of acquiring 
and acquired firms have subsided. Cases where inter-firm conflicts persisted for several decades have also been 
reported (Olie, 1996), suggesting that the negative impact of post-acquisition integration on performance may 
also be long lived. This negative impact should nevertheless be particularly strong during the first few years 
after an acquisition. 
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If the desired degree of integration for an acquired subsidiary is low, on the other hand, 
and the subsidiary is allowed to operate quasi autonomously, there will be no or only limited 
interaction with the parent (Olie, 1996: 343). In this case, the ex post integration difficulties 
described above are unlikely to arise, and there will hardly be any negative performance 
effects (Hofstede, 2001; Neal, 1998). In fact, autonomy has been shown to motivate people 
because they have more freedom and are allowed to perform more meaningful and 
responsible tasks. In addition, granting subsidiaries considerable autonomy makes them more 
flexible and effective in responding to environmental changes (Datta and Grant, 1990). 
While the arguments from the M&A literature presented so far strongly suggest that 
tight integration reduces the performance of acquired subsidiaries, these arguments should – 
to a certain extent – also apply to greenfield investments that are tightly integrated, as such 
expansions also require many parent-subsidiary interactions, and are therefore susceptible to 
conflicts as well. In addition, although many tightly integrated foreign greenfields are staffed 
with one or more expatriates (Konopaske et al., 2002), an overwhelming proportion of their 
workforce is nevertheless local and is therefore likely to hold different norms and values 
(Hofstede, 2001), which may create internal conflicts and hinder integration (Neal, 1998: 45). 
We therefore expect integration to negatively affect the performance of both acquisitions and 
greenfields. 
However, there are good reasons why the costs of integration should be significantly 
lower for greenfields than for acquisitions. In contrast to acquirers, which inherit a firm with 
an established workforce and company culture, and with existing operations, structures, and 
procedures (Hennart and Park, 1993; Harzing, 2002), firms making greenfield investments 
can structure the subsidiary as desired from the outset (Hennart and Park, 1993), hire 
managers who share their values and vision, and select employees who fit their organizational 
and/or national culture (Hofstede, 2001). All this reduces the likelihood of internal cultural 
conflicts and hence lowers the costs of integration. 
In sum, we expect that increases in the planned degree of integration negatively affect 
subsidiary performance, but that this effect is stronger for acquisitions than for greenfields, as 
the costs of integration are lower for the latter52. Hence:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the planned degree of integration for a subsidiary (greenfield or 
acquisition), the lower its performance. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The negative relationship between the planned degree of integration and 
subsidiary performance is stronger for acquisitions than for greenfields. 
 
                                                 
52 Note that we implicitly assume that managers actually carry out their ex ante integration plans. 




4.4.1. Data collection 
 
Although our hypotheses can be tested in both a domestic and a foreign setting, we decided to 
test them in the latter, as the liability of newness and ex post integration difficulties should be 
larger in such a setting. This is because a firm entering a foreign market is likely to face 
greater knowledge gaps and to have fewer local contacts than one entering a domestic 
market, and because integration will be more difficult when parents and subsidiaries have 
different national cultures53 (Shimizu et al., 2004). By focusing on foreign expansions by 
Dutch firms, we are thus able to perform a stronger test of our hypotheses.  
The questionnaire used was first pretested on various international management 
scholars, and subsequently on five senior managers of firms that had established or acquired 
one or more foreign subsidiaries in recent years. These pretests led to several small 
modifications. 
A first mailing of questionnaires and accompanying letters was sent in June 2003, 
followed by a second round a few weeks later. The questionnaires were personally directed to 
members of the Executive Board of 821 Dutch firms with more than 100 employees and one 
or more foreign subsidiaries54 (Dutch subsidiaries of foreign firms were excluded). The 
names of these board members and their firms had been identified through the REACH 
database55, which contains Chamber of Commerce data on all firms registered in the 
Netherlands56. 
One thousand seven hundred and eighty-two managers (1520 Dutch and 262 foreign) 
were asked to participate in the study. Eighty-nine of these turned out to be no longer 
employed at the firms contacted, while another 19 worked for firms without foreign 
subsidiaries. Three hundred and twenty-two questionnaires were filled out and returned – a 
response rate of 19.2%, which is comparable to that of other entry mode studies (e.g., Kim 
and Hwang, 1992: 22%; Harzing, 2002: 20%). Respondents were mostly CEOs and CFOs, 
although in some cases they held other positions, such as Member of the Executive Board, 
and Director of Corporate Development57. 
The questionnaire was structured in such a way that respondents would only provide 
data on their firm’s foreign expansions if (1) their firm was responsible for foreign entry 
mode decisions, (2) the expansions had taken place in recent years, and (3) they had been 
personally involved in them. As a result, only 200 of the 322 respondents provided data on 
one of their firm’s foreign greenfield investments and/or acquisitions. In total we received 
data on 248 foreign expansions by 159 firms. For 15 firms, there were multiple respondents, 
                                                 
53 It should be noted that we nevertheless control for differences in cultural distance between the various host 
countries. 
54 When lower-level entities, i.e. divisions and business units, turned out to be responsible for foreign 
expansions as well, we also attempted to send a questionnaire to the heads of these entities. This was mainly the 
case for the largest Dutch firms with quasi-autonomous divisions. 
55 We crosschecked each board member name against the names reported in the firms’ latest annual reports and 
those reported on their websites in order to make sure that we sent the questionnaires to the right persons. 
56 All firms in the Netherlands are legally required to file data with the Chamber of Commerce. 
57 In a few cases respondents had still another position, such as export director or corporate controller. 
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either two (11 firms), three (1 firm), or four (3 firms). In the few cases where these 
respondents provided data on the same expansion, their responses were averaged. 
Thirty-eight expansions were excluded from the analysis; 35 because they had taken 
place in either 2002 or 2003, which we deemed to be too recently for their performance 
estimates to be reliable, given that the survey was conducted in mid-2003; two because of 
missing data on key variables (the planned degree of subsidiary integration and subsidiary 
performance); and one because its parent firm had far less than 100 employees. The final 
sample consists of 210 expansions into 49 countries by 142 firms in the period 1995-2001. 
One hundred and eight of these expansions are greenfields, while the other 102 are 
acquisitions. Their geographic distribution and the industries in which their parent firms are 
active are shown in table 4.1 and 4.2. 
 
Table 4.1: Geographic distribution of the expansions in the sample 
 
Region Number of expansions Percentage 
Belgium and Luxembourg 20 9.5 
Northern Europe 13 6.2 
United Kingdom and Ireland 25 11.9 
Southern Europe 26 12.4 
Germanic countries 20 9.5 
Eastern Europe 37 17.6 
North America 25 11.9 
Latin America 14 6.7 
Asia 22 10.5 
Africa 5 2.4 
Australia 3 1.4 
 
Table 4.2: Industry distribution of the parent firms 
 
Main industry Number of firms Percentage 
Agriculture and horticulture 4 2.8 
Food and beverages 13 9.1 
Machinery and electronics 13 9.1 
Wood and paper products 11 7.7 
Chemicals and synthetics 14 9.9 
Metal products 13 9.1 
Construction 4 2.8 
Other manufacturing 5 3.5 
Retail and wholesale trade 18 12.7 






Financial services 14 9.9 
Professional services 19 13.4 
Other services 3 2.1 
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4.4.2. Non-response bias 
 
In order to assess whether the 159 firms that provided expansion data are representative of 
the full population of Dutch multinational enterprises (MNEs), we examined whether they 
differed from the 662 firms that did not provide data. Specifically, we examined whether the 
two groups of firms were significantly different in annual worldwide sales and number of 
employees58. T-tests that corrected for unequal variances across the two groups indicate that 
the firms that provided expansion data are significantly larger than those that did not, both in 
annual worldwide sales and in number of employees (p<0.01 for both variables, two tailed), 
with the former having on average sales of 3.34 billion euros and over 12,000 employees, and 
the latter sales of 1.16 billion and approximately 2800 employees. Hence, it should be kept in 
mind that our findings only apply to the largest Dutch MNEs, and that they are not 
necessarily generalizable to the smaller ones. 
The fact that our expansion data mainly come from large MNEs should not be 
surprising for two reasons. First, large MNEs are more likely to have established and/or 
acquired foreign subsidiaries in recent years, and are therefore more likely to qualify for 
participation in the study, as we explicitly asked for data on recent foreign expansions. 
Second, because these large MNEs on average expand abroad more often, their management 
should be more interested in participating in the study, as we gave respondents the option to 




Subsidiary performance. To measure a subsidiary’s performance, our dependent variable, 
we asked managers to indicate on a 7-point scale ranging from ‘very bad’ to ‘very good’ how 
the subsidiary performed on four criteria of performance during the first two years after it had 
become operational (compared to their expectation at the time of entry). These criteria were 
sales level, market share, profit level, and overall performance59. Previous studies have also 
used perceptual measures of subsidiary performance (e.g., Brouthers et al., 2003; Fey and 
Beamish, 2001; Mjoen and Tallman, 1997), and have shown that they are significantly 
correlated with more objective proxies for venture success (e.g., Geringer and Hebert, 1991). 
Following Morosini et al. (1998), we focus on performance during the subsidiary’s 
first two years, because this measure provides the best test of our hypotheses. For example, 
whether greenfields truly suffer from a greater liability of newness than acquisitions should 
be most noticeable during the first few years of a subsidiary’s life. Similarly, the negative 
effect of integration should be strongest during a subsidiary’s early years, as firms may 
gradually learn to deal with each other (e.g., Barkema et al., 1996), and integration may in 
fact be beneficial rather than detrimental in the long run. 
We created a summated scale of subsidiary performance by averaging the scores on the 
four performance items. According to Hair et al. (1998), such a scale is reliable when the 
                                                 
58 Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain sales and employee data for all firms that did not provide data. 
59 As we deliberately asked respondents for information on their firms’ most recent foreign expansion, the 
performance data are not be biased towards success stories.  
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inter-item correlations exceed .30 and the item-to-scale correlations .50. This is clearly the 
case, with the lowest inter-item and item-to-scale correlations being .58 and .71, respectively. 
Moreover, Cronbach’s alpha for the four performance items is .90, indicating that they form a 
highly reliable scale. 
Entry mode.  Our strategic choice variable is the entry mode of the subsidiary, either a 
greenfield investment or an acquisition. We created a dummy variable that was coded 1 for 
all greenfields (i.e., wholly and partially owned), and 0 for all acquisitions (i.e., full and 
partial)60. 
Subsidiary integration. We assessed the planned degree of subsidiary integration 
through 12 items. On a 5-point scale ranging from ‘very little autonomy intended’ to ‘very 
much autonomy intended’, we asked managers to indicate how much autonomy over 12 
different business activities their management team intended to give the subsidiary at the time 
it was established or acquired61. We also provided a category ‘no intentions in advance’, in 
case managers had not considered the desired degree of autonomy for one or more activities 
ex ante, and deliberately asked for the planned degree of autonomy for each activity, because 
the actual ex post degree may very well be a de facto consequence of unsuccessful integration 
attempts. 
We created a summated integration scale by reversing the scores on the individual 
autonomy items and combining them into a single composite measure. Inspection of the inter-
item correlation matrix and the item-to-scale correlations showed that the item ‘raising 
capital’ had a low correlation with most of the other items and that its item-to-scale 
correlation was only .36, implying that it should be excluded from the scale. Observation of 
the Cronbach's alpha confirmed this, as its value decreased when ‘raising capital’ was 
included in the scale. The 11 remaining items generally satisfied Hair et al.’s (1998) 
correlation criteria and together formed a highly reliable scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of .89. 
Their scores were therefore averaged to form a composite measure of the planned degree of 
subsidiary integration62. 
 
4.4.4. Control variables 
 
In order to maximize the reliability of our findings, we control for a variety of other factors 
that have been found to affect foreign subsidiary performance in previous research. 
Firm size. Large firms may be better able to support recently established or acquired 
subsidiaries, as they are likely to have more financial and/or managerial resources available. 
On the other hand, an individual subsidiary is less important to a large firm than to a 
relatively small one, and may therefore receive less attention and support from a large firm’s 
headquarters, thus increasing the risk of losses (Hennart et al., 1998). We control for firm 
                                                 
60 As argued earlier, there are no strong theoretical reasons for excluding or having a separate category for 
partially-owned greenfields. 
61 These activities were procurement, product/service design, R&D, manufacturing/service process, the use of 
brand names, packaging, pricing, advertising and sales promotion, the design of reward systems, job design, 
selection and training of employees, and raising capital. 
62 It should be noted that we did not always have integration scores on all 11 items, either because respondents 
indicated that their management team had not considered the desired degree of integration for a particular 
activity ex ante, or because a subsidiary did not perform all 11 business activities. 
Entry Mode Choice, Integration, and Subsidiary Performance 
 63 
size by including a firm’s annual worldwide sales (in thousands of euros) as indicated in the 
REACH database. 
International experience. Firms with much international experience may be better 
able to exploit and run foreign subsidiaries (Li, 1995). International experience was measured 
through a firm’s total number of foreign subsidiaries (wholly and partially owned), obtained 
from the firms’ annual reports, their corporate websites, and the questionnaire. 
Host-country experience. Subsidiaries of firms that are familiar with the host country 
are likely to perform better than those of firms without any host-country experience, as they 
can benefit from their parents’ knowledge of local conditions and may be able to rely upon 
existing local operations, while subsidiaries of inexperienced firms face considerable 
uncertainty and lack a local network (Li, 1995). A firm’s host-country experience was 
assessed through the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to indicate whether their firm 
had been active in the country entered before through (1) licensing agreements, (2) export 
(direct or through sales agents), (3) sales subsidiaries, (4) manufacturing or service 
subsidiaries, or (5) other means (see below). We assigned different values to these experience 
types, because they involve different levels of interaction with locals and hence allow varying 
levels of learning about the local economy (Johansson and Vahlne, 1977). Specifically, we 
assigned the values 1 to 4 to the first four experience types, respectively. In the few cases 
where firms had other experiences with the country entered63, the value assigned to these 
experiences depended on the description provided by the respondents. Our measure of host-
country experience is the sum of the values assigned to the different experience types. 
Relatedness of the expansion. Firms expanding into industries that are new to them 
often lack the tacit product-specific knowledge that is required to successfully operate in the 
new industry (Hennart and Park, 1993; Li, 1995). Unrelated expansions are therefore more 
likely to exhibit low performance. Firms entering similar or related industries, on the other 
hand, can draw on industry-specific experiences (Shaver, 1998), which should make their 
expansions more successful. We asked respondents for a description of the subsidiary’s main 
products/services and compared it to REACH’s description of the parent firm’s main and 
secondary activities. Relatedness is measured by a categorical variable equal to 0 if the 
expansion’s main products/services were the same as its parent’s main products/services, 1 if 
they were the same as its parent’s secondary products/services, and 2 if they differed from 
both its parent’s main and secondary products/services. 
Joint venture. A firm entering a joint venture (JV) has to get used to cooperating with 
a – possibly foreign – equity partner and can expect potential conflicts over the strategy and 
management of the venture (Hennart et al., 1998). The advantage of having a partner, 
however, is that he may be better equipped to deal with local stakeholders and other issues 
related to the venture’s environment (Root, 1998; Stopford and Wells, 1972). If a firm opts 
for a wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS), on the other hand, it must operate in an alien market 
without partner support, but can avoid the conflicts that come with the co-management of a 
venture. Which of these effects dominates is an empirical question. We control for their 
potential presence through a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if the subsidiary was a 
JV, and 0 otherwise. In line with most previous entry mode studies (for an overview, see 
                                                 
63 These experiences include procurement from local firms and attending trade shows, among others. 
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Datta et al., 2002), we coded both greenfields with multiple parents and partial acquisitions 
as JVs. 
Demand growth. A subsidiary’s performance should be better, the higher the growth 
of the demand for its products (Hennart et al., 1998). In line with the two-year time frame of 
our performance measure, we asked respondents to rate on a 7-point scale the growth rate of 
the demand for the subsidiary’s products and/or services during its first two years. 
Competition. Similarly, the stronger the competition faced by a subsidiary, the lower 
its performance. The level of competition encountered during the first two years was also 
assessed by respondents on a 7-point scale. 
Cultural distance. The larger the cultural differences between two countries, the more 
dissimilar their norms, values, customs, and business practices (Hofstede, 2001; Kogut and 
Singh, 1988). Expansions into culturally distant countries should therefore exhibit a lower 
performance than those into culturally similar ones. In line with previous research (e.g., 
Barkema et al., 1996; Park and Ungson, 1997; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001), we use the 
Kogut and Singh (1988) index to measure the cultural distance between the Netherlands and 
the countries entered by the firms in our sample.   
Economic conditions. Obviously, the state of the local and global economy will also 
affect the performance of foreign subsidiaries. We therefore asked respondents to rate on a 7-
point scale the economic conditions faced by the subsidiary during its first two years. 
Greenfield experience. For reasons to be discussed below, we tested hypothesis 3 by 
splitting our sample into greenfields investments and acquisitions, and analyzing the effect of 
the planned degree of integration in both subsamples. The initial performance of a focal 
greenfield may depend on the expanding firm’s previous experiences with greenfield 
investments, as it may have gradually developed the skills and routines to effectively manage 
such investments (Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999). We therefore control for greenfield 
experience while testing hypothesis 3. We obtained this variable from the questionnaire by 
asking respondents to rate on a 7-point scale how much experience with foreign greenfield 
investments their firm had.  
Acquisition experience. Similarly, the initial performance of a focal acquisition may 
depend on a firm’s previous experience with making acquisitions. Our acquisition subsample 
therefore contains a control for previous acquisition experience, which was also assessed 
through the questionnaire and measured on a 7-point scale. 
 
4.4.5. Common method bias 
 
Because both our dependent variable – i.e., initial subsidiary performance – and the key 
independent variables – i.e., the subsidiary’s entry mode and the planned degree of subsidiary 
integration – as well as several control variables, are based on data provided by a single 
individual, they are potentially affected by common method bias. However, there are several 
reasons why this should not a problem in our case. First, variables such as a subsidiary’s 
entry mode are objective, as they are universally defined and can easily be verified from other 
sources. Second, common method bias is only a concern if (1) the items comprising the 
scales are highly similar in content, (2) constructs are measured through a few items only, (3) 
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respondents are not familiar with the constructs, and (4) all variables are cognitions 
(Brouthers et al., 2003). Since (1) the items measuring subsidiary performance and those 
measuring the planned degree of subsidiary integration are dissimilar in content, (2) these 
constructs are measured through a large number of items, (3) top managers are familiar with 
them, and (4) the variables included in our models are a mix of cognitive and objective 
measures, it is highly unlikely that they suffer from a common method bias. Third, following 
Kotabe et al. (2003), we performed Podsakoff and Organ’s (1986) one-factor test of common 
method bias on the five truly cognitive variables included in our full-sample regression 
model. This resulted in two factors, with subsidiary performance, demand growth, and 
economic conditions loading highly on the first factor, and the planned degree of subsidiary 
integration and competition mainly loading on the second, thus suggesting the absence of 
common method bias64. Fourth, we asked for the planned degree of subsidiary integration 
first, and included various other items in our survey before asking for the subsidiary’s actual 
performance, which reduces the risk that the relationship between these two concepts is 
subject to a common method bias. Finally, even if there is a bias, it should be in the opposite 
direction of our hypothesis, making our test more conservative, as we would expect managers 
to report a lower planned degree of integration than in reality if a subsidiary is performing 
poorly, since they cannot be held responsible for the performance of quasi-autonomous 





We used Intercooled STATA 7 to estimate our models. Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2 are tested 
on the full sample of 210 observations by means of Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure, 
which accounts for the potential self-selection effect of entry mode (Shaver, 1998). This 
procedure first estimates a binary probit model of entry mode choice to generate the 
correction term for self selection (lambda), and then employs OLS regression analysis with 
robust standard errors to estimate a performance model that includes this correction term65, 66. 
The exact specification of the first-stage binary probit model and its estimation results can be 
found in table A4.1 of the appendix. 
As stated earlier, hypothesis 3 is tested by splitting the full sample into greenfields and 
acquisitions. We analyzed the effects of the planned degree of integration and the control 
variables (including the correction for self selection) in both subsamples through OLS 
regression with robust (White) standard errors. There are a number of reasons why this 
                                                 
64 Note that this is a very conservative test, as (i) the factor analysis was performed on only five variables, which 
might easily have resulted in only one factor, even in the absence of common method bias, and (ii) we could 
have included several other variables that are based on data from the questionnaire in the analysis as well. Given 
that factor analysis resulted in multiple factors even under these extreme conditions, we are confident that our 
data are not subject to a common method bias. 
65 In STATA 7, this two-stage procedure can be executed automatically through the ‘treatreg’ command. If 
specified, this command also generates the values of lambda and adds them to the dataset. For the manual 
calculation of lambda in STATA, see Hamilton and Nickerson (2003). 
66 Robust standard errors are used because this two-stage procedure by definition produces a heteroskedastic 
error term in the performance model (Shaver, 1998). 
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approach is preferable to entering an interaction term between the planned degree of 
integration and the entry mode dummy. First, by splitting our sample we are able to include 
greenfield experience as a control variable in the greenfield subsample, and acquisition 
experience in the acquisition subsample, thus increasing the reliability of our findings. 
Second, splitting the sample allows the regression coefficients of the control variables to vary 
across the two subsamples. This may yield additional insights, especially with respect to the 
regression coefficient lambda, since this coefficient is difficult to interpret in the full sample 
(Shaver, 1998). Third, this approach avoids multicollinearity problems due to high 
correlations between the planned degree of integration and the entry mode dummy on the one 




Table 4.3 contains the descriptive statistics of all variables and their correlations. The 
correlations between the independent variables are low, except for those between the entry 
mode dummy and the correction term for self selection (r=0.79), firm size and international 
experience (r=0.50), and demand growth and economic conditions (r=0.47). However, the 
two largest values of the variance inflation factors of our full-sample regression model are 
only 5.85 and 4.67, which is considerably lower than Hair et al.’s (1998) multicollinearity 
threshold value of 10, and they are caused by the inevitable high correlation between our 
entry mode dummy and the correction term for self selection. 
Model 1 in table 4.4 provides an empirical test of hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2. Hypothesis 
1a stated that the performance of greenfield investments should be systematically better than 
that of acquisitions, while hypothesis 1b claimed the opposite. As a preliminary test of these 
competing hypotheses, we performed a simple t-test, which showed that the mean 
performance of greenfields is significantly lower than that of acquisitions (3.81 vs. 4.34, 
p<0.01, two tailed). The multivariate results of model 1 provide further evidence. The 
regression coefficient of entry mode is negative and significant (p<0.01), indicating that the 
initial performance of greenfields is systematically lower than that of acquisitions. 
Specifically, the value of the coefficient shows a performance difference of .85, which is 
quite substantial, given that the performance items were measured on a 7-point scale. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that higher planned degrees of integration should negatively 
affect initial subsidiary performance. Consistent with this hypothesis, the coefficient of the 
planned degree of integration is significantly negative at the 5% level in model 1, implying 




Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Performance 4.07 1.39             
2. Entry mode 0.51 0.50 -0.19            
3. Integration 2.80 0.89 -0.15 0.22           
4. Firm size 2,975,038 7,286,154 0.10 -0.05 -0.14          
5. International experience 26.02 41.81 0.11 -0.09 0.01 0.50         
6. Host-country experience 2.93 2.47 0.18 -0.20 -0.03 0.15 0.25        
7. Unrelated expansion 0.21 0.49 0.08 -0.13 -0.21 0.16 0.06 0.06       
8. JV 0.28 0.45 0.02 -0.16 -0.17 0.02 -0.09 -0.03 0.06      
9. Demand growth 4.61 1.36 0.60 0.04 -0.04 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.02 0.02     
10. Competition 4.42 1.46 -0.05 -0.12 -0.02 0.00 0.09 0.09 -0.08 0.00 -0.05    
11. Cultural distance 2.14 1.07 -0.01 0.30 0.07 0.10 0.04 -0.02 -0.08 0.12 0.14 -0.26   
12. Economic conditions 4.20 1.59 0.56 -0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.47 -0.04 -0.08  




Table 4.4: Impact of entry mode and planned degree of integration on foreign 
subsidiary performance 
 
Dependent variable: Subsidiary performance 
 






Entry mode (greenfield = 1) -0.85
(0.33)





















































































































    
Number of observations 210 108 102 
R-squared 0.52 0.46 0.59 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed test of the effect of entry mode because of 
competing hypotheses, all other tests are one tailed.  
 
† p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The results for the control variables are mixed, with some of them significantly 
affecting performance, and others having an insignificant effect. As expected, subsidiaries of 
firms with considerable host-country experience (p<0.1), and those facing high demand 
growth and favorable economic conditions perform better (p<0.001 for both variables). The 
significant effect of the regression coefficient of the correction for self selection (p<0.1) 
indicates that there are indeed unobservable factors influencing a firm’s entry mode choice 
that also influence subsequent subsidiary performance. However, it is difficult to interpret 
this self-selection effect, since its estimate is restricted to be the same for greenfields and 
acquisitions (Shaver, 1998). The effects of the other controls are insignificant. The 
insignificant effect of unrelated expansions is probably due to the fact that a large majority of 
the expansions in our sample (174 out of 210) were in the parents’ main line(s) of business. 
Models 2 and 3 in table 4.4 present the results for the greenfield and acquisition 
subsamples, respectively. Hypothesis 3 proposed that integration should hurt the performance 
of greenfields less than that of acquisitions because greenfields have lower integration costs. 
The results of model 2 and 3 support this contention: the regression coefficient of the planned 
degree of integration is insignificant and virtually zero for greenfields, and significantly 
negative for acquisitions (p<0.01). 
Turning to the control variables, we find that high demand growth and favorable 
economic conditions enhance the performance of both greenfields and acquisitions (p<0.001 
for both variables in both model 2 and 3), but that host-country experience only increases 
acquisition performance (p<0.05). The latter finding suggests that it is sensible for firms to 
have at least some business experience with a country before they make acquisitions there, as 
this enables them to manage these acquisitions more successfully, but that such experience 
does not contribute to the success of greenfield starts. Surprisingly, international experience 
has a significantly negative effect on the performance of greenfields (p<0.1). The correction 
term for self selection is only significant in the greenfield subsample (p<0.1), but – 
unexpectedly – its effect is positive, implying that subsidiaries of firms that actually chose to 
enter by greenfield have a lower performance than those of firms with equivalent observable 
characteristics, had they decided to enter by greenfield (cf. Shaver, 1998). That is, 
unobserved characteristics that lead firms to choose greenfields also affect the performance of 
these greenfields, but in a negative way. If the firms that chose an acquisition had opted for a 
greenfield investment instead, the performance of these greenfields would have exceeded that 
of the actual greenfields in the sample (cf. Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). The insignificant 
effects of greenfield and acquisition experience seem to indicate that firms do not learn from 
previous expansions of the same type, perhaps because each expansion has unique features, 







This paper tries to answer the following three questions: (1) Does the performance of 
greenfields and acquisitions differ systematically? (2) Does integration reduce subsidiary 
performance? and (3) Does integration have a differential effect on the performance of 
greenfields and acquisitions? 
With respect to the first question, we find that the initial performance of greenfields 
and acquisitions indeed differs systematically, with greenfields generally performing worse 
than acquisitions, even after controlling for self selection. This provides support for the 
arguments that greenfields suffer from a liability of newness while acquisitions have moved 
beyond this stage (Pennings et al., 1994), and that greenfield entry is more likely to lead to 
competitive responses than entry through acquisition (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Hennart and 
Park, 1993). The significantly positive effects of self selection in the full sample and in the 
greenfield subsample indicate that our sample firms made mistakes, and that it is mainly the 
ones choosing greenfields that did so, in the sense that some of them should have opted for an 
acquisition instead. However, even after controlling for these mistakes, we still find strong 
evidence that greenfields have a systematically lower initial performance than acquisitions. 
With respect to the second question, we find that the ex post initial performance of 
subsidiaries is lower when their parents intend ex ante to tightly integrate them. Assuming 
that firms usually carry out their intentions, this finding confirms those of the M&A literature 
that integrating acquisitions is difficult and usually results in lower performance. We are, to 
the best of our knowledge, the first to empirically validate this claim through a large-scale, 
multivariate study.  
Turning to the third question, we find that the effect of the intended degree of 
integration on subsidiary performance indeed varies between greenfields and acquisitions. 
Specifically, we find that integration significantly lowers the initial performance of 
acquisitions, but not that of greenfields. It can thus be concluded that the significantly 
negative effect of integration on subsidiary performance is driven by the negative 
performance effects associated with integrating acquisitions, and not by those associated with 
integrating greenfields. Our findings suggest that integrating greenfields is not a problem, 
presumably because they can be set up as desired by managers who share their parent’s 
values and vision (Hennart and Park, 1993), and who do not face existing operations, 
structures, and procedures, as in the case of acquisitions (Harzing, 2002). 
Given that (i) greenfields have a lower initial performance than acquisitions and (ii) 
integration reduces the initial performance of acquisitions but not that of greenfields, it 
becomes worthwhile to examine whether greenfields have a lower performance than 
acquisitions at all levels of integration, or whether they actually start to outperform 
acquisitions when the degree of integration becomes sufficiently high. Using the results of 
model 2 and 3, and holding all variables (including lambda) constant at their subsample 
mean, we find that greenfields start to outperform acquisitions when the planned degree of 
subsidiary integration exceeds 4.27, which is within the variable’s observed range of 1 to 5. It 
can thus be concluded that – all else equal – firms are generally better off choosing 
acquisitions, unless they desire a high degree of integration. The results of chapter 3 are in 
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line with this conclusion, as they indicated that firms that plan to grant their subsidiaries a 
high level of autonomy have a preference for acquisitions, but that those that plan to tightly 




Should we expect greenfield investments to be more or less profitable than acquisitions? 
Some authors have argued that acquisitions involve higher resource procurement, ownership, 
managerial control, and integration costs than greenfield investments, and hence that their 
performance should be worse. Others, on the other hand, have pointed out that greenfield 
investments are inherently more risky and suffer from a liability of newness, and that they 
should therefore perform less well than acquisitions. In short, the literature offers no clear 
theoretical predictions. Moreover, the empirical evidence is mixed, with some studies finding 
that greenfields perform better and others finding the reverse, and should be interpreted with 
care due to methodological limitations.  
In this paper we attempt to resolve this issue. On the theory side, we point out that one 
important variable affecting the initial performance of acquisitions is the extent to which the 
acquired unit needs to be integrated into the parent. Integration should reduce a subsidiary’s 
performance in all circumstances, but because greenfields are easier to integrate than 
acquisitions, initial attempts at integration should have particularly deleterious consequences 
for the performance of acquisitions. Hence, greenfields should initially perform better if a 
high degree of integration is needed, and acquisitions in the reverse case.  
Analyzing a sample of 210 foreign expansions by Dutch firms, and correcting for the 
fact that the choice of entry mode is endogeneously determined, we find that the initial 
performance of greenfields is systematically lower than that of acquisitions, that higher 
planned degrees of integration reduce subsidiary performance, and that this negative effect is 
much stronger for acquisitions than for greenfields. At high levels of intended integration, 
greenfields perform better than acquisitions. The main conclusion is that firms are generally 
better off in the short run choosing acquisitions, unless they plan to tightly integrate them, in 
which case greenfield investments are the more attractive entry mode. 
One important caveat is that this study focuses on a subsidiary’s initial performance, 
i.e. its performance during its first two years. We chose to focus on initial performance 
because it allows us to test the validity of all theoretical arguments, including those, such as 
the liability of newness, that predict mainly short-term performance. Furthermore, the 
respondents’ recollections of expansions made recently are more likely to be accurate than 
those made a long time ago. The downside of our approach is that we are unable to say 
whether these short-term effects persist or are reversed in the long term. An answer to this 





The variables included in our first-stage entry mode choice model are derived from previous empirical research 
on the determinants of a firm’s choice between a greenfield and an acquisition (for an overview, see chapter 2). 
The variables in the choice model that are also present in our performance models are described in section 4.4. 
A firm’s degree of diversification was measured through the number of 4-digit industry codes in which it 
operates. Firm type is a dummy with a value of 1 if the firm is into either services or wholesale trade, and 0 if it 
is into manufacturing. The remaining variables come from the questionnaire, and represent single items 
measured on a 7-point scale, except for the variable ‘host-government restrictions on acquisitions and incentives 
to abstain from them’, which is a two-item measure with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.66. 
 
Table A4.1: Results of the first-stage binary probit model of entry mode choice 
(greenfield = 1) 
 


















































































Host-government restrictions on acquisitions and incentives to abstain from them -0.23
(0.11)
* 











Number of observations 210 
Model Chi-squared 92.37*** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.32 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; † p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (one tailed) 










International business (IB) scholars have tried to explain the magnitude of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows between countries (e.g., Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2002; Sethi et al., 2003; Tuman and Emmert, 1999). Although these flows do not 
adequately capture aggregate foreign expansion activity, as home-country funds are only one 
of many possible ways of financing foreign expansions (Root, 1984; Hennart, 2000)68, such 
aggregate analyses are nevertheless useful because they generalize the individual experiences 
of many investment projects and add to our understanding of the pattern of investor’s 
reactions to various host-country characteristics (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002). One factor that 
is generally acknowledged to affect FDI flows is the cultural distance between home and host 
countries (Davidson, 1980; Molle and Morsink, 1991; Li and Guisinger, 1992; Loree and 
Guisinger, 1995; Sethi et al., 2003). Large cultural differences imply large dissimilarities in 
values, customs, behaviors, and business practices (Hofstede, 2001; Kogut and Singh, 1988), 
and these make it difficult to successfully manage affiliates in culturally distant countries. 
However, it is so far unclear how national cultural differences affect trade flows 
between countries. Although Beckerman in his seminal piece on the determinants of intra-
European trade flows already emphasized the importance of “psychic distance” (1956: 38), 
subsequent studies have only included dummy variables indicating whether the trading 
partners had a common dominant language and/or religion (Geraci and Prewo, 1977; 
Srivastava and Green, 1986; Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Frankel and Rose, 2002; 
Yeyati, 2003; De Groot et al., 2004). Such proxies, however, do not fully capture inter-
country differences in shared norms and values – the dominant definition of national cultural 
distance in the literature (e.g., Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hofstede, 2001). Moreover, these 
studies do not offer a well-developed theory of the relationship between national cultural 
distance and trade flows, limiting themselves to stating that countries with a common 
language and religion should engage in more trade. One important point that they overlook is 
that firms can also sell their products abroad through local (i.e., host-country) production, and 
that a theory of how cultural distance affects international trade flows must take this into 
account. 
We overcome these limitations of previous research by (i) developing a fully-fledged 
theory of the relationship between national cultural distance and trade flows that takes into 
account the alternative of local production, and (ii) using a cardinal measure that corresponds 
more closely to the concept of national cultural distance, i.e. the Kogut and Singh (1988) 
                                                 
67 This paper is the result of joint work with Sjoerd Beugelsdijk and Jean-François Hennart. 
68 For example, in 1990 more than 50% of the assets of U.S. firms’ foreign affiliates were financed with capital 
from abroad (Delapierre and Milelli, 1995, as cited in Hennart, 2000). 
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index. Specifically, we theorize that international trade flows initially increase with cultural 
distance, as firms first replace local production with exports, but that trade flows eventually 
start to decrease, as large cultural differences make trade unattractive as well. Analyzing a 
sample of bilateral merchandise trade flows between 100 countries over the 1990-1999 
period, and controlling for a variety of other variables that have been found to affect 
international trade levels, we find that the amount of bilateral trade between countries first 
increases and then decreases with national cultural distance.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines our 
theory of the impact of national cultural distance on bilateral trade flows. This results in the 
formulation of a single hypothesis. The methodological section that follows describes our 
data sources, the operationalization of our variables, and the statistical methods used to test 
the hypothesis. We then present our results, and end with our main conclusions, the 
limitations of this study, and some suggestions for future research. 
 
5.2. Theory and hypothesis 
 
The importance of trade in total international exchanges should not be underestimated. For 
example, the value of U.S. merchandise imports in 2001 was 1180 billion dollars (UNCTAD, 
2003), while the sales of foreign manufacturers’ U.S. affiliates in 2001 were ‘only’ 952 
billion dollars (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2003). As stated above, a well-developed 
theory of the relationship between national cultural distance and international trade flows is 
so far lacking. In this section we fill this gap in the literature by developing a rigorous theory 
of the relationship between these two concepts. 
 
5.2.1. Cultural distance and total bilateral sales 
 
There are two ways in which firms can sell in foreign markets: they can export their products, 
i.e. produce them at home and sell them (or have them sold) abroad, or they can produce and 
sell them locally, i.e. in the host country (Caves, 1996). This implies that the total amount of 
foreign sales consists of two components, i.e. sales through trade (i.e., exports) and sales 
through local production. 
In line with previous research, we define national cultural distance (henceforth, CD) as 
the degree to which the shared norms and values in one country differ from those in another 
(cf. Hofstede, 2001; Kogut and Singh, 1988). Everything else constant, we would expect the 
total amount of sales (through both trade and local production) between any pair of countries 
(i.e., total bilateral sales) to vary with the CD between them. This is because selling abroad, 
either through trade or through local manufacture, requires social interactions with locals who 
have culture-specific communication and negotiation styles (e.g., Adler, 1986; Adler and 
Graham, 1987; Campbell et al., 1988; Graham et al., 1988; Bandyopadhay and Robicheaux, 
1993; Hofstede, 2001). The greater the difference in norms and values between two countries, 
i.e. the larger the CD between them, the greater the differences in these communication and 
negotiation styles. These differences in turn lead to misunderstandings and conflicts, and 
hamper the pursuit of economic relations (Neal, 1998), thus reducing a firm’s foreign sales.  
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Analyzing questionnaire data on work-related values obtained from IBM employees 
working in 40 different countries, Hofstede (1980) identified four dimensions along which 
national cultures differ, viz. power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and 
masculinity, with each dimension representing a different response to a universal societal 
problem69 (Hofstede, 2001). Power distance refers to the extent to which people believe that 
power and status are distributed unequally and the extent to which they accept an unequal 
distribution of power as the proper way for social systems to be organized (Hofstede, 1980). 
In countries characterized by a high power distance, there is a general belief that there should 
be a clear-cut order in which everyone has a rightful place, while in low power-distance 
countries all people expect to have equal rights and the opportunity to change their position in 
society (Very et al., 1996). In firms, power distance reflects the amount of formal hierarchy, 
the degree of centralization, and the amount of participation in decision making (Newman 
and Nollen, 1996). 
Uncertainty avoidance refers to the extent to which people are threatened by uncertain, 
unknown, or unstructured situations (Hofstede, 1980). Low uncertainty-avoidance countries 
socialize their inhabitants into accepting uncertainty and ambiguity and not becoming upset 
by it. People from such countries tend to accept each day as it comes, take risks rather easily, 
do not work as hard, and are relatively tolerant of behavior and opinions different from their 
own because they do not feel threatened by them. People from high uncertainty-avoidance 
countries, on the other hand, are not very comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity, and 
tend to develop institutions that create security and reduce uncertainty. Within firms, 
uncertainty avoidance is manifested in clear and detailed plans, policies, and procedures that 
help employees cope with their discomfort with uncertain and unknown situations (Newman 
and Nollen, 1996). Firms in low uncertainty-avoidance countries, on the other hand, 
emphasize flexibility, with employees being receptive to change and willing to try new ways 
of working. Formal work rules are used as guidelines rather than constraints, and it is 
acceptable to deviate from them if this benefits the firm (Very et al., 1996). 
Individualism and its opposite, collectivism, refer to the degree to which a society 
emphasizes the role of the individual as opposed to that of the group. In individualistic 
societies the ties between individuals are loose, with people being expected to look after 
themselves and their immediate family only, while in collectivistic societies people from 
birth onwards are integrated in strong, cohesive in-groups, which protect them throughout 
their lifetime in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede, 1980). In firms, individualism 
is expressed in autonomy, individual responsibility for results, individual-level rewards, 
promotion of self-achievement, job specialization, and management by objectives, while 
collectivism is manifested in work-unit solidarity, team-based rewards, group work 
assignments, consensus decision making, and plans that take into consideration the health and 
well-being of employees, the community, and society (Newman and Nollen, 1996; Very et 
al., 1996). 
                                                 
69 Later research by Hofstede and Bond (1988) uncovered a fifth dimension along which national cultures differ, 




Masculinity and its counterpart, femininity, refer to the extent to which a society’s 
dominant values emphasize traditional masculine social values such as competitiveness, 
assertiveness, achievement, ambition, and the acquisition of money and other material 
possessions, as opposed to feminine social values such as nurturing, helping others, putting 
relationships with people before money, not showing off, and minding the quality of life 
(Hofstede, 1980; Very et al., 1996). In firms, this dimension is reflected in performance-
based opportunities for high earnings, recognition, advancement, and rewards in masculine 
countries, and management practices emphasizing the quality of interpersonal relationships 
and working conditions in more feminine countries (Newman and Nollen, 1996). 
Each of these four dimensions of national culture affects the way in which people 
communicate and negotiate (Hofstede 2001). Power distance affects the degree of 
centralization of control, the decision-making structure, and the importance of the status of 
negotiators, while uncertainty avoidance affects the tolerance for ambiguity and the trust in 
opponents who show unfamiliar behaviors, as well as the need for structure and ritual in 
negotiation processes. Collectivism influences the need for stable relationships between the 
interacting parties. In collectivist countries, the replacement of a negotiator by another 
requires that a new relationship be built before negotiations can continue, and mediators have 
an important role because they maintain a viable pattern of relationships that allows 
negotiators to discuss disagreements. Masculinity influences the need for ego-boosting 
behavior and the sympathy for the strong on the part of negotiators and their superiors, as 
well as the tendency to resolve disagreements through a show of force. In feminine countries 
conflicts tend to be resolved through compromises and consensus.  
These differences in communication and negotiation styles cause problems and raise 
the costs of selling abroad, because they lead to misunderstandings and misattributions of 
motives and intentions, which impedes smooth interactions (Hkansson and Johanson, 1988; 
Olie, 1996). This in turn causes negative feelings among the parties involved, such as 
uncertainty, confusion, helplessness, stress, discomfort, frustration, and hostility (Olie, 1996; 
Hofstede, 2001; Elsass and Veiga, 1994; Neal, 1998). These feelings can be subsumed under 
the term ‘acculturative stress’, which is the disruptive tension that is felt by the members a 
culture when they are required to interact with another culture (Very et al., 1996). 
In general, the larger the differences in communication and negotiation styles between 
the interacting parties, the greater the amount of acculturative stress (Berry, 1980; Very et al., 
1996), and hence the higher the chances that business relationships break down (Neal, 1998). 
As differences in communication and negotiation styles generally increase with CD, we 
would expect a negative relationship between CD and the total amount of bilateral sales. 
Specifically, the larger the CD between country x and y, the lower the total sales in country x 
by firms from country y, and vice versa. 
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5.2.2. Cultural distance and bilateral sales through local production 
 
Although we expect total bilateral sales (both those through trade and those through local 
production) to generally decrease with CD (as argued in section 5.2.1), sales through local 
production are likely to decrease faster than those through trade. This is because, compared to 
trade, local production usually requires closer interactions with a wider variety of local 
stakeholders such as employees, unions, suppliers, and government agencies (Hennart, 2000; 
Johanson and Vahlne, 1977).  Hence intercultural conflicts are more likely and more intense 
in case of local production than in case of trade. 
Moreover, the larger the CD between two countries, the greater the differences in their 
organizational and management practices (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Kostova and Roth, 2002). 
These differences make the transfer of home-country practices to production subsidiaries 
located in culturally dissimilar environments difficult and costly (Anderson and Gatignon, 
1986; Agarwal, 1994; Geringer et al., 1989; Barkema et al., 1997). Although firms could give 
up on transferring their home-country practices to their foreign production subsidiaries, and 
try to adopt the host-country’s prevailing practices instead, this would seriously reduce the 
competitiveness of these subsidiaries, because they would not be able to benefit from their 
parents’ competitive advantages. As a result, firms may find it difficult to successfully 
operate production facilities in culturally distant markets, but may still be able to serve such 
markets through exports (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). 
Another important difference between export and local production is that these two 
methods of servicing foreign customers involve different levels of risk and resource 
commitment. While export is often a low-risk alternative requiring limited financial and 
managerial resources, local production is generally a more risky enterprise that requires 
larger investments in physical and human resources (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992). Local 
production also requires substantial knowledge of local values, customs, and habits, which 
can often only be gained through experience, while export can be safely undertaken by firms 
with little experience of the target market, especially when local sales agents are used 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). 
It has frequently been argued that a larger CD leads firms to opt for entry modes 
requiring fewer resources (e.g., Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Root, 1998). More 
specifically, firms expanding into countries with an unknown culture and unfamiliar business 
practices tend to shy away from local production in favor of lower-involvement entry modes 
such as exporting (Dunning, 1993). Firms are generally unwilling to commit substantial 
resources to a production subsidiary located in a culturally distant market, as this would 
reduce their ability to withdraw from the market should the venture turn out to be 
unsuccessful (Hill et al., 1990; Kim and Hwang, 1992). Furthermore, since managers are 
usually not familiar, comfortable, or even in agreement with the values, behaviors and 
practices of cultures that are truly foreign to them, they perceive a higher level of uncertainty 
when entering cultural distant countries (Caves, 1996), and this leads them to avoid high-
commitment entry modes in those countries (Davidson, 1982; Root, 1998). 
The literature has provided evidence that a large CD leads firms to choose lower-
commitment entry modes (e.g., Arora and Fosfuri, 2000; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Kim and 
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Hwang, 1992; Kogut and Singh, 1988). The importance of CD as a barrier to local production 
is also illustrated by Kim and Kim (1993: 70), who found that Japanese managers rated 
“cultural differences” as the second most important obstacle to FDI in the U.S. (after “anti-
Japanese feelings among Americans”). Similarly, Edwards and Buckley (1998: 511) found 
that Australian firms chose to manufacture in the U.K. mainly because of the similarities in 
language, culture, history, society, and legal systems. All this suggests that local production is 
more sensitive to cultural differences than trade and hence that local production sales fall 
faster with CD than exports.  
 
5.2.3. Cultural distance and bilateral trade 
 
Given that (i) total foreign sales decrease with CD, (ii) such sales can be accomplished 
through either local production or trade, and (iii) sales through local production decrease 
faster with CD than those through trade, we can now determine the relationship between CD 
and the amount of trade between any pair of countries. We derive this relationship 
graphically, using figure 5.1. The upper part of this figure depicts the relationship between 
CD and foreign sales in a particular country (x) by firms from another country (y), keeping all 
other factors influencing these sales constant. Line A plots the total sales in country x by 
firms from country y (and vice versa) (through both local production and export) as a 
function of the CD between them, while line B plots this relationship for those sales due to 
local production in country x. Both lines have downward slopes, but – in line with our 
theoretical arguments – the slope of line B is more negative than that of line A, as sales 
through local production decrease faster with CD than those through export. The difference 
between line A and B represents the total value of the exports to country x by firms from 
country y (and vice versa) as a function of CD. The figure shows that this value first increases 
with CD, as the difference between line A and B initially becomes larger, but that it gradually 
starts to decrease, as line A continues to decrease while line B eventually becomes flat. The 
lower part of figure 5.1 illustrates this graphically. It shows an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between CD and the amount of bilateral trade. We thus hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis: The relationship between CD and the amount of trade between country pairs is 
curvilinear, with the amount of bilateral trade first increasing and then decreasing with CD. 
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Figure 5.1: Graphical derivation of the relationship between cultural distance and 








Bilateral trade. Following Rose (2004), our dependent variable is the log of the amount of 
merchandise trade in constant dollars between pairs of countries, i.e. the sum of their 
merchandise exports and imports. Data for this variable come from IMF’s Direction of Trade 
Statistics and cover 178 countries over the period 1990-1999. 
 It should be noted these data include trade in raw materials and components used as 
inputs to local production, while we theorize trade and local production to be perfect 
substitutes as a function of cultural distance. This type of trade should therefore ideally, but 
cannot practically, be excluded. However, since it is linked to local production, it will also 
fall with cultural distance, and hence its inclusion in the trade figures will not change the 
shape of the relationship between cultural distance and trade derived above. 
In line with our theory, we do exclude trade in services, which comprised 
approximately 20% of total worldwide trade in 2002 (UNCTAD, 2003). We do so because 
service firms often cannot replace local production by trade when they are faced with 
substantial cultural differences, as so-called ‘soft’ services cannot be exported and hence 
require local production (Erramilli, 1990). 
Chapter 5 
80 
National cultural distance. We measured CD by the Kogut and Singh (1988) index, 
which uses Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) country scores for his four dimensions of national 
culture. We were able to obtain these scores for exactly 100 of the countries for which we had 
trade data. These countries are listed in table 5.1. 
The Kogut and Singh (1988) index is based on the differences in these scores between 
two countries. These differences are corrected for differences in the variance of each 
dimension and then arithmetically averaged. Algebraically: 
 
where CDxy is the cultural distance between country x and country y, Iix is country x’s score 
on the ith cultural dimension, Iiy is country y’s score on this dimension, and Vi is the variance 
of the score of the dimension. 
While acknowledging its limitations (e.g., Shenkar, 2001), we consider the Kogut and 
Singh index to be the best measure of CD available, as the scores on Hofstede’s dimensions 
are available for a large number of countries and their validity has been confirmed in many 
studies (see Van Oudenhoven, 2001 and Sφndergaard, 1994 for an overview of earlier 
replications), suggesting that they can reliably be used to determine the CD between 
countries. Although other scholars (e.g., Schwartz, 1994) have more recently developed 
similar national-culture frameworks to classify countries, these frameworks have so far not 
been subject to extensive validation and their dimension scores are only available for a 
limited number of countries. Using another framework would thus reduce both the internal 
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Table 5.1: Countries included in the sample 
 
1. United States 













15. Japan  
16. Finland  
17. Greece 






24. New Zealand 





30. Costa Rica 
31. Dom Republic 
32. Ecuador 
33. El Salvador 
34. Guatemala 
















51. Saudi Arabia 
52. Syria 





58. Sri Lanka 
59. Hong Kong  
60. India 
61. Indonesia 















77. Sierra Leone 
78. Namibia 
79. Tanzania 
























Control variables. International economists have successfully used so-called “gravity 
models” to explain international trade flows (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Frankel and 
Rose, 2002; Martinez-Zarzoso, 2003; Rose, 2004), which have provided some of the clearest 
and most robust empirical results in international economics (Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995). 
These models postulate that the amount of trade between two countries is positively related to 
their combined size and level of economic development, and negatively to transport costs, 
with the latter usually proxied by variables such as the geographic distance between the two 
countries, their combined surface areas (both associated with higher transport costs), and the 
existence of a shared land border (which should lower transport costs). We use these and 
other variables traditionally included in these models as control variables. Specifically, we 
include the log of the product of country x and y’s real GDPs and real GDPs per capita (log 
GDPxGDPy and log GDPpcxGDPpcy, respectively), the log of their geographic distance, the 
log of the product of their surface areas, a dummy with a value of 1 if x and y share a land 
border, a dummy with a value of 1 if x was ever colonized by y or vice versa, a dummy with a 
value of 1 if both have one or more official languages in common, a dummy with a value of 1 
if both belong to the same regional trade agreement (ANZCERTA, ASEAN, CACM, 
CARICOM, EU, MERCOSUR, NAFTA, SPARTECA, or US-Israel FTA), a dummy with a 
value of 1 if both are WTO members, and two dummies with a value of 1 if either x or y is 
from an unstable region (i.e., the Middle East or Sub-Saharan Africa). The GDP data come 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the Penn World Tables, and IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics. The data on regional trade agreements and WTO 
membership were obtained from the website of the World Trade Organization, and those on 
the remaining variables from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook. 
Linder (1961) proposes that countries with similar levels of per capita income engage 
in more trade than those with different per capita income levels, as consumer preferences are 
similar across income levels. This suggests that the relationship between the combined GDP 
per capita and the amount of bilateral trade is U-shaped, with countries that are both poor 
(resulting in a low value for log GDPpcxGDPpcy) or both rich (resulting in a high value for 
log GDPpcxGDPpcy) trading more than country pairs consisting of a poor and a rich country 
(resulting in a medium value for log GDPpcxGDPpcy). We therefore also include the squared 




We did three types of runs. We first used OLS regression analysis with standard errors that 
are robust to clustering by country pairs to estimate a model with the amount of bilateral 
merchandise trade in the most recent year, usually 1999, as the dependent variable70. Using 
the same technique, we then estimated a model with the average amount of bilateral trade 
between each country pair over the 1990-1999 period as the dependent variable. Finally, we 
                                                 
70 When 1999 data were not available, we used data from a previous year, usually 1998 or 1997. 
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used GLS regression to estimate a random-effects panel model for the same time period71. All 




Table 5.2 gives the descriptive statistics of all variables for the model with the amount of 
bilateral trade in the most recent year as the dependent variable. Correlations between the 
independent variables are typically moderate to low, implying little multicollinearity72. 
Table 5.3 presents the results of the three regression models. We find strong support 
for our hypothesis that the amount of bilateral trade first increases and then decreases with 
CD. In line with this hypothesis, the regression coefficient of CD is positive and significant in 
all three models (p<0.001), while that of CD squared is consistently negative and significant 
(p<0.001), indicating that countries initially engage in more trade when cultural differences 
become larger, but eventually start to trade less. In model 1 the positive effect of CD becomes 
negative at a value of approximately –0.21 / (2 x –0.02) = 5.3, which is within the variable’s 
observed range, given that its maximum value is 12.673. F-tests (for model 1 and 2) and a 
Wald test (for model 3) showed that adding the two CD variables to the control variables 
significantly increases the explanatory power of all three models (p<0.01). 
In line with previous studies in international economics, we find that large country 
pairs (log GDPxGDPy) engage in significantly more trade (p<0.001 in all three models), and 
that transport costs – proxied by log distance, log AreaxAreay, and shared border – have a 
negative effect on trade flows (p<0.001 for all three variables in all three models)74. In 
addition, pairs of countries with a former colonial relationship, at least one common official 
language, and shared WTO membership tend to trade more (p<0.001 for all three variables in 
all three models, except for ‘both in WTO’ in model 2 (p<0.01)). The two regional dummies 
indicate that countries trade less if one of the partners is from an unstable region, although 
their effects are not always significant. 
The results of model 1 and 2 indicate that countries belonging to the same regional 
trade agreement do not engage in significantly more trade than those that do not, although the 
effect of the variable becomes significant in model 3 (p<0.01). A more detailed analysis 
shows that the insignificant effect in model 1 and 2 is due to the fact that the various trade 
agreements included in our dummy have differential effects, with most of them having a 
positive effect on trade, some (NAFTA and MERCOSUR) an insignificant effect, and the EU 
a negative one. Although this may seem surprising, as all trade agreements should have 
reduced the costs of trade, it actually suggests that more advanced agreements such as the EU 
have reduced the costs of local production even more. 
 
                                                 
71 Because our measure of CD is constant over time (cf. Hofstede, 1980, 2001), we could not estimate a fixed-
effects panel model. 
72 All variance inflation factors, except for those of log GDPpcxGDPpcy and its squared term, were lower than 
Hair et al.’s (1998) cutoff value of 10, indicating that we do not have serious multicollinearity problems. 
Excluding (log GDPpcxGDPpcy)
2 from our models did not change our results. 
73 In model 2 and 3 the CD-trade relationship peaks at CD values of 5.4 and 6.0, respectively. 
74 An alternative explanation for the positive effect of shared border is that people from neighboring countries 
are more familiar with each other’s cultures and therefore engage in more trade.  
 
 
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for model 1 
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Log trade 11.05 3.40             
2. Log GDPxGDPy 49.31 2.66 0.81            
3. Log GDPpcxGDPpcy 16.45 2.11 0.52 0.56           
4. Log distance 8.15 0.85 -0.25 0.05 -0.09          
5. Log AreaxAreay 24.24 2.96 0.25 0.45 -0.24 0.19         
6. Shared border 0.03 0.16 0.19 0.05 -0.00 -0.37 0.06        
7. Former colony 0.01 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.07       
8. Common language 0.16 0.37 0.04 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.08 0.17      
9. Regional trade agreement 0.03 0.16 0.26 0.20 0.22 -0.28 -0.00 0.16 0.04 0.02     
10. Both in WTO 0.64 0.48 0.23 0.23 0.32 0.11 -0.11 -0.02 0.05 0.14 0.11    
11. x or y Middle Eastern 0.21 0.41 -0.12 -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.09 -0.45   
12. x or y Sub Saharan 0.19 0.39 -0.30 -0.27 -0.43 0.11 0.16 -0.06 -0.02 0.17 -0.08 0.10 -0.11  
13. Cultural distance 2.07 1.62 0.18 0.20 0.33 0.09 -0.07 -0.09 0.01 -0.13 0.02 0.15 -0.23 -0.16 
 
  
Table 5.3: Results of regression analyses 
 
Dependent variable: Log of bilateral merchandise trade volume 
 
Variable 
 Model 1: 








Intercept -26.44 (1.39)** -22.36 (2.27)** -10.25 (0.83)** 
Log GDPxGDPy 1.06 (0.02)** 1.03 (0.02)** 0.95 (0.02)** 
Log GDPpcxGDPpcy -0.50 (0.15)* -1.13 (0.26)** -1.35 (0.08)** 
(Log GDPpcxGDPpcy)2 0.01 (0.004)* 0.04 (0.008)** 0.03 (0.003)** 
Log distance -1.09 (0.03)** -1.15 (0.03)** -1.21 (0.03)** 
Log AreaxAreay -0.06 (0.01)** -0.06 (0.01)** -0.07 (0.01)** 
Shared border 0.77 (0.16)** 0.75 (0.18)** 0.58 (0.17)** 
Former colony 0.53 (0.15)** 0.58 (0.15)** 1.12 (0.22)** 
Common language 0.91 (0.08)** 0.75 (0.07)** 1.05 (0.07)** 
Regional trade agreement 0.03 (0.15) 0.12 (0.15) 0.21 (0.08)* 
Both in WTO 0.38 (0.07)** 0.21 (0.07)* 0.39 (0.03)** 
Country x or y Middle Eastern  -0.19 (0.08) -0.19 (0.08) -0.33 (0.07)** 
Country x or y Sub Saharan -0.76 (0.09)** -0.45 (0.09)** -1.83 (0.07)** 
Cultural distance 0.21 (0.04)** 0.30 (0.04)** 0.64 (0.04)** 
(Cultural distance)2 -0.02 (0.005)** -0.03 (0.005)** -0.05 (0.006)** 
    
N 4,542 4,542 33,975 
R-squared 0.76 0.77 0.61 
F-value 1011.15** 1045.19**  
Wald Chi-squared   12097.32** 
 




We also find strong empirical support for Linder’s (1961) proposition. Consistent with 
his prediction, the coefficient of log GDPpcxGDPpcy is significantly negative, while that of 
its squared term is significantly positive in all three models, indicating that trade flows 
between country pairs with similar per capita income levels are larger than those between 
country pairs with different income levels. 
 
5.5. Conclusions, limitations, and suggestions 
 
This paper analyzes the effects of national cultural differences on bilateral merchandise trade 
flows. We hypothesize and consistently find an inverted U-shaped relationship between CD 
and the amount of trade between country pairs, with trade first increasing and then decreasing 
with CD. This suggests that firms increasingly replace local production with trade to serve 
culturally more distant countries, presumably because they fear the high costs and risks 
associated with local production in such countries, but that trade gradually becomes more 
difficult at higher levels of cultural distance as well, as the communication and negotiation 
styles of trading partners become too diverse to successfully manage international trade. 
These findings are not only relevant for international business, but may also have 
implications for international economics. Scholars in this field have typically explained trade 
and FDI patterns by inter-country differences in relative factor endowments and hence 
comparative costs (e.g., Amiti and Wakelin, 2003; Markusen, 2002; for an overview of 
earlier work, see Caves, 1996: 36-45). However, their conceptualization of costs may be 
incomplete, as our study suggest that national cultural differences also affect the costs of 
trade and local production, and – perhaps even more importantly – that this effect varies 
across these two methods of serving foreign markets.  
One limitation of our study is that although we argue that local production sales 
decrease faster with cultural distance than exports, and although our findings suggest that this 
is indeed the case, we do not test this assertion explicitly. Doing so would require data on the 
sales of MNEs’ foreign production affiliates, which – to the best of our knowledge – is only 
available for a small number of developed countries. 
Another limitation is that we implicitly assume that the impact of CD on trade levels is 
the same for trade flows from country x to country y as for trade flows from y to x. However, 
it may be easier for Chinese firms to export to the U.S. than vice versa (cf. Shenkar, 2001). 
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to separate these trade flows. 
A final limitation is that although our final sample covers 100 countries, we were 
nevertheless forced to exclude a substantial number of countries (most notably, Taiwan) due 
to missing recent trade and/or cultural data. However, we have no reason to believe that our 
sample is biased in any way, and that adding additional countries would substantially change 
our results, since our sample (see table 5.1) seems to be representative for the full population 
of countries and includes all major economies. We thus expect our results to be generalizable 
to the countries not present in our sample. 
Whereas this paper focused on the effect of cultural differences on aggregate trade 
levels, future research may try to shed light on the potential impact of institutional 
differences. Globerman and Shapiro (2003) and Bevan et al. (2004) recently found that FDI 
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inflows are smaller in countries with poorly-developed institutions. Since the enforcement of 
property rights and the adherence to trade contracts with foreign exporters varies significantly 
between countries (Zhang et al., 2003), it seems worthwhile to perform a similar analysis for 
international trade flows. According to Xu and Shenkar (2002), firms will choose low-
commitment modes (such as export) when the target country has an institutional system that 
is very different from that of their home country, but will opt for high-commitment ones (i.e., 
local production facilities) when the target-country system is more similar. This suggests that 
it is not the absolute quality level of the host-country’s institutional environment that 
determines the volume of trade and/or local production sales, but rather the difference in 











This final chapter contains the main conclusions of my doctoral dissertation. In the next 
section I will summarize its most important contributions and findings. I will then offer some 
suggestions for future research.  
 
6.2. Contributions and findings 
 
As stated in section 1.4, the main goal of this dissertation is to increase our scientific 
understanding of the determinants of foreign entry mode choices and the subsequent 
performance of these entry modes, with a special emphasis on the role of national cultural 
distance and the planned degree of subsidiary autonomy. The dissertation has substantially 
increased our understanding of these issues by providing several theoretical and 
methodological advancements. 
Chapters 2 to 4 all focus on an MNE’s establishment mode choice, i.e. greenfield 
investment or acquisition. Although chapter 2 makes clear that there has been abundant 
empirical research on the determinants of this choice, it also clearly shows that this research 
has its limitations. For example, it argues that many scholars have paid too little attention to 
the choice of the most appropriate research design, and that this has often forced them to omit 
important variables, resulting in divergent findings. As such, chapter 2 shows that research in 
this area can be greatly improved, and it offers a number of theoretical and methodological 
suggestions for doing so. 
One of these suggestions is to examine the moderating effect of the planned degree of 
subsidiary autonomy on the relationship between national cultural distance and an MNE’s 
establishment mode choice, which is done in chapter 3. Its main theoretical contribution is the 
notion that the effect of cultural distance on the likelihood of a greenfield is not consistently 
positive, as previous research has argued, but dependent on the planned degree of subsidiary 
autonomy, with this effect being significantly weaker at high levels of planned autonomy. 
This is because post-acquisition integration difficulties in culturally distant countries are 
considerably reduced if acquired units are allowed to operate autonomously, which makes 
acquisitions in such countries more attractive. We also argue that the planned degree of 
subsidiary autonomy has a direct effect on an MNE’s establishment mode choice, with MNEs 
planning to grant their subsidiaries little autonomy preferring greenfields to facilitate 
integration (Hennart and Park, 1993), and those planning to grant them much autonomy 
preferring acquisitions to obtain the knowledge needed to be locally responsive (Harzing, 
2002). Avoiding the methodological pitfalls identified in chapter 2 by choosing a research 
design that allows for sufficient variation in cultural distance and by carefully controlling for 
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a variety of other firm, industry, and country-level variables affecting an MNE’s 
establishment mode choice, we find strong empirical support for both hypotheses. 
Chapter 3 also examines the direct and indirect effect of the planned degree of 
subsidiary autonomy, but now on a subsidiary’s ex post performance. Specifically, it finds 
that increases in the planned degree of integration reduce a subsidiary’s initial performance, 
as tight integration increases the likelihood and intensity of inter-firm conflicts (Buono and 
Bowditch, 1989; Datta, 1991; Elsass and Veiga, 1994), but that this effect is much stronger 
for acquisitions than for greenfields, as the former come with an established workforce and 
culture, and existing operations (Hennart and Park, 1993; Harzing, 2002). We also provide 
methodological advances by being the first to follow Shaver’s (1998) suggestion to correct 
for entry-mode self-selection and by being the first to use a multi-item perceptual 
performance measure. 
Moreover, following another suggestion made in chapter 2, both chapter 3 and 4 rely 
heavily on survey data, while virtually all previous studies have exclusively relied on 
secondary data. The advantage of our approach is that we can achieve a higher degree of 
correspondence with the concepts underlying our variables by carefully designing and 
formulating our survey questions. This is especially important for the planned degree of 
subsidiary autonomy, as it is very difficult, if not impossible, to properly measure this key 
concept through secondary data sources. 
Chapter 5, on the relationship between national cultural distance and bilateral trade 
flows, has a different unit of analysis, i.e. country pairs rather than foreign subsidiaries, but 
also deals with the choice between different foreign entry modes, namely that between export 
and host-country production. It advances and integrates research in international economics 
(IE) and international business (IB) in various ways. Its main contribution to both fields is 
that it is the first study to develop a fully-fledged theory of the effect of cultural distance on 
the amount of bilateral merchandise trade. The chapter also advances the field of IE by 
introducing a novel – although admittedly still imperfect – measure of cultural distance 
popular in IB, i.e. the Kogut and Singh (1988) index, and by showing that cultural differences 
also affect the costs of trade and local production, thus broadening the traditional IE cost 
concept. Another contribution to IB is that we use a gravity model originating from IE to test 
the hypothesized inverted U-shaped relationship between cultural distance and bilateral trade 
flows. Analyzing a sample of bilateral merchandise trade flows between 100 countries during 
the period 1990-1999 through several statistical methods, we consistently find strong 




Although this dissertation makes a number of clear contributions, there are also some issues 
that require further research. First and foremost, I strongly recommend IB scholars to develop 
new measures of cultural distance. Although this recommendation has been made frequently 
in recent years (e.g., Shenkar, 2001), the IB field so far has made little progress in this area. 
For reasons of data availability and comparability to previous research, chapters 3 to 5 all use 
the widely-accepted Kogut and Singh (1988) index based on Hofstede (1980) to measure the 
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cultural distance between countries. However, this measure has a number of conceptual and 
methodological limitations in the form of “hidden assumptions that largely go unnoticed but 
are not supported by either logic or empirical evidence (Shenkar, 2001: 522). The most 
important assumptions are (1) that the cultural distance from country x to country y is the 
same as that from y to x, (2) that this distance is constant over time, (3) that it has a linear 
impact on ex ante entry mode choice and ex post subsidiary performance, (4) that it is the 
only dimension of distance that matters, (5) that its effect is solely detrimental, (6) that there 
is no variation in culture within a country, neither in national nor in organizational culture, 
and (7) that the difference in the scores on each of Hofstede’s (1980) four dimensions of 
national culture is equally important. Unfortunately, none of these assumptions is supported 
by the literature, neither theoretically nor empirically, and their validity can therefore be 
questioned (Shenkar, 2001). 
Future research should try to develop alternatives that overcome (some of) the above 
limitations and use these to replicate the empirical tests performed in this dissertation. These 
alternative measures can be based on both more recent secondary data sources (e.g., 
Schwartz, 1994) and managerial perceptions, depending on the research question. For 
example, strategic decisions such as entry mode choices are made by managers and are 
therefore probably best explained by their subjective perception of the cultural distance to the 
host country (Boyd et al., 1993), as opposed to some objective estimate. The ex post outcome 
of such decisions in terms of performance, on the other hand, is more likely to be explained 
by objective cultural distance measures based on secondary data, as these measures are 
assumed to accurately represent – or at least proxy for – the ‘true’ extent of cultural 
differences between countries (Shenkar, 2001). These new measures could also include other 
dimensions of distance correlated with cultural distance, such as the political, geographic, and 
economic distance between countries (Ghemawat, 2001). 
Second, although all three empirical chapters of this dissertation look at the effect of 
cultural distance, chapter 4 only includes the Kogut and Singh (1988) index as a control 
variable and finds its effect to be insignificant. This may be because the effect of cultural 
distance on a subsidiary’s performance is similar to its effect on an MNE’s establishment 
mode choice as examined in chapter 3, i.e. dependent on the degree of subsidiary autonomy. 
That is, differences in national culture may reduce a foreign subsidiary’s performance, but 
only if the subsidiary is tightly integrated into the MNE parent. If the subsidiary is granted a 
considerable degree of autonomy instead, cultural differences are unlikely to harm its 
performance because there is little interaction with the MNE parent (Hofstede, 2001; Neal, 
1998; Olie, 1996). In fact, in line with one of Shenkar’s (2001) observations, differences in 
national culture may even be beneficial in this case, especially in case of an acquisition, as 
the acquired unit gains access to the MNE’s country-specific organizational and management 
practices and can carefully select and adopt those that it considers to be most useful 
(Morosini et al., 1998), without being forced to implement all of them, as is usually the case 
when an acquired unit is tightly integrated (Pablo, 1994). Future research may shed more 
light on this issue. 
Finally, even though their research interests are partly overlapping, the fields of IE and 
IB so far have been two separate disciplines coexisting rather isolated from one another. I 
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therefore encourage scholars from both disciplines to bridge the gap between them by 
introducing theories, measures, and models originating from either discipline into the other, 
as was done in chapter 5 of this dissertation. Such mutual knowledge exchanges should 
advance both fields and should contribute to our scientific understanding of the relationships 
between various micro and macro-level phenomena in international settings. This dissertation 
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(SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
 
 
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit vier artikelen over buitenlandse toetredingsvormen. Een 
buitenlandse toetredingsvorm kan worden omschreven als een institutioneel arrangement dat 
het voor een onderneming mogelijk maakt om haar producten, technologie, menselijke 
vaardigheden, management of andere middelen in een ander land te exploiteren (Root, 1998). 
Er bestaan veel verschillende toetredingsvormen, zoals licentie- en franchiseovereenkomsten, 
ruilhandel, export, strategische allianties, joint ventures, 100% dochterondernemingen, 
greenfield investments en overnames. Sommige van deze toetredingsvormen vereisen 
zogenaamde directe buitenlandse investeringen van ondernemingen. Ondernemingen die 
zulke investeringen hebben gedaan, worden multinationals genoemd. Multinationals bezitten 
en hebben zeggenschap over waardetoevoegende activiteiten in meerdere landen (Dunning, 
1993) en hebben werknemers in het buitenland (Hennart, 2000). 
De buitenlandse toetredingsvormen die in dit proefschrift centraal staan, zijn greenfield 
investments, overnames en – in mindere mate – export. Een greenfield investment, of 
kortweg greenfield, is een investering door een multinational in een nieuwe buitenlandse 
dochteronderneming die van de grond af aan moeten worden opgebouwd, hetzij door de 
multinational zelf, hetzij met behulp van één of meerdere (lokale) partners die een deel van 
de aandelen van de dochter bezitten. In het geval van een overname daarentegen koopt een 
multinational (een deel van) de aandelen van een bestaande buitenlandse onderneming. 
Zowel greenfields als overnames zijn vormen van directe buitenlandse investeringen. 
Export, tenslotte, kan op verschillende manieren plaatsvinden, te weten direct van de 
exporterende onderneming naar haar buitenlandse klanten, indirect door middel van 
verkoopagenten of distributeurs die in het binnen- of buitenland zijn gevestigd, of door 
middel van een buitenlandse verkoopvestiging die eigendom is van de exporterende 
onderneming (Albaum et al., 2002; Bell, 1996). In het laatste geval laat de exporterende 
onderneming haar producten naar haar buitenlandse verkoopvestiging verschepen en worden 
deze aldaar verkocht. 
De algemene doelstelling van dit proefschrift is het verder ontwikkelen van het 
onderzoek naar de bovengenoemde buitenlandse toetredingsvormen. Meer specifiek is het 
belangrijkste doel om de wetenschappelijke kennis van de determinanten van de keuze tussen 
deze toetredingsvormen en van hun daaropvolgende prestaties te vergroten. De nadruk ligt 
hierbij op de rol van cultuurverschillen tussen landen en op de geplande mate van autonomie 
voor buitenlandse dochterondernemingen, aangezien deze factoren tot op heden onvoldoende 
of in het geheel niet in verband zijn gebracht met buitenlandse toetredingsvormen en hun 
prestaties. 
Het eerste artikel van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 2) geeft een kritisch overzicht van het 
bestaande empirische onderzoek naar de factoren die de keuze van een multinational tussen 
een greenfield en een overname beïnvloeden. De reden voor dit artikel is dat het na bijna 25 
jaar onderzoek nog steeds niet duidelijk is welke factoren deze keuze precies beïnvloeden, 
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aangezien eerdere onderzoeksresultaten vaak tegenstrijdig waren. In het artikel identificeren 
we de belangrijkste redenen voor deze tegenstrijdigheden en doen we suggesties om 
toekomstig onderzoek op dit gebied te verbeteren. 
Het tweede artikel (hoofdstuk 3) onderzoekt de invloeden van de cultuurafstand tussen 
landen, de geplande mate van autonomie voor een buitenlandse dochteronderneming, en de 
interactie tussen deze twee factoren op de keuze van een multinational tussen een greenfield 
en een overname. Eerdere studies hebben beweerd dat multinationals de voorkeur geven aan 
greenfields in landen met een hele andere cultuur, omdat grote cultuurverschillen het moeilijk 
maken om overgenomen dochterondernemingen te integreren in de moedermaatschappij. 
Deze studies vonden hier echter niet altijd empirisch bewijs voor. Wij stellen dat dit komt 
doordat de problemen die gepaard gaan met het integreren van dochterondernemingen die 
zijn overgenomen in landen met een hele andere cultuur aanmerkelijk kleiner zijn als 
multinationals deze dochterondernemingen veel autonomie verlenen. In zulke gevallen stijgt 
de kans dat multinationals in landen met een hele andere cultuur voor overnames kiezen. 
We toetsen deze bewering op een steekproef van 246 investeringen door Nederlandse 
multinationals in 52 landen en corrigeren hierbij voor een aantal andere factoren die de keuze 
tussen een greenfield en een overname beïnvloeden. We vinden bewijs dat een grote 
cultuurafstand er toe leidt dat multinationals voor greenfields kiezen, maar dat deze relatie 
significant zwakker is als ze van plan zijn om hun buitenlandse dochterondernemingen veel 
autonomie te verlenen. Tevens vinden we bewijs dat, gegeven een zekere cultuurafstand, 
multinationals die van plan zijn om hun dochterondernemingen weinig autonomie te verlenen 
een voorkeur voor greenfields hebben en dat dit met name geldt voor multinationals die van 
plan zijn om hun dochterondernemingen weinig autonomie op het gebied van hun 
productieactiviteiten te verlenen. 
In het derde artikel (hoofdstuk 4) onderzoeken en vergelijken we de prestaties van 
greenfields en overnames. We doen dit omdat het beperkte aantal eerdere studies op dit 
gebied verschillende theoretische argumenten heeft gebruikt om hun tegenstrijdige 
voorspellingen te onderbouwen en ze tegenstrijdige onderzoeksresultaten hebben geboekt, 
waarschijnlijk als gevolg van methodologische beperkingen. In het artikel analyseren we een 
steekproef van 210 buitenlandse investeringen door Nederlandse multinationals en corrigeren 
we voor deze beperkingen. We vinden bewijs dat greenfields in het algemeen slechter 
presteren dan overnames, maar dat greenfields het beter doen dan overnames als hun 
moedermaatschappijen van plan zijn om hen weinig autonomie te verlenen. 
Het vierde en laatste artikel (hoofdstuk 5) onderzoekt de invloed van de cultuurafstand 
tussen landen op hun hoeveelheid bilaterale handel in goederen. We stellen (i) dat 
ondernemingen hun producten op twee manieren in het buitenland kunnen verkopen, te weten 
door middel van handel en door middel van lokale productie in het buitenland, (ii) dat de 
cultuurafstand tussen landen een sterker negatief effect heeft op buitenlandse verkopen door 
middel van lokale productie dan op buitenlandse verkopen door middel van handel en (iii) dat 
dit resulteert in een relatie tussen cultuurafstand en bilaterale handelsstromen die de vorm 
heeft van een omgekeerde U. We analyseren een steekproef van bilaterale handelsstromen 
van goederen tussen 100 landen in de periode 1990-1999 en corrigeren hierbij voor de 
traditionele variabelen die internationale handelsstromen beïnvloeden, zoals de 
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gecombineerde grootte en het gecombineerde welvaartsniveau van de handelspartners, en hun 
geografische afstand. We vinden bewijs dat de hoeveelheid bilaterale handel tussen landen 
inderdaad eerst toeneemt met hun cultuurafstand en vervolgens afneemt. 
